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ABSTRACT
Within the last two decades, India has not only enacted 
specific legislation on environmental protection but has 
also virtually created a new fundamental right to a clean 
environment in the Constitution. The models and methods 
adopted in the Indian context appear, at first sight, 
similar to those in other common law systems. Yet, there are 
many subtle differences which have changed the structure and 
content of legal development in India. Indian environmental 
jurisprudence brings out the unique characteristics of a new 
legal order which has been gradually established in India.
The distinguishing nature of this jurisprudence, as 
this thesis shows in detail, has three interconnected 
elements. First, the nature of the new Indian constitutional 
law regime accords greater importance to public concerns 
than protecting private interests. Current Indian 
jurisprudence shows an increased assertion of public 
accountability by enlarging the domain of public law. This 
has created new dimensions of justice based on a new public 
law rationale which reacts constructively to established 
common law models.
Secondly, this jurisprudential development reflects 
certain aspects of Indian legal culture, through implicit 
and explicit reliance on autochthonous values and concepts
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of law, encapsulated in the Indian juristic postulate of 
dharma. The new developments reflect distinct elements of 
Indian dharmic legal culture, which are markedly different 
from common law postulates evolved out of an 
individualistic, property-based private law culture.
Thirdly, the emerging Indian environmental 
jurisprudence bears testimony to the activist role of the 
Indian judiciary which has also had a significant impact in 
many areas other than environmental law. In short, the 
development of environmental jurisprudence in India 
manifests neo-dharmic jurisprudence in postmodern public 
law. It accommodates ideas currently voiced by experts 
around the world for protecting the environment, in forms 
modified by the legal culture of India.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The focus of the study
The development of environmental jurisprudence in India may 
appear, at first sight, similar to what we see in other 
common law countries. Yet, a closer analysis reveals that 
India has been developing a form of environmental 
jurisprudence which is significantly different from other 
common law systems. In fact, Indian environmental 
jurisprudence brings out the unique characteristics of the 
new legal order which has been gradually established in 
India during the late 197 0s and throughout the 1980s and 
early 1990s.
India not only enacted various specific laws to control 
environmental pollution, but has also incorporated 
significant provisions for the protection of the environment 
into its Constitution.1 Within the last two decades, the 
development of environmental jurisprudence in India, 
following these constitutional law changes, has been 
remarkable in the sense that it has led to the virtual 
creation of a fundamental right to a clean environment in 
Indian law. This forms part of the public law regime 
established by the Constitution and appears to be based not 
only on modern concepts of fundamental human rights but also 
on indigenous notions of social justice, constituting a
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unique human rights approach adopted through affirmative 
action.2
The main aim of this thesis is to bring out the 
distinct nature of this new Indian environmental 
jurisprudence by analysing its development within a broader 
constitutional and jurisprudential framework. In fact, the 
emerging Indian environmental jurisprudence has relied on 
three interconnected elements. First, it manifests the new 
Indian constitutional law rationale which now clearly 
accords importance to public concerns rather than to 
protecting private interests. Secondly, it reflects certain 
aspects of Indian legal culture through implicit and 
explicit reliance on autochthonous values based on ancient, 
pre-colonial indigenous notions and concepts of law. 
Thirdly, it bears testimony to the uniquely activist role of 
the higher Indian judiciary in promoting this new rationale. 
These three interconnected elements characterise the manner 
and approach adopted in the recent development of Indian 
environmental jurisprudence.
The major purpose of the present thesis is to analyse 
this recent development and to show how Indian environmental 
jurisprudence functions not as an adjunct to the common law 
systems, but as an independent and yet interconnected 
mechanism for the legal protection of the environment. The 
analysis of Indian environmental jurisprudence also shows 
that it proceeds closely in line with legal ideologies
10
towards creating a human right for a clean environment, 
which has been frequently voiced in international fora.3 
While this thesis cannot focus on the international legal 
dimension, the current Indian experience strengthens the 
arguments against the development of environmental law 
within a regulatory law paradigm adopting economic 
rationalisation, as found particularly in the Anglo-American 
common law jurisdictions.4
The development of environmental law in the 
Anglo-American common law jurisdictions has been built on a 
regulatory private law approach,5 where the protection of 
proprietary interests tends to take precedence over public 
interests.6 It is argued here that the Indian 
jurisprudential development counters this approach by 
refuting economic rationalisation as the major criterion for 
environmental law development. The Indian experience also 
shows that the problems of protecting the environment 
transcend mundane levels of legal, economic, political or 
social conceptualisations and involve the intricate problem 
of accommodating varied and conflicting concepts and 
ideologies. The present thesis argues that this is not a new 
predicament. It shows in detail that awareness of ancient 
concepts for protecting Nature and the 'environment', in a 
wider sense, can be and has been put to productive use in 
the development of a modern regime of environmental 
regulation and jurisprudence that implies not only pious 
talk but also serious action.
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The fundamental question that confronts the developing 
economies is to establish an ideology of law to regulate 
society in a comprehensive manner and to set the limits and 
goals of development.7 Briefly, the current global concern 
to protect the environment reflects a re-thinking in the 
West about the fundamental ideology upon which the laws to 
protect the environment have been built. There is growing 
acceptance in the West that non-Western cultures may know a 
great deal about the intimate links of man and environment 
and intricate methods to regulate them.8 Theories of legal 
pluralism also assert the significance of legal cultures in 
the context of 'law and development'.9 The widespread quest 
for developing indigenous alternative approaches to law 
requires the modernisation of indigenous law rather than the 
use of 'modern' law as an instrument of modernisation.10 
Within the current environmental crisis, where ecological 
despoliation is perceived as a direct threat to humanity, 
every aspect of modernity - science, technology, capitalism, 
socialism, democracy and nationalism - is now being re­
examined, based on new 'eco-centric' philosophies and 
environmental ethics, if not a new eco-centric religion.11
The 1987 Report of the World Commission on Environment 
and Development [WCED] showed the possibility of a new era 
of economic growth.12 Although sustainable development has 
been criticised as a catch-all phrase and a vague concept 
where one encounters moral convictions as a substitute for 
practical thought,13 the concept has come to stay following
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the Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 which presented 
a programme of action based on it.14 The need to take into 
consideration environmental ethics and morals as aspects of 
human rights and duties is quite apparent today at the 
international level.15 With the problem of environmental 
degradation becoming globally accepted as a matter of 
serious and grave concern, legal solutions to environmental 
problems lie not in temporary legal remedies but in 
fundamental ideological changes in the role and use of 
law.16 The development of Indian environmental jurisprudence 
shows how, within a modern constitutional law framework, 
such a comprehensive approach can be maintained and used.17
1.2 The complexity of the present Indian scenario
The Indian Constitution, as a political document, laid down 
the imperatives of the state's responsibility towards its 
citizen by guaranteed fundamental rights. At the same time 
it required the state to carry out numerous policies to 
achieve several constitutional ideals for the nation's 
future socio-economic and legal development. Together they 
reflect strong aspirations towards the construction of a new 
legal order in which the state is placed under great 
responsibility as an embodiment of the collective will. Thus 
the Indian Constitution has gradually ushered in, 
particularly during the last two decades, a new 
constitutional law rationale which is a conscious move away
13
from the earlier common law-based Western legal traditions.
Although the plan for a new legal order was envisaged 
by the framers of the Constitution nearly half a century 
ago, its more perceptible beginnings emerged only within the 
last two decades. Several cardinal provisions of the Indian 
Constitution have been given interpretations quite 
differently from that which they were hitherto thought to 
imply. In particular, greater importance has been given to 
the Directive Principles of State Policy, including several 
new directives introduced by constitutional amendments in 
197 6, through an expanded judicial interpretation of the 
provisions of fundamental rights.
The concept of 'the state' has been widely enlarged to 
bring numerous activities into the public law domain. The 
concept of 'equality before law', protected under the 
Constitution, has led to the creation of a public law 
doctrine against state 'arbitrariness', resulting in a more 
effective check on all administrative actions. The right to 
life, guaranteed by the Constitution, has been expanded both 
substantively and procedurally. The concept of life has been 
interpreted to include ideals for a dignified life, clearly 
embracing indigenous values. Any 'procedure established by 
law' that could deprive an individual of this dignified life 
has to be judicially recognisable as just, fair and 
reasonable.
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The cumulative effect of these various constitutional 
reinterpretations, discussed in more detail below, has been 
the evolution of a new public law rationale which asserts 
and emphasises public duties and public accountability and 
clearly accords greater importance to public interests 
rather than protecting private interests. In short, there 
has been a dramatic reorientation of legal ideologies in 
India within the last two decades in establishing the new 
public law regime.
The creation of an indigenous form of public interest 
litigation, also called social action litigation, has become 
a unique and powerful mechanism for speedy and less costly 
recourse to redress common human rights grievances which 
affect the lives of many Indians.18 Active judicial law­
making through social action litigation has brought about 
phenomenal changes in Indian constitutionalism which are now 
beginning to be analysed and debated in more detail.19 This 
new development has had significant implications for the 
development of environmental jurisprudence in India. The 
judicial pronouncements on environmental issues, brought as 
public interest litigation under constitutional law have 
significantly enhanced legal growth and have set trends for 
the development of India's new legal regime. Since 1986, all 
major Indian statutes and their amendments have incorporated 
liberalised rules about standing and speedier procedures. 
The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 is only the most 
relevant example in the present context.20 However, while
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there has been much statutory modification in the specific 
Indian environmental legislation, a critical examination 
reveals many defects, showing how legislative and 
administrative policies are yet to adapt to the significant 
developments initiated and directed by the judiciary.
The judiciary-led legal developments in India were 
achieved by resorting to the extraordinary powers of the 
higher courts. The extensive writ jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court and the High Courts under the provisions of 
the Constitution allowed for the consolidation of a societal 
role for the judiciary.21 This powerful position of the 
judiciary has enabled the higher Indian judiciary to mould 
new concepts and strategies and to develop the law in 
accordance with newly evolving legal ideologies, influenced 
by international legal developments as much as by South 
Asian values and domestic notions of law and justice. The 
analysis of numerous cases decided within the last decade or 
so shows the tremendous contribution of the Indian judiciary 
in directing this orientation of Indian jurisprudence. A 
positive yet critical analysis reveals and illustrates how 
what a Japanese jurist has called 'legal postulates' 
underpin these judicial dialectics and rhetoric.22
The development of Indian environmental jurisprudence 
by the Indian judiciary not only reflects the changes in 
legal ideology but also brings out the uniqueness of the 
Indian legal culture. The Indian legal system has been
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considered to be a common law system for all practical 
purposes.23 However, it has always accommodated and 
amalgamated legal notions and values peculiar to the 
socio-cultural traditions of South Asia.24 Indian 
environmental jurisprudence as part of the Indian 
constitutional law demonstrates the greater process of 
constructing a new legal order in India and thus the 
productive application of indigenous 'legal postulates.' 
Some decades ago, when Professor Julius Stone challenged 
Indian scholars to explain what precisely other countries 
could learn from her "cultural heritage", the result was 
disappointing, according to one eminent scholar in London, 
who then attempted to show some elements of the dharma. 
concepts for world peace.25 The manifestation of cultural 
factors is increasingly apparent now, particularly but not 
exclusively in the protection of the environment in India.
The ancient philosophies of law in India, as far as 
they seem relevant to a discussion of environmental law in 
India today, show how in India, from very early times, the 
regulation of human conduct included implicit concern for 
Nature or the environment. The Indian way of life and in 
particular Hinduism as a cosmic religion envisage the 
intimate interlinking of all microcosmic as well as 
macrocosmic concerns in every aspect of human existence.26 
This kind of systemic universal view provides basic 
conceptual elements which are inherently relevant for 
ecological discussions and environmental law. For various
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reasons, such conceptual elements have implicitly, rather 
than explicitly, been relied upon as the legal postulates of 
current Indian environmental jurisprudence.
There is now a rapidly growing literature on Indian 
traditions and philosophies relating to the environment.27 
This literature, too, seems to indicate that the Indian 
concept of dharma, which encapsulates the underlying 
traditional Indian legal culture, has been an important 
contributing force behind the current legal developments in 
India.28
As indicated, the present thesis demonstrates how the 
new public law rationale has been able to modify the 
traditional British-influenced Indian law to tackle 
environmental issues. I shall show in chapter 3 below how 
the public nuisance provisions under the civil and criminal 
laws of India have recently been reinterpreted to become an 
important part of Indian environmental jurisprudence. The 
powers of the magistrate to curb public nuisance, envisaged 
under the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973, have now become 
an effective mechanism to oversee the neglect of local 
amenities by local bodies and public authorities. Unlike the 
Anglo-American common law jurisdictions, in which the law of 
public nuisance remains an ineffective tool for the 
protection of the environment,29 the Indian experience shows 
how this somewhat defunct law has been effectively 
revitalised and revived for the purpose of environmental
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protection. The result is a distinctive jurisprudential 
outcome based on the explicit constitutional mandate to 
protect the environment.
Overall, therefore, the recent Indian environmental 
jurisprudence, arising out of the progressive evolution of 
modern constitutional law rationales towards establishing a 
unique public law regime, combined with ancient notions of 
ecological balance, appears as a postmodern legal 
development.30 It can, as this thesis will attempt to show, 
appropriately be termed as 'neo-dharmic' and it is immensely 
complex in its conceptual foundations and actual 
manifestations.
1.3 The structure of the thesis
To unravel this complex structure, I have decided not to 
proceed historically, discussing first ancient notions of 
legal postulates, but to focus initially on modern India's 
constitutional framework. Given that modern Indian 
environmental jurisprudence has developed as a sub-category 
of constitutional law rather than as a field of isolated 
regulatory statutes, the present thesis will need first to 
focus to a considerable extent on recent developments in 
Indian constitutional law. Without taking this approach, the 
recent developments in Indian environmental law could not be 
put to productive use for a jurisprudential analysis.
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Chapter 2 brings out those aspects of the Indian 
constitutional law background which are relevant to the
recent development of Indian environmental jurisprudence. 
The relevant parts of the Indian Constitution of 1950 itself 
are analysed first to show how they provided an important 
basis for current legal developments.
As we have noted already, these provisions reflect 
aspirations towards the construction of a new legal order. 
This quest to create a new order, consciously moving away 
from the earlier colonial domination with its common law 
tradition, becomes gradually stronger in the interpretations 
given to several cardinal provisions of the Indian
Constitution. This chapter thus analyses the importance 
accorded to the Preamble, and investigates the crucial 
relationship between the guaranteed Fundamental Rights in 
Part III and the ideals and policies contained in the
Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the
Constitution. Later sub-sections focus on the impact of the 
judicially expanded meaning of relevant Fundamental Rights 
provisions of the constitution which have become significant 
for the development of Indian environmental jurisprudence. 
Particularly, the expanded concepts of 'the state' in 
Article 12, 'equality before law' in Article 14 and 
'protection of life' in Article 21 of the Constitution 
require some analysis.
This chapter also evaluates the extraordinary writ
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jurisdictional powers of the Supreme Court and the High 
Courts. Many of the judiciary-led legal developments were 
achieved by resorting to these powers. The drive towards a 
new socio-legal order, coupled with the power conferred by 
the extraordinary jurisdiction, prompted the creation of an 
indigenous form of public interest litigation also called 
social action litigation [SAL].
But not everything has depended on the judiciary. It 
has been of great relevance for the development of Indian 
environmental jurisprudence that some new Directive 
Principles of State Policy, and other relevant provisions 
emphasising duties rather than rights, were introduced by 
important constitutional amendments in 197 6. The chapter 
brings out the scope and extent of the new constitutional 
law regime which has been relied upon heavily for the 
development of environmental jurisprudence in India.
Chapter 3 traces the common law foundations of Indian 
environmental jurisprudence and shows how they have later 
given way to a public law rationale. In India, under the 
earlier common law tradition, the development of law against 
perpetrators of environmental harm often proved inadequate. 
It seems that this was so because the early laws, in 
particular the use of public nuisance law, followed to a 
large extent the developments under the English common law. 
The incorporation of public nuisance in specific provisions 
under the civil and criminal codes in India did not, by
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itself, liberate the application of the law from its common 
law limitations and traditional understanding. Further, the 
restrictive rules on standing under the common law tradition 
prevented ordinary people from seeking judicial remedies to 
abate environmental degradation and pollution as public 
nuisance. Some of the early relevant cases on public 
nuisance are analysed in order to show the extent to which 
this branch of law was resorted to and to highlight its 
limited usefulness. The chapter then proceeds to show the 
impact of the new public law rationale which has been able 
to bring about radical changes in the meaning and usefulness 
of this particular area of law, linking it productively to 
the new constitutional law regime.
Chapter 4 evaluates the major Indian environmental 
legislation and its administration, pointing out the defects 
and the fundamental problems which have undermined the 
effectiveness of such legislation, as well as discussing 
recent changes. It focuses on the Water Act of 1974, the Air 
Act of 1981 and the Environment Protection Act of 1986 in 
order to ascertain to what extent these enactments have 
achieved their respective purpose of environmental 
protection. A critical assessment of these specific laws 
shows that a more effective remedial mechanism is needed 
particularly at the local level. This is an area in which 
ideals, policies and administrative realities are yet to be 
resolved. The present situation raises serious doubts about 
the appropriateness of the new legal strategies adopted for
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achieving an ecological balance and ecologically sound 
economic development.
Chapter 5 focuses on the nature of the Indian legal 
system as a conceptual entity and seeks to identify the 
significant aspects of Indian legal culture and the place of 
environmental protection within this context. This task 
involves tracing the ancient philosophies of law in India as 
far as they seem relevant to a discussion of environmental 
law today. The chapter shows how in India, from very early 
times, the regulation of human conduct included implicit 
concern for Nature or the environment. Such universal and 
cosmic concerns have provided conceptual elements that have 
formed an integral part of Indian legal philosophy from time 
immemorial. These underlying conceptual elements are 
discussed here in order to examine their relevance for the 
emergence of modern Indian environmental jurisprudence.
Further, the recent literature on tradition and 
philosophy of ecology, with a growing number of 
contributions from Indian legal writers, is examined here to 
support the hypothesis that traditional concepts can be 
usefully employed today. It appears that the concept of 
dharma, which underlies traditional Indian legal culture, 
has been contributing to current legal development in India 
much more than is commonly assumed, mainly because Indian 
writers continue to make implicit rather than explicit use 
of central traditional cultural concepts and values while
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analysing modern legal developments. The picture that 
emerges is, therefore, of a post-modernistic legal 
development with an anti-modernistic standpoint which
rejects so-called modern practices and concepts and reverts 
to what is perceived as more balanced traditional and 
ecologically sustainable approaches.
Chapter 6 discusses in detail the recent development of 
Indian environmental jurisprudence by the Indian judiciary. 
The extensive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High 
Courts which allowed the consolidation of an explicit 
societal role for the Indian judiciary has, in turn, enabled 
the judges to mould new concepts and strategies for
environmental protection and to develop the unique 
jurisprudence that we are centrally concerned with here. The 
chapter shows how the three interlinking components which we 
identified have worked together in the creation of this neo- 
dharmic jurisprudence.
Our analysis focuses on the impact of three important 
categories of cases which manifest legal postmodernism in 
employing the public law rationale and the autochthonous 
elements for environmental justice, epitomising its neo- 
dharmic character. The first is headed by the Ratlam case,31 
which served as a path breaker, opening the way for a new
jurisconscience. The second group of cases, known as the
Mehta cases,32 inducts new jurisprudential principles based 
on a constitution-centred Indian public law rationale.
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Thirdly, the various orders and decisions made by the Indian 
courts in an attempt to resolve the famous Bhoyal case,33 
authenticate the operation of a neo-dharmic jurisprudence 
for environmental justice.
The study of the three categories of cases brings out 
the adoption of strategies and techniques which distinguish 
Indian environmental jurisprudence. They show the 
renunciation of well-established principles and notions of 
laws inherited under colonial rule. The repercussions of 
these cases are examined by analysing numerous other 
reported decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts in 
India. A critical analysis is carried out to highlight 
elements of judicial rhetoric as well as very 
practically-oriented suggestions in these judicial 
pronouncements. This analysis also helps to come to 
conclusions about the future course of legal developments in 
India.
Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, sums up the 
characteristic nature of the new Indian environmental 
jurisprudence. It demonstrates the outcome of creating a 
legal order based on public law rationale and making 
environmental law an important part of that legal order. It 
also reveals the prominence accorded to the environment 
through implicit reliance on traditional conceptual 
understandings of law and indigenous values related to 
Nature.
25
There is much concern in India to be seen to respond to 
international initiatives and standards, while at the same 
time developing an indigenous model. The present thesis 
could not include within its ambit a detailed examination of 
the links between the Indian development of environmental 
jurisprudence and international initiatives towards 
establishing sound and sustainable legal principles to be 
adopted around the world. However, the characteristic 
features of Indian environmental jurisprudence, as this 
study would show, strongly favours an universal human rights 
approach. Thus, this study strengthens the case for 
developing the general concept of a human right to a clean 
environment as a fundamental component in the context of 
sustainable development. It refutes the current Anglo- 
American trend to rely on economic regulation as an 
effective means or an holistic approach to tackle 
environmental issues. The Indian evidence would show that a 
pro-active multi-level approach to environmental protection 
can bring theoretical as well as practical results.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
1. The Constitution of India 1950 (hereafter: the
Constitution) was amended in 197 6 by the 42nd Amendment 
which incorporated, inter alia, Article 48A and Article 
5lA(g) specifically dealing with the protection of the 
environment. For details see chapter 2.2 below at pp.47-49.
2. See Pathak, R.S., "Human rights and the development of the
environmental law in India", (1988) 14 Commonwealth Law
Bulletin, 1171-1180. For earlier analyses on the 
development of Indian human rights jurisprudence see Menon, 
Madhava N.R., "The dawn of human rights jurisprudence", 
(1987) 1 Supreme Court Cases (Journal), 1-12; Singh, M.P., 
"Jurisprudential foundations of affirmative action", (1981- 
82) 10-11 Delhi Law Review, 39-65. For an insight into the 
Indian understanding of human rights see generally Kothari,
S. and H. Sethi (eds.), Rethinking human rights: challenges 
for theory and action, 1989, New York, New Horizons Press 
and Delhi, Lokayan; Baxi, Upendra, "From human rights to 
the right to be human: some heresies", ibid, 151-166. See 
also Panikkar, Raimundo, "Is the notion of human rights a 
Western concept?", (1982) 120 Diogenes, 75-102;
Chattopadhyaya, D.P., "Human rights, justice and social 
context", in Rosenbaum, Alan S. (ed. ) , The philosophy of
human rights :____international perspectives , 1980,
Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 169-193; Chiriyankandath, 
James, "Human rights in India: concepts and contexts",
(1993) 2 Contemporary South Asia, 245-263.
3 . The World Charter for Nature declared in 1982 as its first
general principle that: "Nature shall be respected and its
essential processes shall not be impaired." See World 
Charter for Nature, (1982) UN Doc A/51. The legal 
principles for environmental protection and sustainable 
development enunciated by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development [WCED] in June 1986 stated in 
Article 1 that: "All human beings have the fundamental
right to an environment adequate for their health and well 
being." See Report of the World Commission on Environment 
and Development, Our common future, 1987, Oxford and New 
York, Oxford University Press, at 348.
4. On the debate for and against economic rationalisation see
generally Sagoff, Mark, The economy of the earth, 1988, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Rose, Carol M. , 
"Environmental Faust succumbs to temptations of economic 
Mephistopheles, or, value by any other name is preference", 
(1989) 87 Michigan Law Review, 1631-1646; Braithwaite, J., 
"The limits of economism in controlling harmful corporate 
conduct", (1982) 16 Law and Society Review, 481-500,
extracted in Ogus, A.I. and Veljanovski, C.G. (eds.), 
Readings in the economics of law and regulation, 1984,
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Oxford, Clarendon Press; Mintz, Joel A., "Economic reform 
of environmental protection: a brief comment on a recent 
debate", (1991) 15 Harvard Environmental Law Review, 149-
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CHAPTER 2 THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF INDIAN
ENVIRONMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE
As indicated in the introduction, the legal development for 
the protection of the environment in India is firmly based 
on a constitutional rationale. This constitutional rationale 
seeks to establish a new public law regime in India. The 
present chapter, therefore, shows how the foundations and 
wider parameters of Indian environmental jurisprudence are 
closely linked with the significant constitutional law 
developments that India has witnessed within the last two 
decades.
This chapter initially focuses on the increased 
importance accorded to the aims and ideals contained in the 
Preamble and the shift in emphasis between the Fundamental 
Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy. In this 
context, the chapter investigates the scope of judicial 
review, expanded consequent to judicial interpretations 
which changed the meaning particularly of Articles 12, 14
and 21 of the Indian Constitution. We then proceed to 
analyse the changes in procedural doctrines which have 
turned standard constitutional remedies into effective 
public law strategies within the specificities of the Indian 
setting. This chapter also deals with the manner in which 
Indian public interest litigation, as a unique mechanism, 
has enhanced the operation of the new constitutional
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rationale. The cumulative effect of these constitutional law 
developments, which has pervaded the current legal 
development as a whole, indicates the permeation of a legal 
ideology and philosophy which focuses on the common good and 
has given much impetus to the development of Indian 
environmental jurisprudence.
2.1 The significance of the aims and ideals of the 
Constitution
It would appear, at first sight, that the Indian 
Constitution of 1950 established a legal order based on the 
earlier British common law tradition. Yet, the aims and 
ideals envisaged by the Constitution called for the creation 
of a new legal order. The Constitution conveys the spirit of 
independence and envisages a process of decolonisation and 
reconstruction. The Preamble, the Fundamental Rights [FR], 
the Directive Principles of State Policy [DPSP] and the 
incorporation of the Fundamental Duties [FD] in 1976, 
brought about distinguishable changes to the ideology and 
rationale of Indian constitutionalism. These vital parts of 
the Constitution have, even if this was not initially 
obvious, laid the foundations for a new public law regime. 
This development has depended on gradual evolution through 
a process of modification and accommodation, rather than any 
radical revolutionary eruption.
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After independence in 1947, the struggle to live as an 
independent nation centred upon the framing of the
Constitution itself.1 The Constitution, as a legal document, 
marked the birth of 'modern India'.2 The framework of the 
Indian Constitution was apparently built upon the British 
Government of India Act of 1935.3 At the same time it is 
well-known that one can discern in the Indian Constitution 
the influence of several modern constitutions. The
Parliamentary form of government broadly follows the British 
model but Indian federalism relies on principles from the 
American, Canadian and Australian constitutions.4 The
American Bill of Rights had its impact on the formulation of 
the Fundamental Rights and the inspiration for the Directive 
Principles of State Policy has come from the Irish
Constitution.5 At the time of drafting the Constitution 
itself, it was observed by Dr. Ambedkar, the Chairman of the 
constitutional drafting committee, that:
"The only new things, if there can be any, in a
constitution framed so late in the day are the 
variations made to remove the faults and to accommodate 
it to the needs of the country."6
The Fundamental Duties, incorporated into the
Constitution in 197 6, which are significant for our study 
and analysed in detail later in this chapter, have been 
shown to be similar to those found in the Constitutions of 
Japan and China; they are also in line with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.7 Several earlier writers on
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Indian jurisprudence have pointed out that the Indian 
Constitution reflects the eclectic nature of Indian legal 
culture, taking in everything which is deemed suitable to 
its needs.8
The initial main aim of constitution making was to 
establish a democracy based on the ideals of justice, 
liberty, equality and fraternity. The need for a new 
constitution forming the basic law of the land for the 
realisation of these ideals was paramount at that time.9 How 
exactly those aims were to be achieved might not have 
appeared clear at that time. The general direction as stated 
by Dr. Ambedkar was:
"Now, having regard to the fact that there are various 
ways by which economic democracy may be brought, we 
have deliberately introduced . . . something which is not 
fixed or rigid. We have left enough room for people of 
different ways of thinking, ... It is no use giving a 
fixed, rigid form to something which is not rigid, 
which is fundamentally changing and must . . . keep on 
changing. "10
The above statement of Dr. Ambedkar indicates how the 
framers of the Indian Constitution aimed to create a new 
economic and social order, which also necessarily calls 
forth a new legal order, not by prescribing a particular way 
but leaving further development to be determined through the 
democratic process. Implicit in this strategy is the
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instinctive non-acceptance of so-called 'modern' ideologies 
in their entirety - whether it be the individualistic 
capitalist order or the communist or socialist order. As a 
result, the process of Indian constitution-making prepared 
the ground for the evolution of a new indigenous order 
which, it is argued here, relies upon traditional Indian 
understandings of social, economic, political and legal 
order. A general indication of the direction was laid down 
in the DPSP. Ambedkar stated that:
"It is therefore, no use saying that the directive 
principles have no value. In my judgment, the directive 
principles have a great value, for they lay down that 
our ideal is economic democracy. Because we did not 
want merely a parliamentary form of government to be 
instituted through the various mechanisms provided in 
the constitution, without any direction as to what our 
economic ideal or as to what our social order ought to 
be, we deliberately included the Directive Principles 
in our constitution. . . 1,11
The deliberate inclusion of the Directive Principles 
did not by itself bring about any significant legal change 
for several decades because they had to operate under the 
earlier legal tradition and remained incompatible with 
actual realities and the then prevalent legal culture of 
India. Even a recent analysis on Ambedkar's prophecies, by 
a well-known Indian legal writer, shows that Indian life is 
full of contradictions, producing burdens of inequality,
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which threaten to destroy the political structure built by 
the Constitution.12 Dhavan appears optimistic, although he 
seems a bit disillusioned, raising the question whether the 
Constitution would secure a new jurisprudence whose impact 
would be felt as social fact.13
Before we proceed to investigate the gradual shift in 
emphasising the importance of the DPSP, we focus on the 
preamble of the Constitution. The original resolution to 
constitute India into a Sovereign, Democratic Republic was 
modified by the 42nd amendment of 197 6 which made India a 
sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic.14 It 
appears that the concept of socialism, added by the 42nd 
amendment, merely brought out explicitly what was already 
implicit in the preamble. However, the 197 6 amendments gave 
greater momentum to steer a course of political, economic 
and legal development away from an individualistic, private 
property-based approach.
The preamble was earlier not considered so important 
for the interpretation of various provisions of the 
Constitution and in resolving constitutional issues in 
India.15 In Keshavananda Bharati v State of Kerala,16 which 
marks the beginning of the great change, the preamble was 
interpreted as setting forth the goals of the political 
society in India. It has also been pointed out that the 
preamble has to be invoked to determine the ambit of the FR 
and DPSP and that the preamble to the Constitution is of
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extreme importance for judicial interpretation of the 
Constitution, so that "the constitution should be read and 
interpreted in the light of the good and noble vision 
expressed in the preamble".17 The role of these ideals has 
been seen as forming "the trinity" of the Constitution and 
has been summed up in the following words by the Supreme 
Court in a case decided a few years ago:
"In deciding a case which may not be covered by 
authority courts have before them the beacon light of 
the trinity of the constitution and the play of legal 
light and shade must lead on the path of justice 
social, economical and political. Lacking precedent, 
the court can always be guided by that light and the 
guidance thus shed by the trinity of our Constitution. 
Public policy can be drawn from the constitution."18
The significance accorded to the aims and ideals 
envisaged by the Indian Constitution calling forth the 
creation and embellishment of a new legal order shows a 
perceptible ideological change. It is therefore the case, as 
our later analysis of environmental cases will confirm, that 
legal development in India, especially more recently, has 
been very much guided by such resolute if general ideals. 
The following parts of this chapter analyse specific areas 
of constitutional law changes to illustrate this gradual 
evolution. We concentrate first on the DPSP to show how they 
have gradually transformed themselves from pious obligations 
to positive policies.
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2.2 The importance of the Directive Principles of State
Policy
The DPSP, which were incorporated by the framers of the 
Indian Constitution to lay down cherished socio-economic and 
political ideals and values, have been shown to be closely 
linked to the Indian social and cultural life.19
The legislative history of the Constitution shows that 
the initial draft included the DPSP along with the FR in 
Part III itself.20 There was also a move to give primacy to 
directive principles over fundamental rights in cases of 
conflict; amendments were suggested to this effect, but they 
were not adopted by the drafting committee.21 The minutes of 
the drafting committee show that between those who wanted to 
make the DPSP justiciable and those who wanted to make them 
non-justiciable, the latter won the day.22 If such moves had 
prevailed then there would have been more radical legal 
change within the first few decades itself. Instead the path 
chosen was one of gradual change through adopting the 
processes of accommodation.
The fact that, in their nature and effect, Fundamental 
Rights and Directive Principles are apparently different, 
has resulted in their separation in Parts III and IV. This 
has given rise to the belief that fundamental rights were 
for the most parts rights of the individual and that 
directive principles were intended for the welfare of the
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public.23 In view of the earlier ambivalent approaches and 
unresolved conflicts, it comes as no surprise that there has 
been a constant debate as to the position of the DPSP.
From the start quite divergent views were voiced as to 
what ideals should be expressed in what parts of the 
Constitution. Faced with wide gulfs of differences of 
opinion about the right path, the making of the Indian 
constitution has been a process where the framers were often 
caught between two fundamentally divergent approaches and 
ended up accommodating both. Principally, the issue was how 
the public interest can be strengthened in view of powerful 
private concerns. Although the discourse about the FR-DPSP 
complex was not originally conducted in those terms, this is 
what lies at the core of the complex discussions about 
developments in Indian constitutional law. Seervai points 
out that it would be inaccurate rewriting of history to say 
now that the framers of the Constitution gave primacy to the 
DPSP over the FRs, because the Directive Principles have 
only gradually received increasingly greater importance.24
The importance of the Directive Principles vis-a-vis 
the Fundamental Rights which has changed considerably from 
what it was understood to be a few decades ago came about, 
according to Seervai, in three periods.25 During the first 
period, there was no question of critical analysis of Part 
III in conjunction with Part IV; it was taken as the obvious 
view that fundamental rights must always prevail.26 The
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second period saw several attempts to harmonise the two 
parts of the Constitution.27 This period has generated much 
ambivalence which got resolved in the third period with the 
decision in Minerva Mills in 1980.28 The last decade or so 
of the present period shows how the policies incorporated 
into the DPSP are given effect through more activist 
interpretations of the provisions in the FR articles.
Thus one can say that the importance given to the DPSP 
makes the Indian Constitution as a political document create 
a legal ideology that forms the background for all further 
legal development in India. By guaranteeing fundamental 
rights and at the same time requiring the state to carry out 
very many policies to achieve the ideals of a more perfect 
state, the basic legal ideology appears to be centred on 
public duty rather than on individual rights. The provisions 
in Part III check the state's authority over individuals, 
while Part IV provides the positive policies containing the 
aspirations of the people, as well as the ideals and values 
cherished by them. The DPSP which have been seen as the 
'potential stuff' out of which public policies of the 
government are made in India,29 have now become the guiding 
principles of law.30
Several decades ago, when Granville Austin described 
the characteristic nature of the FR and DPSP as constituting 
the 'conscience' of the Constitution, he surmised the roots 
of DPSP in the following words:
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"It is not unreasonable to conjecture also that the 
placing on the government of a major responsibility for 
the welfare of the mass of Indians had an even deeper 
grounding in Indian history. Under a petty ruler, a 
Mogul emperor, or the British Raj, responsibility for 
both initiation and execution of efforts to improve the 
lot of the people had lain with the government. What 
the government did not do, or see done, usually was not 
done. The masses had, generally speaking, looked to the 
ruler for dispensations both evil and good. Heir to 
this tradition, Assembly members believed that the 
impetus for bringing about the social revolution 
continued to rest with the government."31
Austin has also noted the words of Alladi Krishnaswami 
Ayyar, a prominent member of the Constituent Assembly, 
summing up the debate on the right to property and 
compensation.
"The law, he said, 'must reflect the progressive and 
social techniques of the age'. Dharma and the duty the 
individual owed to society were the basis of India's 
social framework, he continued; capitalism as practised 
in the West was 'alien to the root idea of our 
civilization. The sole end of property is Yagna and to 
serve a social purpose', he concluded."32
Our discussion in chapter 5 below on the traditional 
conceptual understanding of law, particularly on property
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which bears great relevance for environmental protection, 
show that the concept of property in India was always 
envisaged for the common good and was not primarily meant 
for individual enjoyment. It also shows that a juridical 
rationale emphasising common duty rather than individual 
rights forms the basis of dharmic jurisprudence. Recent 
writing on the policy perspectives of the DPSP leads to the 
conclusion that the DPSP are the equivalent of Rajadharma, 
the fundamental principles of governance under the 
traditional Indian legal culture,33 analysed in more detail 
in chapter 5. Any approach that would have sought to divide 
the two elements or give less importance to the DPSP, would 
have been less productive for the development of India's 
unique environmental jurisprudence.
Especially after 1972, following the 25th amendment of 
the Constitution, the DPSP assumed greater importance in the 
scheme of the Constitution.34 In Kesavananda Bharati v State 
of Kerala,35 the Supreme Court emphasised that there was no 
disharmony between the DPSP and the FR as they supplemented 
each other in aiming at the same goal of bringing about a 
social revolution as envisaged in the Preamble. It was held 
that the courts have a responsibility in so interpreting the 
Constitution as to ensure implementation of the DPSP and to 
harmonise the social objectives underlying them with 
individual rights. By 1980 the confusion that had prevailed 
about the DPSP had been resolved. In Minerva Mills v Union 
of India,36 it was held that:
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"In other words, the Indian Constitution is founded on 
the bed-rock of the balance between Parts III and IV. 
To give absolute primacy to one over the other is to 
disturb the harmony of the Constitution. This harmony 
and balance between fundamental rights and directive 
principles is an essential feature of the 
Constitution. 1,37
Here Bhagwati, J. expressed the view that no part of 
the constitution is more important than Part IV by 
distinguishing the Indian concept of a legal right and duty 
from the Western rights-based jurisprudential perspectives 
and stated that:
"I may also point out that simply because the Directive 
Principles do not create rights enforceable in a court 
of law, it does not follow that they do not create any 
obligations on the State. We are so much obsessed by 
the Hohfeldian Classification that we tend to think of 
rights, liberties, powers and privileges as being 
invariably linked with the corresponding concept of 
duty, no-right, liability and immunity. We find it 
difficult to conceive of obligations or duties which do 
not create corresponding rights in others."38 
He then went on to hold that:
"It is therefore, to my mind, clear beyond doubt that 
merely because the Directive Principles are not 
enforceable in a court of law, it does not mean that 
they cannot create obligations or duties binding on the
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State. The crucial test which has to be applied is 
whether the Directive Principles impose any obligations 
or duties on the State; if they do, the State would be 
bound by a constitutional mandate to carry out such 
obligations or duties, even though no corresponding 
right is created in any one which can be enforced in a 
court of law. "39
The position as stated in Minerva Mills above remains 
the same after all the debates of the early decades about 
the working of the Constitution. The Fundamental Rights and 
the Directive Principles which were seen to constitute the 
'conscience' of the Indian Constitution,40 are now on a much 
clearer footing. It can now be said that the Directive 
Principles prescribe the goals to be attained and the 
Fundamental Rights provide the means by which the goals are 
to be achieved.
Thus when the importance of environmental protection 
became a great concern globally by the mid-1970s, it soon 
found its place in the DPSP following the 42nd amendment of 
1976. Our analysis in later chapters shows that in effect 
some of the DPSP, including the policy to protect the 
environment, have been treated virtually as fundamental 
rights for the purpose of remedial action.
There has been a growing feeling in the country that 
there should be a reordering of priorities and, as a result,
47
the idea of protecting the environment has become 
significantly important.41 The changes made by the 42nd 
amendment of the Constitution in 197 6 have been much more 
than the addition of a few new clauses or provisions. The 
conceptual underpinnings requiring greater attention to the 
public interest, giving less importance to private legal 
rights and proprietary interests were brought out more 
explicitly and clearly. It is most relevant for this thesis 
that the new constitutional law amendments also included 
specific provisions for the protection of the environment, 
which could then be relied on by the Indian judiciary.
A new article that formed a new Part IV A of the 
Constitution, called the Fundamental Duties, was also 
incorporated into the Constitution which prescribed inter 
alia the duty of every citizen to protect and improve the 
natural environment. Both Article 48A in the DPSP and 
Article 51A (g) in the fundamental duties contain the policy 
of environmental protection in very broad terms to cover all 
aspects of environmental degradation and conservation. The 
new Article 48A reads as follows:
"The State shall endeavour to protect and improve the 
environment and to safeguard the forest and wildlife of 
the country."
The specific provision of 51A (g) , in the new Part IVA
dealing with the Fundamental Duties, reads as follows:
"It shall be the duty of every citizen of India - 
...(g) to protect and improve the natural environment
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including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife, and to 
have compassion for living creatures;"
Prior to this amendment there were no specific 
provisions dealing with environmental protection in the 
Constitution. There were, however, provisions for the 
improvement for public health (Article 47), for the 
organisation of agriculture and animal husbandry (Article
48), and for the protection of national monuments (Article
49) .
The incorporation of the specific provisions in the 
Constitution was the result of the initiatives of the then 
Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, whose approach towards the 
environment involved a Third World perspective.42 At the 
United Nations Conference on Human Environment at Stockholm 
in 1972, she championed the cause of environment and 
development by emphasising the view that environmental 
degradation in less developed countries is the direct result 
of underdevelopment and that it would not be correct to 
equate their problem with that of the developed countries.
It has been shown that when the new provisions came up 
for consideration in both Houses of Parliament, a general 
concern was expressed by a cross section of members about 
the deteriorating environment.43 It is significant to note 
the statement of Mrs. Gandhi at that time:
"So far, the feeling of responsibility towards nature
was absent all over the world. It was not absent in our 
old ancient books; but came about because we adopted 
the Western viewpoint. Now the time has come to go back
to the source of strength of the human race and to try
to preserve and revitalise them. "44
One can say that the new perspective for the 
development of environmental law in India which has been 
accorded by the specific constitutional provisions in 197 6 
is a response to the social and political needs of the 
country to move closer to traditional Indian legal ideology, 
which is discussed in detail in chapter 5 below.45 The 
following discussion here is focused on the formation of 
India's new public law rationale as a basic legal ideology 
which is most relevant for the current legal development for 
the protection of the environment.
2.3 The evolution of the Indian public law regime
The importance and emphasis accorded to the aims and ideals
of the Constitution, as we saw in chapter 2.1 and 2.2 above, 
has gradually led to the evolution of a public law regime 
through a decade of judicial activism which began in the 
mid-197 0s. Three significant areas of this development are 
analysed here, as they are particularly relevant for the 
development of Indian environmental jurisprudence. Our 
analysis also shows that these three major areas of change
50
are closely linked in expanding judicial review in India. 
First, the scope of judicial review under Article 13 has 
been enlarged by the expanded judicial interpretation of the 
definition of 'the state' under Article 12 of the 
Constitution, so as to include a very wide range of
governmental and administrative bodies and their activities. 
Secondly, the scope of judicial review under Article 14 of 
the Constitution has been redefined and modified to curtail 
any arbitrary action by the administration. Thirdly, the 
scope of judicial review for any infringement of the right 
to life, protected by Article 21 of the Constitution, has 
also been widely expanded to include any substantive 
infringements to the quality of life and the mandatory
requirement of a reasonable, fair and just procedure. Below 
we discuss these issues in turn, showing their relevance for 
the development of environmental jurisprudence.
The definition of 'the state' in Article 12 is 
exclusively meant for the purposes of Parts III and IV of
the Constitution. However, the meaning of 'the state' in
Article 12 which is directly related to the scope of
judicial review under Article 13 gives insight into the 
concept of law and the meaning of state as understood in 
India generally. Article 12 provides a general definition of 
'the state' and reads as follows:
"In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, 
"the State" includes the Government and Parliament of 
India and the Government and the Legislature of each of
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the States and all local or other authorities within 
the territory of India or under the control of the 
Government of India."
Clause 2 of Article 13, which is relevant in this context, 
reads as follows:
"The state shall not make any law which takes away or 
abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law 
made in contravention of this clause shall, to the 
extent of the contravention, be void."
In 1975 the Supreme Court of India in Sukhdev Sincrh v 
Bhaqatram46 interpreted the definition of 'the state' in 
Article 12 to include within its fold a wide range of 
governmental bodies. In 1979 this was further developed and 
the expanded scope of Article 12 was laid down in R . D . 
Shetty v International Airports Authority.47 Consequently, 
a body, whether a registered society or a corporation 
exercising commercial or non-commercial activities, could be 
regarded to come within the scope of 'the state' within 
Article 12. A line of decisions following these two 
important cases included within the meaning of 'the state' 
several entities and enterprises and their activities.48 
Thus one can say that by expanding the concept of ' the 
state' there has been a gradual diminution in the 
distinction between a private enterprise and a public 
entity. This change, which has been seen as the 'dynamics of 
Article 12',49 expanding the scope of judicial review, in 
effect seeks to establish a public law domain.
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This expanded scope of judicial review has made it 
possible to include the state as a necessary party in almost 
all the environmental issues adjudicated before the courts 
in India. Further below, when we analyse the well-known M. C. 
Mehta cases, discussed in detail in chapter 6.2, we shall 
see how even the activities of private enterprises could be 
controlled by the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court.50 Thus it is now possible in practice to 
implead the state as a necessary party in environmental 
issues before the courts.51 In other words, the 
constitutional remedies envisaged to protect individual 
rights from direct state action can now be extended to curb 
even indirect action or inaction. The underlying rationale 
is that by regulating the regulator the object of regulation 
can be achieved more effectively. This rationale, which lies 
at the core of the new Indian public law regime, and which 
has been gradually established through this particular set 
of constitutional provisions, has been described as a 
'watershed' in Indian administrative law.52
Secondly, the power of judicial review has been 
extended more generally to check administrative discretion 
through a unique logical interpretation of Article 14. This 
interpretation has given a new dimension to the concept of 
equality in Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 14 reads 
as follows:
"The State shall not deny to any person equality before
the law or the equal protection of the laws within the
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territory of India."
This Article has been seen as an anti-discriminatory 
provision for over two decades as it merely states that the 
State shall not deny to any person equality before the law 
or the equal protection of the laws. In 1974, 'equality' was 
interpreted in E.P. Royappa v State of Tamil Nadu53 as 
follows:
"Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and 
dimensions and it cannot be "cribbed, cabined and 
confined" within traditional and doctrinaire limits. 
From a positivistic point of view, equality is 
antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and 
arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the 
rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim 
and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is 
arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both 
according to political logic and constitutional law and 
is therefore violative of Article 14 ... "54
Since arbitrary actions are by their very nature 
antithetical to the notion of equality, a check on the 
administration is notably established through Article 14. 
The reasoning in Roy a w  a of 1974 gave rise to a tactical 
concept that would further enhance judicial scrutiny and 
public accountability as a constitutional requirement.55 
This was developed further in Maneka Gandhi in 1978,56 R.D. 
She tty in 19 7 9 57 and Ajay Hasia in 198158 to establish an
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effective public law guarantee against administrative 
arbitrariness in India.
The dynamic concept of the Rule of Law as understood in 
India added a new dimension to the concept of equality 
contained in Article 14 of the constitution. It has been 
noted that the Rule of Law in India has an explicit 
ideological content.59 Massey shows that the concept in 
India in its ideological sense represents an ethical code 
for the exercise of public power.60 Baxi, in his analysis of 
Justice Mathew's conception of the state, also draws the 
conclusion that the growing power of social groups in the 
form of giant corporations, trade unions or associations 
needs to be equally constrained by the rule of law and 
justice requirements.61 Thus the second facet of the Indian 
constitutional law regime, relevant for our study, was 
developed not only to check but also to guide administrative 
discretion. The significance of judicial guidelines on the 
exercise of administrative discretion has also become an 
important aspect of Indian environmental jurisprudence. It 
is discussed in detail when we discuss specific 
environmental cases in chapters 3 and 6 below.
Thirdly, perhaps the most important development of 
modern India's constitutional law regime for the purpose of 
this study is evidenced by the expanded protection accorded 
to life and personal liberty under Article 21. Article 21 of 
the Constitution states as follows:
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"No person shall be deprived of his life and personal 
liberty except according to procedure established by 
law. "
The scope and ambit of this cardinal provision of the 
Indian Constitution has to be understood in two parts - the 
meaning of the concept of life and the nature of the 
procedural law which infringes the quality of life in 
general. By 1978 the FRs were held "to represent the basic 
values cherished by the people of this country since the 
Vedic times and they are calculated to protect the dignity 
of the individual and create conditions in which every human 
being can develop his personality to the fullest extent."62 
Maneka Gandhi led the way for the gradual transformation of 
the meaning of the right to life.
Thus in Francis Coralie Mullin v Administrator, Union 
Territory of Delhi,63 the right to life has been perceived 
to include the right to live with human dignity and decency. 
The Supreme Court interpreted the right to life in the 
following words:
"... the question which arises is whether the right to 
life is limited to only the protection of limb or 
faculty or does it go further and embrace something 
more. We think that the right to life include [s] the 
right to live with human dignity and all that goes 
along with it, ... Of course the magnitude and content 
of the components of this right would depend upon the
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extent of the economic development of the country but 
it must in any view of the matter include the basic 
necessities of life and also the right to carry on such 
functions and activities as constitutes the bare 
minimum expression of the human self."64
In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India,65 the right 
to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution 
underwent a quantum leap, most significant for our study, by 
linking it with the ideals contained in the DPSP. As a 
result, it was held that:
"The right to live with human dignity enshrined in 
Article 21 derives its life breath from the Directive 
Principles of State Policy and . . . These are minimum 
requirements which must exist in order to enable a 
person to live with human dignity and no State -
neither the Central Government or the State Government 
- has the right to take any action which would deprive 
a person of the enjoyment of these basic essentials."66
Any doubts or judicial trepidation that might have been 
felt at that time seem to have disappeared now as can be
seen from recent Supreme Court judgments about how the
concept of reasonableness relevant for the interpretation of 
the fundamental rights finds manifestation and expression in 
the DPSP. Thus in Union of India v Hindustan Development 
Corporation,67 it was stated:
"Now coming to the test of reasonableness which
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pervades the constitutional scheme, this Court in 
several cases particularly with reference to Articles 
14, 19 and 21 has considered this concept of
reasonableness and has held that the same finds its 
positive manifestation and expression in the lofty 
ideal of social and economic justice which inspires and 
animates the Directive Principles and that Article 14 
strikes at arbitrariness in State action."68
Other recent cases also indicate how values and ideals 
that were not considered as fundamental rights earlier but 
remained as DPSPs are now gradually seen as part of the 
concept of life protected by the Constitution. For instance, 
in Mohini Jain v State of Karnataka,69 the Supreme Court,
while holding that the right to education flows directly
from the right to life held that:
"'Right to life' is the compendious expression for all 
those rights which the courts must enforce because they 
are basic to the dignified enjoyment of life. It 
extends to the full range of conduct which the 
individual is free to pursue .... The right to life
under Article 21 and the dignity of an individual
cannot be assured unless it is accompained by the right 
to education."70
It can be argued that the concept of the right to life 
as developed under the Indian Constitution clearly lies in 
the values attached to the meaning of life as a
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philosophical and cultural concept. This inevitably conveys 
a subtle yet perceptible difference in its meaning and 
content. In the above case the court justified the right to 
education as a concomitant to the FRs by stating:
"Indian civilisation recognises education as one of the 
pious obligations of the human society .... Education 
in India has never been a commodity for sale."71
Although the above observation may appear as mere pious 
talk, it nonetheless illustrates an implicit attempt by the 
Indian courts to attach autochthonous values to the 
constitutionally protected right to life. A perceptibly 
different conceptual understanding, emphasising cultural 
ideals and values, is given protection as part of the right 
to life in the current Indian juridical discourse.
Along with the transmutation of the meaning of the 
'right to life', the interpretation of the term 'procedure 
established by law' by the Supreme Court also underwent 
great transformation. It has, according to a constitutional 
law commentator, "made the amplest use of the engine of 
judicial review, undaunted by the cramping language of the 
Article, so much so, the resultant today is just the 
opposite of what it was in the beginning".72
Thus both the substantive and procedural aspects of the 
American constitutional law concept of 'due process', which 
were avoided by the framers of the Indian Constitution, were
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in effect read into this Article by Maneka Gandhi73 and the 
line of decisions following Francis Coralie Mullin.74
The above development is best illustrated in Bachan 
Singh v State of Punjab.75 While interpreting Article 21, 
Bhagwati J. took the view that the word 'procedure' in that 
Article includes both substantive and procedural due 
process. He held that:
"... the word 'procedure' in Article 21 is wide enough 
to cover the entire process by which deprivation is 
effected and that would include not only the adjectival 
but also the substantive part of the law... Every facet 
of the law which deprives a person of his life or 
personal liberty would, therefore, have to stand the 
test of reasonableness, fairness and justness in order 
to be outside the inhibition of Article 21."76
The expanded scope of Article 21 due to the 
interpretation given to the word 'procedure' has had a wide- 
ranging impact on Indian legal developments, particularly in 
the area of human rights.77 The scope of this exemplified 
expansion can be seen for instance when the Supreme Court 
struck down provisions under the Indian Penal Code of 1860, 
prescribing mandatory death sentence, as unreasonable and 
unjust,78 or when the Supreme Court assessed the 
reasonableness of the National Security Act, 1980, the 
primary legislation to protect national security and to curb 
terrorism.79
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There has been a gradual shift in the legal ideology 
from A.K. Gopalan v State of Madras,80 and A.P.M. Jabalpur 
v Shivakant Sukla,81 to Maneka Gandhi,82 and Francis Coralie 
Mullin.83 The adherence to judicial restraint, based on the 
earlier legal tradition which was found in A.K. Goyalan and 
which reached a highwater mark with the judicial 'hands off' 
position in A.P.M. Jabalpur, has been radically transformed 
following Maneka Gandhi, an important case which supports 
judicial intervention and activism.
The origin of the new legal rationale in India lies in 
the active judicial interpretation of cardinal fundamental 
rights provisions of the Constitution. The gradual 
establishment of a public law domain is the outcome of 
combined effects of the interpretation given to them 
particularly in the cases discussed above. Indian 
environmental jurisprudence now clearly manifests this newly 
evolved philosophy of Indian constitutionalism, based on 
constitutional provisions, but led by an activist judiciary. 
The following sub-chapter explores the mechanism for 
judicial activism as provided by the Constitution and the 
implications of this new scenario.
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2.4 The extraordinary remedial powers and their
modifications
We have already seen how the ideals of the Constitution have 
encouraged the Indian judges to assume more explicitly a 
societal and thus necessarily a political role.84 The 
extraordinary constitutional powers of the higher Indian 
judiciary have greatly enhanced the evolution of the new 
constitutional rationale. Here the technicalities of these 
specific powers are analysed to illustrate how they operate. 
The focus is on the modification brought about within the 
last two decades in the operation of these remedial 
provisions of the Constitution, without delving elaborately 
into the scope of these provisions. Their strategic 
importance has been relied upon heavily for the development 
of Indian environmental jurisprudence, details of which are 
discussed in later chapters.
The enforcement of fundamental rights through the 
extraordinary constitutional remedies is an important facet 
of the entire operational gamut of Indian constitutional law 
development. The main remedial provisions in the 
Constitution which are relevant for this study are the 
extraordinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under 
Article 32 and of the High Courts under Article 226. We 
focus our investigation here on how the scope of the 
remedies has been modified to meet social needs.
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These provisions confer power on the superior courts to 
issue directions, orders or writs including writs in the 
nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto 
and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the 
enforcement of a fundamental right. The power under Article 
32 is twofold in nature, in the sense that the right to move 
the Supreme Court for the enforcement of the fundamental 
rights is guaranteed, and at the same time the Supreme Court 
is empowered to grant any appropriate remedies.85 The scope 
of Article 22 6, although it does not guarantee a right to 
move the High Courts, is in fact wider than that of Article 
32, as it provides greater discretion to the courts for the 
enforcement not only of the fundamental rights but also for 
any other purposes.
Since the early 1980s, the established rules of common 
law on locus standi have been modified for the purpose of 
giving effect to the new constitutional rationale. This was 
at first achieved by extending procedures followed under 
writs of habeas corpus. In the case of a habeas corpus writ, 
the remedy against human rights violations, any concerned 
person can file a petition to secure the release of a person 
in illegal detention. To some extent the writ of quo 
warranto also allowed any person to challenge the 
appointment of a person to a public office. However, the 
general rule that only a person whose right had been 
infringed could seek relief governed the issue of the writs 
of mandamus and certiorari challenging administrative
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actions.86
Two Supreme Court rulings in the mid-1970s provided the 
starting point for the gradual expansion of the concept of 
locus standi in mandamus and certiorari writ proceedings. In 
Bar Council of Maharashtra v M.V. Dabholkar,87 and J.M. 
Desai v Roshan Kumar,88 the Supreme Court indicated that the 
concept of standing varies with circumstances; while in
private law its ambit was narrow, it had to be given wider
import in public law matters. Although a 'meddlesome
interloper' would have no locus standi, a stranger may have 
standing where circumstances involving a grave miscarriage 
of justice had an adverse effect on public interest.89 Apart 
from these two rulings, one can see that generally, in
matters involving public interest, the High Courts in 
various states have often shown a liberal attitude.90
Considerable legal movement occurred at the beginning 
of the 1980s. In Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v Union 
of India,91 Krishna Iyer J. relied upon the Dabholkar case92 
to support a broad-based application of the principle of 
locus standi necessary to challenge administrative actions. 
In ABSK Sangh (Railways) v Union of India,93 while 
recognising the locus standi of an unrecognised association, 
Justice Krishna Iyer held that:
"Our current processual jurisprudence is not of 
individualistic Anglo-Indian mould. It is broad-based 
and people-oriented, and envisions access to justice
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through 'class actions', 'public interest litigation', 
and 'representative proceedings'. Indeed, little 
Indians in large numbers seeking remedies in courts 
through collective proceedings, instead of being driven 
to an expensive plurality of litigation, is an 
affirmation of participative justice in our democracy. 
We have no hesitation in holding that the narrow 
concept of 'cause of action' and 'person aggrieved' and 
individual litigation is becoming obsolescent in some 
jurisdictions. "94
This judicial policy became crystallised by 1981, in an 
important case concerning the transfer of judges, S.P. Gupta 
v Union of India.95 In this case, Bhagwati, J. stated that: 
"... where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to 
a person or to a determinate class of persons by reason 
of violation of any constitutional or legal right . . . 
and such person or determinate class of persons is by 
reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or 
socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable 
to approach the court for relief, any member of the 
public can maintain an application for an appropriate 
direction, order or writ in the High Court under 
Article 226 of the constitution and in case of a breach 
of fundamental right of such person or determinate 
class of persons, in the Supreme Court under Article 32 
seeking judicial redress for the legal wrong or injury 
caused to such person or determinate class of
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persons . 1,96
In People's Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) v Union 
of India,97 known as the Asiad case, the expanded doctrine 
of standing was applied by the court to allow civil rights 
organisations to maintain a petition alleging violations of 
fundamental rights of labourers employed for certain 
construction works. In Sheela Barse v State of 
Maharashtra,98 a journalist was heard by the Supreme Court 
to remedy the condition of women in police custody. The 
Court directed that there should be special provisions for 
women prisoners in police custody.
In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India,99 a social 
organisation had sent a letter to a judge of the Supreme 
Court stating that large numbers of labourers were working 
in stone quarries as bonded labourers under inhuman 
conditions. The Supreme Court treated the letter as a writ 
petition, issued notice and appointed an advocate as 
Commissioner to investigate the matter and to report back to 
the court. In this case the Supreme Court rejected the 
objections raised by the Union Government on the 
maintainability of the petition. The court interpreted the 
scope of Article 32 widely, stating that the Court could 
adopt such procedure as it thought fit in the exercise of 
its jurisdiction for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
The above cases show how the extaordinary powers of
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the courts under the Constitution have been modified. This 
expansion of the remedial powers in the Constitution has led 
to the evolution of a new type of litigation to meet the 
social needs of the country.
2.5 The effect of social action litigation
The above cases expanding the scope of standing gave way to 
a new judicial process of social action litigation (SAL) or 
Indian public interest litigation.100 The terminology is 
often intermixed in judicial pronouncements.101 It is 
basically a non-adversarial justice delivery process in 
which the judge is an active participatory figure rather 
than a passive umpire.
SAL has been used as an important vehicle to resolve 
environmental issues and has contributed much to the 
development of Indian environmental jurisprudence. SAL is in 
addition to civil actions which could be brought before 
ordinary courts to redress public interest grievances, 
either as representative suits under Order I Rule 8 
proceedings or civil actions under section 91 of the Civil 
Procedure Code of 1908 after the 1976 Amendment, discussed 
in chapter 3.3 below.
The essence of the SAL strategy is a unique human 
rights approach which has been extended into various realms
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of administrative law such as environmental law. The 
constant resort to the judiciary for resolving major 
environmental issues through SAL has become a characteristic 
feature of Indian environmental jurisprudence. The 
development of environmental jurisprudence has made full use 
of all these techniques developed to protect the human 
rights of the people of India.
Cunningham's study on public interest litigation in 
India distinguished it from traditional litigation by 
focussing on the expanded standing, non-adversarial 
procedures and the attenuation of rights from remedies.102 
Writers have shown that SAL provided the vehicle to change 
the common law doctrine of locus standi and the doctrine of 
stare decisis.103 The former restricts access to law and the 
latter restricts changes in the law and the judicial process 
itself.
One could say that both the doctrine of locus standi 
and the doctrine of stare decisis, which form the pillars of 
the common law tradition, have now become antithetical to 
the new Indian public law rationale. By entertaining an 
action of a representative or through a pro bono publico 
action, the court takes into consideration the importance of 
the public cause rather than seeing the issues brought only 
as a matter between the parties involved in the litigation. 
Cunningham shows that by providing remedies where there are 
no rights, the courts are in effect showing the need to
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depart from the fundamental principles of the traditional 
common law system and to develop a process of 'creative 
legislation' .104
SAL has been used as an instrument for providing speedy 
remedies for the enforcement of the FRs arising out of gross 
human rights violations and thus it marks the dawn of human 
rights jurisprudence in India.105 One of the early reported 
cases in this context is Sunil Batra v Delhi 
Administration.106 The court ordered a probe into the 
activities inside Tihar jail in Delhi on the basis of a 
letter written by one of the inmates of the prison, alleging 
gross atrocities committed by a jail warden against a 
prisoner. Sunil Batra I and II101 were soon followed by a 
series of probing directions issued against the Bihar 
government to ameliorate the condition of undertrial 
prisoners in Hussainara Khatoon v State of Bihar I-IV108 and 
in Khatri v State of Bihar,109 where prisoners who were 
subjected to torture were directed to be released and paid 
compensation. These early cases brought out gross human 
rights violations meted out to men in custody.
One could therefore say that SAL has been developed to 
achieve practical results. The relaxation of procedural 
rules regarding standing requirements, the introduction of 
epistolary jurisdiction, the exercise of suo moto powers and 
the use of Commissions to redress imbalance of evidence have 
all radically changed the ideology of the legal order, the
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operation of the judicial process, and they have yielded 
tangible results. Some of the leading SAL cases show a 
certain democratisation of the judicial process for the 
benefit of the poor, ignorant and oppressed classes of the 
society.110
There has, however, been much criticism as to the use 
of SAL techniques to wider areas of social regulation. It 
has been pointed out that courts may not be in a position to 
enforce directions laid down by them in most of these 
cases.111 It has also been argued that SAL is entering a 
limitless field leading to mere ubiquitious law games.112 At 
the same time it has been noted that the courts are becoming 
wary of the limits of SAL and have often shown astuteness 
and vigilance in not allowing the abuse of SAL strategies 
for litigously inclined strongmen.113
Among non-legal circles Indian public interest 
litigation still faces much criticism.114 The role of the 
Supreme Court in environmental litigation has also been 
criticised in a business fortnightly as "arbitratory".115 
Notably, a recent judgment of the Kerala High Court analyses 
the inherent limitations of public interest litigation and 
highlights how a court has to be extremely circumspect in 
such matters.116
The major effect of these cases for the development of 
environmental jurisprudence in India has been the greater
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emphasis placed on the accountability of state 
administration by exposing state actions and inactions to 
public scrutiny through judicial processes. Thus the public 
law domain, developed through a constitutional law 
rationale, places the primary responsibility upon the state 
to enhance the quality of the life of its citizens. 
Consequently, the legislature has also stepped in, after 
1986, to affirm the legitimacy of extended standing 
requirements and class action techniques. The changes 
brought about in the standing procedures in specific 
legislation related to the protection of the environment are 
discussed further in chapter 4.4 below. Thus the judiciary 
in India has assumed a unique role in shaping the future 
development of laws in India.
2.6 The societal role of the Indian judiciary
Several important socio-legal studies focused on the Indian 
Supreme Court have shown the unique role of the Indian 
judges and the use of their judicial power.117 According to 
Gadbois, the power of judicial review, enabling the courts 
to set limits not only on executive actions but also on 
legislative power, both in theory and in practice, makes the 
Indian Supreme Court wield a form of political power unknown 
elsewhere.118 Judicial review in India is an explicitly 
politically assigned role, as the provisions for judicial 
review sanction the courts' involvement in the ongoing
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political process.
We have already seen in chapter 2.4 and 2.5 above that 
the limitation placed upon the people's access to justice 
through the courts' earlier status quoist adherence has been 
radically modified in the last two decades through the 
process of judicial activism and public interest 
litigation.119 Thus the constitutional rationale seeks to 
make judicial processes work for the common people rather 
than being an arena of legal quibbling for men with long 
purses. The raison d'etre of this new legal rationale has 
been expressed by one of the most active judges of that 
time, Krishna Iyer J. , as:
"If law must serve life - the life of the many million 
masses whose lot has been blood, toil, tears and sweat 
- the crucifixion of the Indo-Anglican system and the 
resurrection of the Indian system is an imperative of 
independence. 1,120
The lectures and writings by some Indian judges show 
how they have balanced the conflicting claims of legislative 
need, social purpose and doing justice. One judge has 
asserted that it is the duty of judges to carry out their 
task without losing their philosophical outlook.121 The need 
to achieve the ideals set in the Constitution, coupled with 
the powers conferred upon the judiciary, has in effect 
created this characteristic role for the judges in India. To 
a well-known English public law expert, what has guided the
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judicial discretion of activist Indian judges appear to be 
extra legal factors.122
The extensive jurisdiction conferred upon the superior 
courts by the Constitution was gradually expanded further by 
the judges themselves.123 It can be said that after the 
political controversy raised by the Golak Nath case124 and 
its aftermath in judicial supersession,125 Keshavananda 
Bharati v State of Kerala126 puts the Indian judiciary 
clearly in a position where "the last word on the question 
of justice and fairness does not rest with the 
legislature" .127
The central role played by the court has also been 
explained as an exercise of rule making power by the court 
in the absence of legislative guidance.128 Cunningham has 
been able to show how the courts' actions in some cases 
appear to be typically legislative in nature.129 Court 
decisions have resolved several controversial and sensitive 
policy issues where even legislative attempts had failed 
earlier. For instance in Laxmi Kant Pandev v Union of 
India,130 the Supreme Court in the process of resolving a 
controversial and sensitive policy issue on how foreigners 
should be allowed to adopt Indian children, laid down 
detailed guidelines carrying the force of law. Rural 
Litigation Entitlement Kendra, Dehra Dun v State of U.P.131 
and other environmental cases analysed in chapters 3 and 6 
below show how the Supreme Court considered, balanced and
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resolved weighty competing policies, priorities and issues 
of resources. In rendering judgment, the court reviewed 
highly technical reports and sociological material and then 
issued comprehensive directions and guidelines.
Not surprisingly, it has been argued that the role of 
the higher judiciary in India has gradually become more 
overtly political.132 The new role of the higher judiciary 
has been summed up recently in an important decision of the 
Supreme Court133 on the independence of the judiciary in 
India in the following words:
"In the experience of the working of the constitution 
and the judicial system it becomes manifest that what 
was traditionally a non-political field, when courts 
were deciding disputes between citizen X and citizen Y, 
there grew additions of conflicts between the citizen 
and the state, enforcement of fundamental rights 
violations, public interest litigation, enforcement of 
policy matter and the like. Any matter under the sky, 
subject to inherent limitation, is open for judicial 
review in the higher judiciary. Not only do we strike 
down in judicial review executive, administrative or 
quasi judicial action and dismantle what appears to us 
to be offensive, still in numerous cases we have gone 
further to lay guidelines and done affirmative action. 
In doing so, have we not taken over political fields? 
Have we not in many an instance guided the functioning 
of a particular wing of the government and directed it
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to be run in a particular fashion and monitor its 
progress? Have we not sitting on the couch of Article 
14 been telling the executive what is right from our 
point of view, and had it done by our way? 
Multiplication of examples would hardly be necessary to 
hammer the point. There is nothing to feel shy in 
stating that the traditional role of the court of 
remaining apolitical is a thought of the past."134
The above words of a Supreme Court judge show how the 
working of the Constitution and the judicial system in India 
have brought about the transformation of an inherited common 
law system into a unique Indian public law system. The new 
rationale compels the legal system to function in many 
unique ways rejecting its adjudicatory posture and the 
mystery and mystique of the inherited common law-like 
judicial processes.
This new role of the higher judiciary has been seen as 
a case of 'enchantment'.135 The survey conducted by Gadbois 
and Sharma indicates the wide support for the Supreme 
Court's activist role among the legal community in order to 
retain the confidence of the people.136 The consolidation of 
a societal role of the judiciary through the processes of 
judicial review and judicial activism has enabled the courts 
to direct future legal development. This is particularly the 
case in the development of Indian environmental 
jurisprudence. This has facilitated constant resort to the
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judiciary to resolve major environmental issues through the 
unique strategies of SAL or Indian public interest 
litigation.
This chapter has laid out relevant aspects of Indian 
constitutional law which have created, through their 
cumulative effect, a new public law rationale. Thus, within 
the last two decades, there has been perceptible change in 
the constitutional law of India and this has provided a 
strong background for the development of Indian 
environmental jurisprudence. The specific provisions which 
were added to the Constitution in 197 6 made it explicitly 
clear that protection of the environment operates very much 
as a part of the Indian constitutional regime.
Before the advent of the new constitutional rationale 
and the incorporation of specific provisions for the 
protection of the environment, the only regime in this area 
was the defunct common law regime which sought to police the 
environment through public nuisance doctrines adhering to 
British criminal law strategies and private property 
principles. The next chapter analyses how the new 
constitutional rationale has now modified the Indian law on 
public nuisance.
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CHAPTER 3 PUBLIC NUISANCE AND INDIAN ENVIRONMENTAL
JURISPRUDENCE: FROM COMMON LAW FOUNDATIONS TO 
PUBLIC LAW MODELS
In the previous chapter, relevant areas of Indian 
constitutional law which have formed the basic foundation of 
Indian environmental jurisprudence were analysed. The 
cumulative result of the changes, particularly the meaning 
and importance accorded to different parts of the 
Constitution, pointed to the evolution of a new public law 
rationale. The gradual modifications and changes which are 
significant for the unique development of Indian 
environmental jurisprudence showed how this development has 
now steered away from the earlier legal order based on the 
common law rationale. In the present chapter, the common law 
foundations particularly relevant for the protection of the 
environment are analysed. The chapter initially shows the 
inherent deficiency of the common law on public nuisance for 
the purpose of environmental protection. It then focuses on 
the relevant provisions of law in India and illustrates the 
manner in which they operated in the past. Finally we 
analyse the modifications and strategies adopted in India 
within the last decade or so to make the public nuisance law 
work within the new public law rationale.
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3.1 Public nuisance and the common law foundations in India
Before the terms 'environment' and 'pollution' assumed their 
current meaning and importance, what we now see as 
environmental or pollution matters were covered by other 
mechanisms of law. In particular, a doctrinal basis for 
environmental law can be founded upon the law of nuisance 
under the common law. The importance of the common law for 
the purpose of environmental protection has lately been 
given much attention in the Anglo-American common law 
jurisdictions.1
One can see that public nuisance as a crime under 
English common law includes such diverse matters as carrying 
on an offensive trade, obstructing the highway by rendering 
it dangerous and inconvenient to pass, exposing to the 
public street a person suffering from infectious disease, or 
selling food unfit for human consumption.2 Although most 
instances of environmental harm can be brought within the 
conceptual fold of public nuisance under the common law, 
this appears to have become inadequate in actions against 
perpetrators of environmental harm.3
Under common law, public nuisance is covered both under 
the law of crime and the law of tort. The law on nuisance, 
a rather unique area of law, is of two kinds: public and 
private nuisance. A private nuisance is a civil wrong and a 
public or a common nuisance is generally considered as a
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criminal offence. The element which all public nuisance has 
in common with private nuisance is that of annoyance or 
inconvenience. The maxim 'Sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
laedas' which, in essence, means the use of one's property 
so as not to injure another's, shows the ideological pith 
and substance of nuisance law as evolved under the common 
law. It indicates a condition or activity which unduly 
interferes with the use or enjoyment of land. It has been 
shown that although this maxim was a favourite citation in 
the early cases on nuisance, like most maxims, it was held 
to be lacking in definition and inaccurate.4
Historically, the law of nuisance under the common law 
developed for the protection of proprietorial rights through 
what was known as "the assize of nuisance" .5 The common law 
recognised rights to protection against environmentally 
offensive activities but generally tied these rights to 
property interests. The common law courts, particularly 
during the Industrial Revolution, adopted a policy of 
non-interference. This position, it would appear, became 
more established as the common law passed over into the 
colonies, as in American law.6 Salmond, the well-known 
English jurist, has however noted that public and private 
nuisances are not in reality two species of the same genus.7
It has been shown by the authors of an English criminal 
law textbook that the Blackstonian definition of public 
nuisance as "an annoyance to all the King's subjects" is
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clearly too wide and if it was so, no public nuisance could 
ever be established.8 One also frequently finds reference to 
the definition of Lord Denning, which is often cited in 
English nuisance cases, that:
"A public nuisance is a nuisance which is so widespread 
in its range or so indiscriminate in its effects that 
it would not be reasonable to expect one person to take 
proceedings on his own responsibility to put a stop to 
it, but that it should be taken on the responsibility 
of the community at large."9
One can therefore agree with a more modern definition 
that public nuisance as a criminal offence is an unlawful 
act or ommission to discharge a legal duty, which act or 
omission endangers the lives, safety, health, property or 
comfort of the public or by which the public are obstructed 
in the exercise or enjoyment of any right common to all.10 
Over the years in England, virtually the entire area of 
traditional public nuisance prosecutions has been 
comprehensively covered by statutes.11 With the advent of 
statutory law, the use of common law principles in this area 
has been stultified.12 Where a statute expressly or by 
necessary implication authorises an activity, then liability 
under the common law principle is excluded. This appears to 
have been the case in the use of public nuisance in England 
for the development of environmental jurisprudence.13 Thus 
the law on public nuisance in common law jurisdictions 
remains markedly underutilised, confused and dormant and has
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even defied precise definition, particularly for the purpose 
of environmental protection.14
Therefore there is a strong case in the Anglo-American 
common law jurisdictions, that in order to meet modern 
environmental problems, public nuisance should not 
unnecessarily constrict itself with archaic property law 
notions, nor should it refuse an individual to prosecute the 
perpetrator of a crime against the community at large. In 
the context of the Exxon Valdez litigation, which arose out 
of an oil tanker disaster in North America, it was brought 
out that liberal standing rules could have solved much of 
the dilemma involved in public nuisance and federal citizen 
suits in the United States.15 The inadequacy of the common 
law for protecting the environment clearly indicates the 
need for radical change in the ideology of the legal system 
and the non-adherence to adversarial proceedings which 
operate by pitching the interests and rights of one person 
against those of another. In this respect, one could say 
that a revitalised public nuisance could be of much utility 
in environmental cases.16
The new public law regime in India has been able to 
bring about important modifications to remould and 
revitalise the principles of public nuisance and utilise 
them effectively. First, the public interest to protect the 
environment was brought within the fold of the new 
public law regime by incorporating specific provisions in
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the Indian constitution, as shown in chapter 2 above. 
Secondly, the judicial processes of adversarial proceedings 
were modified through liberalised standing provisions and 
through explicit judicial activism to foster public interest 
and to meet the ends of environmental justice.
We begin our investigation into the Indian situation by 
showing how the foundations of the Anglo-Indian common law 
allowed modification and variation necessary for the 
development of modern India's environmental jurisprudence. 
Therefore, it is relevant to consider here briefly the 
peculiar way by which India came under the influence of the 
common law.
The origins of the import of common law into India have 
been traced to the early Charter Acts from 1661 onwards.17 
The early Charters, which established English courts in 
India, while the Moghul rulers were still officially the 
supreme authority over the Hindu and Muslim kingdoms in most 
parts of India, required the judges to act according to 
"Justice, equity and good conscience" in deciding civil 
disputes if no source of law was identifiable.18 The origin 
of this formula has been traced to the Romano-Canonical 
juridical philosophy of the sixteenth-century English 
jurists.19 The formula was then adopted in India to smooth 
out discrepancies between different systems of law which 
were in operation and to introduce concepts which strongly 
resemble the character of the English law. Professor Derrett
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has argued that not only English law was applied, but also 
it gave room for the application of all kinds of laws.20 
This concept, therefore, has not only brought Indian legal 
development in line with English common law but has offered 
ample scope for modificaton and variation.21 The judicial 
need to act according to justice, equity and good conscience 
under the early enactments and the Charter Acts has been 
held to be the main reason for the Indian courts to follow 
English common law.22
Many aspects of the law of torts remained vague in 
India because the application of the English law of torts to 
the Indian conditions was completely unsuitable in many 
fields.23 Only some aspects of the law of torts were 
codified in special statutes,24 while much of the 
substantive law on torts has remained uncodified.25 
Consequently, it could be said that the formula of justice, 
equity and good conscience, sown in India by the British, 
gave more flexibility and adaptability to meet the ends of 
justice by allowing the case-law to develop in challenging 
situations in its own way.
The Constitution of India has not brought about any 
change to this particular situation. According to Article 
372 of the Indian Constitution, all the laws in force 
immediately before the commencement of the Constitution 
continue to be in force. However, in some areas such 
vestigial links have led to quagmire situations. This has
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been shown with reference to the vicarious liability of the 
government for the torts committed by its servants:26
Article 300 of the Constitution of India, which deals 
with the extent of liability, refers back to Section 17 6 of 
the Government of India Act, 1935. This, in turn, refers 
back to Section 32 of the Government of India Act, 1915 and 
that, in turn, refers back to Section 65 of the Government 
of India Act, 1858. Section 65 of the Government of India 
Act, 1858 had laid down that on the assumption of the
Government of India by the British Crown, the Secretary of 
State for India in Council would be liable to the extent as 
the East India Company was previously liable. The decisions 
of the courts in India in this area have also not been of 
any great help.27
The above situation, like in many other areas of law in 
India, indicates that where the legal rationale has not been 
modified and is left to continue, then the result is 
confusion, involving strange historical exegesis.
Under common law a civil action for public nuisance is 
permitted only when the litigant establishes particular 
damage to himself. In cases of public nuisance which affect 
a large portion of the community, a civil action for 
abatement has to be brought by the Advocate General, who 
represents the community at large. To evoke the substantive 
law of public nuisance in such matters would require getting
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across the procedural hurdle of locus standi. As shown in 
the previous chapter, these hurdles have been gradually 
lowered through judicial processes based on the 
constitutional rationale. The Ratlam28 and M.C. Mehta 
cases,29 discussed in detail in Chapter 6.1 and 6.2, show 
the distinct break from the English law tradition towards 
the evolution of a new jurisprudence. They give a strong 
indication that these efforts are also designed to develop 
a public law of torts. In this respect, it has been pointed 
out in India that blueprints for this development could be 
found in civil law jurisprudence, especially the French 
jurisprudence.30 Such an outcome is implicit in the 
statement of the former Chief Justice Bhagwati in M.C. Mehta 
that "we cannot allow our juridical thinking to be 
constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in 
England. "31
3.2 Public Nuisance under the Indian Penal Code
This section focuses here on the operation of the principles 
of the law of nuisance through specific statutory provisions 
in the Civil and Criminal Codes of India.32 The Indian Penal 
Code of 1860 contains elaborate provisions defining the 
crime of public nuisance in its various aspects and 
instances and prescribes punishments. Chapter XIV of the 
Indian Penal Code deals with offences affecting public 
health, safety, convenience, decency and morals.33
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Section 2 68 of the Indian Penal Code provides the 
definition of public nuisance. It follows the general scheme 
adopted in the Code of not defining a term in the abstract 
but by defining it in relation to the doer.34 The section 
reads as follows:
"268. Public nuisance. - A person is guilty of a public 
nuisance who does any act or is guilty of an illegal 
omission which causes any common injury, danger or 
annoyance to the public or to the people in general who 
dwell or occupy property in the vicinity, or which must 
necessarily cause injury, obstruction, danger or 
annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any 
public right. A common nuisance is not excused on the 
ground that it causes some convenience or advantage."
This definition of public nuisance is capable of 
bringing within its fold all instances of public nuisance. 
It has been pointed out that the definition was in fact 
borrowed for the purpose of the Code from a definition 
attempted by the authors of the Digest of Criminal Law in 
England.35 This definition contained in Section 2 68 is 
interlinked with Section 290 of the Indian Penal Code which 
prescribes punishment for public nuisance in cases not 
otherwise specifically provided for in the Code. This 
definition is also relevant with reference to the procedural 
provisions under the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973. 
Section 290 of the Indian Penal Code reads as follows:
"290. Punishment for public nuisance in cases not
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otherwise provided for - Whoever commits a public 
nuisance in any case not otherwise punishable by the 
Code, shall be punished with fine which may extend to 
two hundred Rupees."
Section 290 is worded as a residual provision because 
in the several sections of the chapter punishments are
provided for the various specific nuisances. It could be 
seen that the generality of the definition of public
nuisance in Section 268 provides greater scope for effective 
application than the specific provisions. One can see from 
the cases discussed later in this sub-chapter that Section 
290 read with Section 268 has more often been resorted to 
than other specific provisions related to public nuisance.
There are two specific sections dealing with the
fouling of water (Section 277) and making the atmosphere 
noxious to health (Section 278) which could be used against 
perpetrators of water and air pollution. Sections 277 and 
278 of the Indian Penal Code read as follows:
"277. Fouling water of public spring or reservoir.
Whoever voluntarily corrupts or fouls the water of any 
public spring or reservoir, so as to render it less fit 
for the purpose for which it ordinarily used, shall be 
punished with imprisonment of either description for a 
term which may extend to three months, or with fine 
which may extend to five hundred rupees or with both."
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"278. Making atmosphere noxious to health. Whoever 
voluntarily vitiates the atmosphere in any place so as 
to make it noxious to the health of persons in general 
dwelling or carrying on business in the neighbourhood 
or passing along a public way, shall be punished with 
fine which may extend to five hundred rupees."
The above two provisions have direct relevance to 
environmental protection as they seek to prevent water and 
air pollution through a penal strategy. However, their 
effective application towards achieving this objective is 
doubtful, because the technicalities of Indian criminal law 
require a complete satisfaction of the ingredients of the 
offence as stipulated in the penal provisions. Take for 
instance the provisions relating to fouling of water. The 
wording requires proof of the voluntary corruption or 
fouling of water, that the water must be of a public spring 
or a reservoir and that the water must have been rendered 
less fit for the purpose for which it was ordinarily used. 
Such wordings not only create a burden for the prosecution 
to prove, but also provide the accused enough grounds to 
argue his way out. The above provisions did not liberate the 
criminal justice process from the difficulties of the common 
law demanding elaborate evidence for sundry matters as well 
as technical interpretations of obvious things and events.
The above position is well illustrated by some of the 
early recorded cases. In one of the earliest cases recorded
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in 1882, Queen v Vitti Chokkan,36 it was held in a one 
sentence judgment that the words 'public spring' or 
'reservoir' under Section 277 of the Indian Penal Code did 
not include a river. Thus the Madras High Court, in 1881, 
quashed the conviction of one Vitti Chokkan for having 
"dirtied the drinking waters of the Varaga River, the only 
drinking water available in the locality, by washing 
bullocks therein" and also four other persons for having 
"rendered the spring water of the Varaga River unfit for the 
purpose of bathing and drinking by putting up a dam across 
the river and catching fish".37
In 19 04, the Bombay High Court avoided the specific 
provision in the Indian Penal Code relating to fouling 
water, but sought refuge in the general residual provision 
of Section 290 in the Code for penalising the fouling of 
river waters in Emperor v Nama Rama.38 Here the accused and 
nine others had been convicted by the trial court under the 
specific provision of Section 277 for the offence of fouling 
the waters of a river and rendering it unfit for drinking 
purposes. However the High Court of Bombay had a different 
view on appeal. The court relied upon earlier cases under 
the Indian Penal Code39 and held:
"Though the fouling of the waters of a river running in 
a continuous stream may not be an offence under s. 277, 
Indian Penal Code, it may well be an nuisance under s. 
29 0, Indian Penal Code, if the evidence shows that the 
act was such as to cause common injury or danger to the
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public. "40
In 1887 the Calcutta High Court also expressed doubts 
about the application of the specific provision of fouling 
water in Re: Umesh Chandra Kar,41 where the accused had
placed bamboo stockades across tidal waters and held that 
the offence was one of public nuisance under Section 268, 
punishable under Section 290.
Thus quite specific provisions have to a great extent 
been downgraded by judicial adherence to the letter of the 
law and attention to technical requirements. One could argue 
this point further with similar cases, where nuisance 
related to the fouling of water or vitiating the atmosphere 
were punished by resort to the general penal provisions for 
public nuisance. In Berkefield v Emperor,42 it was held that 
the Manager of a bone mill was guilty of committing a public 
nuisance because he allowed stacks of bones to remain 
uncovered in the open for a long time. They became rotten 
and emitted a smell noxious to people living in or passing 
by the vicinity. The Calcutta High Court held:
"It is clear that for the provison of Section 268, it 
is not necessary that the smells produced by it should 
be injurious to health but that it is sufficient if 
they be offensive to the senses."43
In Phiraya Mai v Emperor,44 the working of rice husking 
machines throughout the whole night in a residential area
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was held to be a public nuisance under Section 268. In this 
case, the court held it was not a sine qua non that such an 
annoyance as this should injuriously affect every member of 
the public within its range of operation, but was sufficient 
that it should affect people in general who dwell in the 
vicinity.45
The above cases show that specific statutory provisions 
seem to have served little good. This adverse effect can 
also be attributed to the then prevailing judicial attitude 
of determining issues by avoiding the use of specific 
provisions, even in clear cases of nuisance arising out of 
water and air pollution. An important factor to be noted 
here is that the residual provision in section 290 lays down 
less punishment than the specific provisions for fouling 
water and for making the atmosphere obnoxious. One could 
draw the inference that statutory specificity and stringent 
penalty had only resulted in stultifying the efficiency of 
the law.
A complete survey of all the reported cases on public 
nuisance related to environmental pollution does not appear 
to have been attempted and it is outside the scope of this 
study to undertake such a survey.46 However, it could be 
said from the cases analysed above that the specific 
provisions under sections 277 and 278 were often avoided to 
deal with what we would now consider as water or air 
pollution. This rationale appears to have continued well
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into the early period of independent India. For instance in 
1953, the Madras High Court in Achammagari Venkata Reddy v 
State47 appears to have avoided the specific provision in 
what must have been a clear case for section 277 and held 
that, if a person by raising the level and cross bunding a 
rastha causes stagnation of water leading to breeding of 
mosquitoes and so on, giving rise to offensive smell and 
causing to the persons living in the vicinity danger to 
their health and annoyance, he commits a public nuisance 
punishable under Section 290.48
Likewise, the application of the public nuisance 
provisions under the criminal law was inhibited by technical 
requirements. In 1959, the Supreme Court of India held in a 
criminal appeal that, if the chimney of a mill is of a 
prescribed height and if it emits smoke, this is not a 
public nuisance and the accused is not guilty of the offence 
punishable under Section 290 of the Indian Penal Code.49
Another important inhibiting factor noticed in the 
study of these early cases is the invocation of a common law 
presumption that the principal is not continually liable for 
the acts of his agent.50 One of the early cases that 
highlight this point is Bibhuti Bhusan Biswas v Bhuban 
Ram.51 Here the proprietor and the manager of a mill were 
prosecuted and convicted under Section 290 of the Indian 
Penal Code on complaints that the working of the mill was a 
nuisance. But the Calcutta High Court did not agree. It set
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aside the conviction and held that the principal is not 
criminally answerable for acts of his agent and such 
convictions are bad in law. This rationale, however, does 
not appear to be acceptable now. The change of rationale on 
this particular point is depicted in the 1973 Andhra Pradesh 
case of Kurnool Municipality v Civic Association, Kurnool,52 
where the Court went to the extent of holding a municipality 
liable for an offence of public nuisance for acts of their 
agents. The Court held:
"It is true that corporate bodies necessarily act by or 
through their agents. There is no reason to exempt them 
from liability for criminal acts or omissions committed 
by their agents or servants while purporting to act for 
or on behalf of the corporate bodies."53
The above case can be seen as a forerunner to the 
momentous change that was brought about in the Ratlam case, 
discussed in chapters 3.4 and 6.1 below. From the above 
analysis of selected old cases on public nuisance in India, 
one can see that the operation of law was very much based 
upon the legal rationale that pervaded the then judicial 
attitude.54 Although the foundations of law and the 
doctrines are very much the same today, the rationale has 
perceptably changed within the last two decades, as this 
thesis shows. This has brought about phenomenal changes in 
the usefulness and understanding of the law.
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3.3 Public Nuisance under the criminal and civil procedural
codes in India
The Indian Criminal Procedure Code of 1973 has a significant 
chapter on maintenance of public order and tranquility, 
which falls into four parts. Part A deals with unlawful 
assemblies (Sections 129-132), Part B with public nuisance 
(Sections 133-143), Part C with urgent cases of nuisance or 
apprehended danger (Section 144), and Part D with disputes 
as to immovable property (Sections 145-148). Most relevant 
in our present context is Section 133, which has been 
resorted to as an effective remedy to abate public nuisance 
in instances of environmental harm. This provision empowers 
a District Magistrate to pass conditional orders for the 
removal of nuisances.55 This section is supplemented with 
ancillary provisions, contained in Sections 134 to 143 of 
the Code,56 to constitute a comprehensive procedure for 
tackling public nuisance.
Section 144 of the Code has to be seen as a significant 
provision conferring wide powers upon the magistrate to deal 
with urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger. It 
constitutes a separate part of the chapter on maintenance of 
public order and tranquility.57 This magisterial power has 
been exercised only for the purpose of preventing public 
disorder arising out of public unrest or riot situations. 
The potential of this provision is vast, but it does not 
appear to have been utilised effectively in cases of
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environmental harm.
All these provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code 
were made at a time when the concern to protect the 
environment was not a matter of much interest. Therefore 
prima facie it may appear as if they are not relevant to 
environmental protection strategies. However, they confer 
wide and ample powers on the Magistrates, potent enough to 
curb or abate any public nuisance which may include 
environmental pollution or degradation. The judicial 
processes in India, being reoriented towards a public law 
rationale, have more recently developed new techniques of 
finding out potentialities of environmental protection in 
provisions hitherto unexplored. It is significant to note 
here that the provisions under the Criminal Procedure Code 
are more akin to an administrative remedy than a penal 
sanction strategy. Hence they have become more functionally 
efficacious under the public law rationale.
Under the Civil Procedure Code of 1908, civil suits 
against the perpetrators of public nuisance were allowed. By 
the amendment of the Civil Procedure Code in 1976, the 
procedure was made easier for the general public to seek 
recourse in the civil courts. Section 91 of the Code now 
reads as follows:
"Public nuisances and other wrongful acts affecting the 
public:-
(1) In the case of a public nuisance or other wrongful
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act affecting, or likely to affect, the public, a suit 
for a declaration and injunction or for such other 
relief as may be appropriate in the circumstances of 
the case, may be instituted, -
(a) by the Advocate-General, or
(b) with the leave of the court, by two or more 
persons, even though no special damage has been caused 
to such persons by reason of such public nuisance or 
other wrongful act.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to limit or 
otherwise affect any right of suit which may exist 
independently of its provisions."
Prior to the amendment in 197 6 such suits were allowed 
only with the sanction of the Advocate General. Thus a 
modification was brought about to the standing requirement 
which had been an obstacle in civil actions against 
environmental degradation. This is an important instance of 
early relaxation of procedural rules in the wider context of 
developing Indian public interest litigation which has 
already been discussed in chapter 2.
Order 1 Rule 8 under the Civil Procedure Code of 1908, 
as amended in 197 6, complements the above section and is 
significant for environmental litigation in India. This 
provision permits one person to sue or defend on behalf of 
all having the same interest. This provision deals with what 
are known as representative suits in common law
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jurisdictions. The rule has been framed and adopted for the 
purpose of saving multiplication of suits over a single 
cause of action. Where the interest of the community is 
affected, the Court has the power to direct one person or 
few to represent the whole community so that inconvenience 
and expenses may be saved. To bring a case under this 
provision, all the members of a class should have a common 
interest in a common subject matter and a common grievance 
and the relief sought should be beneficial to all. This rule 
is an enabling provision and does not prevent an individual 
from pursuing the same matter on its own right to seek 
relief.
An important feature of the civil litigation strategy 
adopted in India is the resort to injunctive relief rather 
than damages. Although in theory damages form an important 
principle in a tort action, in practice injunctive relief is 
used more in India for abating pollution. Lawyers in India, 
intent on abating pollution, often seek a temporary 
injunction against the polluter followed by a perpetual 
injunction on decree. Injunctions are of two kinds temporary 
and perpetual. They are regulated by sections 94 and 95 as 
well as Order 3 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Courts 
have an inherent power to issue a temporary injunction in 
circumstances that are not covered by Order 3 9 when they are 
satisfied that the interest of justice would require so.58 
The grant or refusal of temporary injunction is governed by 
the three established principles of common law: (1) the
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existence of a prima facie case, i.e. the facts showing that 
the plaintiff is likely to succeed in the suit, (2) the 
likelihood of irreparable injury, i.e. an injury that cannot 
be adequately compensated if the injunction is refused and
(3) the balance of convenience, i.e the court must be 
satisfied that the damage the defendant would suffer by the 
grant of the injunction is outweighed by the damage the 
plaintiff would suffer if the injunction is refused.
In Ram Bai Singh v Babulal,59 hazardous dust from a 
brick grinding machine polluted the air of a neighbouring 
medical practitioner's consulting room. Here, the polluter 
was permanently restrained from operating the machine. The 
court recognised a private right of action arising from a 
public nuisance. The court also employed a liberal test to 
determine the existence of a nuisance. Here one could 
discern that the injunction was issued apparently without 
examining the balance of convenience. Here the question also 
arises as to how far the common law standard of 
'reasonableness' provides a satisfactory basis for 
regulating pollution. It appears that under Indian 
conditions, such an approach is not likely to protect the 
most vulnerable sections of the population who are not 
merely the 'average' or 'reasonable person'.60
In B. Venkatappa v B. Lovis,61 the Andhra Pradesh High 
Court upheld the lower court's mandatory injunction 
directing the defendant to close the holes in a chimney
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facing the plaintiff's property. The court authorised the 
plaintiff to seal the holes at the defendant's cost if the 
defendant failed to do so. The High Court stated that the 
smoke and fumes that materially interfered with ordinary 
comfort were enough to constitute an actionable nuisance and 
that actual injury to health need not be proved. In Mukesh 
Textiles Mills (P) Ltd. v H.R. Subramanya Sastri,62 the 
defendants were the owners of a sugar factory which stored 
molasses in an earthen tank near the plaintiff's paddy and 
sugar cane field. The tank collapsed as a result of rodents 
digging into it. The molasses were discharged into the water 
channel and inundated and polluted the plaintiff's land, 
damaging his paddy and sugar cane crops. Here the Karnataka 
High Court applied the rule in Rvlands v Fletcher,63 partly 
confirmed the decision of the Court below and awarded 
damages to the plaintiff. The futile nature of relief 
obtained by the plaintiff in this action should be noted: 
the cause of action arose in April 197 0 and the final 
decision of the High Court was made only in 1987.64
The above cases also reveal that Indian judicial 
processes tend to accord lesser importance to awarding 
damages or costs: thereby moving away from the common law's 
conventional emphasis on damages. It could be argued that to 
some extent the ideology of awarding damages as such is 
incompatible with the Indian public law rationale which 
encourages a legal strategy for prevention rather than cure.
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3.4 From a common law to a public law rationale for public 
nuisance in India
Judicial activism in the use of the provisions on public 
nuisance in the Criminal Procedure Code was rare in the 
early cases because the courts had adopted several 
self-imposed restrictions. In Lalman v Bishambhar Nath,65 a 
Magistrate made an order to stop the working of, and to 
remove, a lime kiln from the municipality limits. This kiln 
had been working for forty five years upon a licence renewed 
from year to year. The order of the Magistrate in 
interfering with its working was set aside by the High 
Court. According to the High Court, the discomfort was only 
to the complainant and his immediate neighbours who had 
moved into the locality much later. The Court, thereby, was 
trying to bring in the notion that long-standing nuisance 
could not be remedied under this provision. Similarly in 
Manipur Dev v Bindhu Bhusan Sarker,66 the use of Section 133 
of the Code was restricted as the nuisance alleged had been 
long-standing. In Khair Din and others v Wasan Singh,67 this 
bar on the exercise of jurisdiction was also accepted. Long­
standing nuisance has been pleaded as a principle of law to 
counter complaints of existing nuisance. This particular 
point of law, based on the common law tradition, has been 
castigated in Ratlam as an "ugly plea".68 Some years ago 
this specific aspect of law has been analysed as an area of 
conflicting judicial opinion.69
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A major element of judicial attitudes which restricted 
the efficacy of the law and which can be deduced from the 
study of early cases arose whenever the issue of public 
nuisance conflicted with the carrying on of trade or 
business of the accused. The trend was akin to the common 
law traditions of recognising individual rights in trade, 
business and property, rather than being aligned to the 
social justice or human rights jurisprudence with its bias 
towards public interest and safety of the people at large.
A typical case that highlights the earlier British 
judicial attitude and its juridical rationale is Deshi Sugar 
Mills v Tupsi Kahar and others in 1926.70 A petition was 
filed with a Sub-Divisional Officer by nearly a hundred 
persons living in the neighbourhood of the river Daha 
complaining that the river had been polluted by the 
effluents from two sugar mills. The matter was referred for 
report and later, after appearance of both parties, an order 
was passed by the Sub-Deputy Magistrate directing the 
managers of the sugar mills to discontinue draining noxious 
water into the river and to abate the nuisance. The managers 
unsuccessfully moved the Sessions Court and then went to the 
High Court, pointing out that the removal of nuisance from 
a river was perhaps hardly applicable to the case of 
pollution by effluents from a factory. The High Court held 
that it was not very material whether that was so or not.71 
The court also expressed the opinion that:
"...in law it is not admissible for a tribunal to
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assume the attitude that, even if a nuisance is proved 
but not as against any particular party complained of 
as causing it, an order prohibiting such nuisance can 
be issued against all parties against whom complaints 
are made."72
Although the court felt that it is of the utmost 
importance that sources of public water supply must be 
maintained pure and free from pollution by industrial 
factories, it was held:
..such pollution must be convincingly proved against 
a wrongdoer before any order can be passed against 
him. 1,73
The Court further asserted that:
"But the matter is, it must be emphasized, one which 
calls for scientific enquiry and cannot be decided 
merely because a number of persons, in April or May 
when the river is very low and hardly flowing, think 
that the stagnation and impurity of the water, an 
outbreak of illness or the loss of some cattle may be 
due to the presence near of two sugar mills."74
Therefore the Court found it technically wrong to issue 
orders against both sugar mills and held that it would be 
necessary to prove substantially, before an order could be 
made against either or both mills, that the effluents from 
either or both, respectively, were noxious. Thus, Bucknill 
J., had no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the
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orders of the Magistrate to abate the pollution must be 
quashed in both these cases. The above case exemplifies the 
judicial attitude and the juridical rationale which appear 
to ignore the obvious public interest element involved in 
this case.
A complete chronological survey of relevant cases is 
clearly beyond the scope of this study. However, it would 
appear that the above judicial attitudes continued until 
about the last two decades. This is apparent because even in 
1962, when the Supreme Court of India had the occasion to 
interpret section 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code in Ram 
Autar v State of Uttar Pradesh,75 this juridical rationale 
did not show much change. In this case, the three appellants 
carried on the trade of auctioning vegetables. As a 
consequence, many carts in which vegetables were brought 
were parked in front of residential houses. This caused 
obstruction and inconvenience to the users of the road. The 
Magistrate intervened with a Section 133 order. The High 
Court of Allahabad dismissed the application for revision 
with the opinion that:
"When it is clear that the business of auctioning 
vegetables cannot be carried on without causing 
obstruction to the passers-by, the conduct of the 
business can be prohibited, even though it is carried 
on in a private place."76
But the Supreme Court held that this proposition of the
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High Court was too wide, construed the provision narrowly 
and allowed the appeal. Justice Das Gupta who delivered the 
judgment of a bench consisting of himself and Justices J.L. 
Kapur and Raghubar Dayal stated that:
"It appears to us that the conduct of trade of this 
nature and indeed of other trades in localities of a 
city where such trades are usually carried on, is bound 
to produce some discomfort though at the same time 
resulting perhaps in the good of the community in other 
respects. "77
It would appear that the interest of the unfortunate 
people affected by the inconveniences arising out of the 
trade carried on in the vicinity has been given less 
importance. According to the Supreme Court:
"In making the provisions of Section 133 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, the Legislature cannot have 
intended the stoppage of such trades in such part of 
town, merely because of the 'discomfort' caused by the 
noise in carrying on the trade."78
The above cases reflect the judicial attitude towards 
environmental protection vis-a-vis industrial or trade 
interests in India which has prevailed until more recently.
The beginnings of change can be seen in Gobind Singh v 
Shanti Sarup,79 decided in 1979 by the Supreme Court 
consisting of Chief Justice Chandrachud and Justices
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Sarkaria and Chinnappa Reddy. In this case the 
Sub-divisional Magistrate had made absolute a conditional 
order under Section 133(1) of the Criminal Procedural Code. 
The order required a baker to demolish the oven and the 
chimney of his bakery as it was found that the construction 
of the bakery and the volume of smoke emitted by it would 
play havoc with the lives of the people living nearby. 
According to the order, the baker should cease trading at 
this particular site and should not light the oven again. On 
revision the High Court upheld the order of the Magistrate. 
The baker appealed by Special Leave to the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court held:
"We are of the opinion that in a matter of this nature 
where what is involved is not merely the right of a 
private individual but health, safety and convenience 
of the public at large; the safer course would be to 
accept the view of the learned Magistrate who saw for 
himself the hazard resulting from the working of the 
bakery. "80
Although the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and 
upheld the Magistrate's order, it nonetheless modified the 
same, holding that:
"Preventing the appellant from using the oven is 
certainly within the terms of the conditional order, 
but not so the order requiring him to desist from 
carrying on the trade of a baker at the site."81
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One can discern a cautious judicial approach here when 
the issue apparently affects the individual's fundamental 
right to trade and occupation guaranteed under Article 19 of 
the Constitution.
The decision in Municipal Council, Ratlam v Vardhi 
Chand and others,82 created a tremendous impact not only in 
expanding the scope of Section 133 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code but also in setting the trend for a new jurisprudence 
through judicial innovation. It is a case in which a 
Magistrate ordered the appellant municipality under this 
provision to remove the nuisance in a locality mainly caused 
by open drains and public refuse by nearby slum dwellers for 
want of lavatories. Another contributory cause for the 
nuisance was the malodorous effluent discharged from a 
nearby alcohol plant. The Magistrate ordered the municipal 
authorities to draft a plan for better sanitary 
arrangements. On appeal the Sessions Court reversed the 
order, but then the High Court approved the order of the 
Magistrate. The Municipal Council appealed to the Supreme 
Court. The court went ahead in laying down the wide 
parameters of the power of the executive first class 
Magistrate in taking effective action against the public 
nuisance of environmental violation. The judgment is not 
confined to the interpretations of the provision but goes to 
the constitutional dimensions of environmental protection 
which are discussed in detail in chapter 6.1 below, while 
the former aspect alone is discussed here.
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Justice Krishna Iyer delivered the judgment of the 
court for himself and Justice Chinnappa Reddy, who was also 
a member of the bench in Gobind Sincrh. The court expounded 
the scope and potential of the concept of public nuisance 
under the Criminal Procedure Code as follows:
"Section 133, Cr.P.C. is categoric, although [it] reads 
discretionary. Judicial discretion when facts for its 
exercise are present, has a mandatory import.... Thus, 
his [the magistrate's] judicial power shall, passing 
through the procedural barrel, fire upon the 
obstruction or nuisance, triggered the jurisdictional 
facts...The imperative tone of S. 133, Cr.P.C. read 
with the punitive temper of S. 188, I.P.C. makes the 
prohibitory act a mandatory duty. "83
The judgment then proceeded to highlight the potential 
scope of this section when activated efficaciously. The 
judgement asserted that:
"Although these two Codes are of ancient vintage, the 
social justice orientation imparted to them by the 
Constitution of India makes it a remedial weapon of 
versatile use."84 
Therefore the court went on to hold that:
"An Order to abate the nuisance by taking affirmative 
action on a time-bound basis is justified in the 
circumstances. "85
Another important aspect of this judgment is its
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categorical assertion emphasising primary concern for public 
health, when confronted with business or industrial 
interests. One must also note that the judgment supplemented 
the magistrate's order and sought to force the state 
government to take appropriate action to stop the pollution 
caused by the effluents from an alcohol plant, stating 
unequivocally that:
"Industries cannot make profit at the expense of public 
health. "86
A further point to be noted here is that the judgment 
reflects the judicial realisation of the inefficacy of the 
existing penal strategy and called forth the need for a new 
legal strategy:
"The dynamics of the judicial process has a new 
'enforcement' dimension not merely through some of the 
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code (as here), 
but also through activated tort consciousness."87
This idea of an 'activated tort', one could argue, 
would be based on a public law rationale. Obviously the 
above case brings in radical views which have set the trend 
towards India's new environmental jurisprudence. A few years 
later, the Indian Supreme Court, in one of the M.C. Mehta. 
cases, discussed in detail below in chapter 6.2, held on the 
question of awarding damages to victims of environmental 
disaster that the compensation "must be correlated to the 
magnitude and capacity of the enterprise because such
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compensation must have a deterrent effect. The larger and 
more prosperous the enterprise, the greater must be the 
amount of compensation payable by it . . . "88 One can argue 
that the rationale behind this observation is purely based 
on asserting a public law regime rather than any private law 
approach of the common law of torts.
The impetus created by the Ratlam decision towards the 
creation of a new jurisprudence has evoked strong reactions 
from several legal scholars. It has been acclaimed as a case 
which provoked judicial cognisance of a problem which had 
not attracted much attention up to that time.89 This case 
was also described as setting a ball rolling which, on 
gaining momentum, would strike down many hurdles in the 
field for environmental protection.90 This case is also 
acclaimed as a pace setter in environmental jurisprudence.91 
A well-known jurist of India, Justice V.S. Deshpande, 
stated:
"It may therefore be said without fear of contradiction 
that the interest of the society in the preservation 
and improvement of the environment proclaimed by the 
constitution is a value which is to be developed by the 
courts. The burning example of judicial activism is the 
Ratlam Municipality case."92
Yet there are some who considered Ratlam as an odd 
decision, rather than the norm-setter, because it attempted 
only to break away from the general case law.93 However more
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recent cases, analysed below in chapter 6, reveal what was 
not obvious earlier, namely that section 133 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code is a very effective tool for the removal of 
pollution. The law of public nuisance is now being used for 
combating pollution to fill effectively the gaps which 
specific legislation has left. A public nuisance, as 
understood in India now, would broadly be defined as an 
unreasonable interference with a general right of the 
public. To that extent a public nuisance is not tied to 
interference with the enjoyment and use of property and the 
remedies against a public nuisance are available to every 
citizen. A number of recent cases illustrate this 
powerfully.
In Naqarjuna Paper Mills Ltd v Sub-Divisional 
Magistrate and Divisional Officer, Sanqareddy,94 the Andhra 
Pradesh High Court considered a petition from a Magistrate's 
Order shutting down a paper mill which had failed to take 
adequate pollution control measures. The mill challenged the 
Order, claiming that the State Pollution Control Board had 
exclusive power to regulate air and water pollution. The 
High Court rejected this argument and upheld the 
Magistrate's power to regulate pollution by restraining a 
public nuisance. In K. Ramachandra Mayya v District 
Magistrate,95 the Karnataka High Court approved a 
Magistrate's Order shutting down a stone quarry, where the 
Magistrate acted on complaints from neighbouring residents 
that the blasting of rocks at the quarry caused nuisance and
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danger from flying stones.
In P.C. Cherian v State of Kerala,96 the Kerala High 
Court had to consider whether carbon particles emitted from 
two factories amounted to an actionable public nuisance. The 
judgement in P.C. Cherian was delivered immediately after 
the judgement of the Supreme Court in Ratlam was reported. 
On the question as to whether there is weight in the 
contention that carbon has no toxic effect on the human body 
and dissemination of carbon is not a public nuisance, 
Justice Janaki Amma held:
"It is sheer common sense that if the atmosphere gets 
contaminated with carbon particles, visible or 
unvisible there is every risk that they would get 
themselves deposited on the bodies and get into the 
respiratory organs of the people residing in the 
neighbourhood. The evidence is that the particles get 
deposited on the wearing apparel of the people and the 
walls of buildings not to mention the other umpteen 
articles which may get affected by the deposit. This is 
therefore an outstanding instance of air pollution 
which has become a menace to people in the industrial 
cities. "97
She then cited the remark of Krishna Iyer J. in Ratlam, 
that:
"Public nuisance, because of pollution being discharged 
by big factories to the detriment of the poorer 
sections, is a challenge to the social justice
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component of the rule of law. "98
The court rejected the argument based on the decision 
in Ram Autar that the stoppage of work of the factories 
would deprive the workers of their livelihood. The court 
held that the danger that the general public has to face by 
the inadequate treatment of the pollutants outweighs the 
advantage in the form of jobs for a few persons and that too 
under threat to their own health.99
Krishna Gopal v State of Madhya Pradesh,100 illustrates 
how section 133 has been invoked even if the nuisance is 
complained of by a single person. In Krishna Gopal, the plea 
that the nuisance caused by a factory was only a private 
nuisance and not a public nuisance to fall within the scope 
of Section 133 was rejected by the Madhya Pradesh High 
Court. In this case a glucose saline factory was licensed to 
operate in a residential area. The boilers of the factory 
made loud noise round the clock, emitting smoke and ash 
dust, disturbing particularly the neighbour next door, who 
was a heart patient. His wife complained to the Sub- 
Divisional Magistrate. The Magistrate issued orders under 
Section 133 to remove the factory and the boiler from the 
area upon obtaining a police report. On appeal the Sessions 
Court found that the boiler alone could be removed and there 
was no need to close the factory. On revision the High Court 
endorsed the order of the Magistrate and ordered removal of 
both the boiler and the factory.
122
In this case, as in P.C. Cherian, the Madhya Pradesh 
High Court found that the emission of smoke from the boiler 
would undoubtedly injure the health as well as the physical 
comfort of the community. It was argued that the
inconvenience caused affected only the residents of a 
neighbouring house and that it should not be considered as 
a public nuisance as it was essentially private in nature. 
But the Court found the argument inherently fallacious and 
held that it is not the intent of the law that the community 
as a whole or a large number of complainants must come
forward to lodge their complaint or protest against the
nuisance. According to Justice Gyani:
"It should be remembered that environmental crimes 
dwarf other crimes to safety and property but the
position of law as it stands in the matter of 
sentencing such environmental crimes is rather 
comfortable. "101
This case also extended the scope of Section 133, with 
importance accorded to the health and physical comfort of 
the community, by holding that:
"The words (of Section 133) are wide in their amplitude 
and undoubtedly cover the present case. Manufacturing 
of medicines in a residential locality with the aid of 
installation of a boiler resulting in the emission of 
smoke therefrom is undoubtedly injurious to health as 
well as to the physical comfort of the community and 
there is no scope for any interference in this revision
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petition on that account."102
Krishna Gopal also brings out, as does Ratlam, the 
total apathy and indifference of public authorities who had 
given their permission for the factory without applying
their minds nor considering the objections from the local
residents. This again shows how the public law rationale
aims to make the relevant authorities, who in this case were
the Joint Director of Town and Country Planning, Municipal 
Corporation and the Chief Inspector of Boilers, obliged to 
carry out their duty. This new rationale, it is submitted, 
has given a major impetus for the current development of 
Indian environmental jurisprudence.103
Professor Leelakrishnan, a well-known environmental law 
teacher in India, has pointed out that in the absence of 
specific statutory law, a handy tool lies in the law of 
public nuisance to check and control environmental 
hazards.104 He shows how the law of public nuisance has been 
effectively used for the purpose of environmental protection 
in India and how the magistrates' power could interfere 
whenever there is any actual nuisance.
The present trend indicates that this power could soon 
be used to make measures for preventing potential nuisance. 
Since the Magistrate's power to this effect is exercised in 
his administrative capacity rather than in his judicial 
capacity, one could say this is another form whereby the
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common law principles of public nuisance have been employed 
to strengthen the new public law regime in India. The 
decision in Krishna Gopa1 shows that lethargy, corruption 
and carelessness of license granting agencies lead to a 
situation where any law relating to environmental protection 
could be violated with impunity. Thus, Section 133 has been 
developed by the judiciary as an overriding provision and as 
an effective tool to be used when the pollution control 
legislation fails.
As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, there is 
a current rethinking in the common law world of how to 
revive and revitalise the law of nuisance as a useful tool 
to tackle many environmental problems that specific 
legislation fails to control. Jurists and academics seem to 
perceive the usefulness of this branch of law but common law 
legal systems appear to be incapable of finding the means 
and methods of revitalisation. Spencer critically examines 
how, in the common law world, public nuisance has become 
virtually obsolete.105 He points out that everything in 
this branch of law seems contrary to modern notions of 
certainty and precision. The offence of public nuisance has 
such incredible breadth and is often treated at length in 
tort books along with private nuisance, although the two 
seem to have nothing much in common.106 There is surely a 
strong case for abolishing the crime of public nuisance, but 
Spencer advocates an alternative view as well. According to 
him, if there is no case for retaining a common law offence
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that consists in effect of doing anything that the court 
dislikes, there may be a case for a general offence of 
"doing anything which creates a major hazard to the physical 
safety or health of the public",107 in order to fill the 
accidental gaps that inevitably appear in the coverage 
provided by specific statutory offences. Spencer concludes, 
"Thus as an alternative to abolish we could keep a 
general offence of public nuisance, but redefine it by 
statute so that it is limited to behaviour which 
creates a threat to public safety or health. This would 
provide a handle against polluters and 
environment-destroyers who find new ways of endangering 
our lives, and would cause less disturbance too in 
civil law than would be caused by abolishing public 
nuisance altogether".108
Conor Gearty's writing on nuisance law in modern tort 
law also shows how the poverty of principle has deprived 
nuisance of what ought to have been its role in recent 
years.109 One could agree with him that the law of public 
nuisance could have been used for getting sewage out of the 
rivers, reducing unwanted noise and cleaning the atmosphere 
of acid smuts, smoke and other pollutants. Its remedies, 
injunctions and damages are in effect the strongest that the 
courts have to offer. They respond to the extent of the harm 
done, not, as in negligence, to the culpability of the 
harmer. Yet, nuisance is both attacked and is burdened 
because it has lost all sense of what it stands for. It
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needs to rediscover its own principles before it can turn 
its attention to effective protection of the environment.
Gearty has also pointed out that nuisance actions under 
the common law face not only the problem of definition but 
also structural problems such as causation, the burden of 
proof and the rules on locus standi.110 Some of the defences 
raised against nuisance actions on environmental issues are 
(1) prescription - which is raised mainly against private 
nuisances of long standing duration, (2) acquiescence - 
which is raised when there is delay in launching actions,
(3) legislative authority - which is the most common attack 
in large environmental cases where the right of action is 
often taken away by some specific statutes. These and 
similar hurdles are shown by a North American jurist to 
raise the question whether common law nuisance actions in 
environmental battles are well-tempered swords or broken 
reeds.111 However, the new Indian approach and its 
techniques show how such broken reeds of the common law, 
when energised with the public law rationale, can emerge as 
well-tempered swords to protect the environment.
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55. Section 133 will again be referred to later in this thesis. 
It reads as follows:
133. Conditional order for the removal of nuisance:-
(1) Whenever a District Magistrate or a Sub-divisional 
Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate specially 
empowered in this behalf by the State Government, on 
receiving the report of a police officer or other 
information and on taking such evidence (if any) as he 
thinks fit, considers -
(a) that any unlawful obstruction or nuisance should be 
removed from any public place or from any way, river or 
channel which is or may be lawfully used by the public; or
(b) that the conduct of any trade or occupation or the 
keeping of any goods or merchandise, is injurious to the 
health or physical comfort of the community, and that in 
consequence such trade or occupation should be prohibited 
or regulated or such goods or merchandise should be removed 
or the keeping thereof regulated; or
(c) that the construction of any building, or the disposal 
of any substance, or is likely to occasion conflagration or
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explosion, should be prevented or stopped; or
(d) that any building, tent or structure, or any tree is in 
such a condition that it is likely to fall and thereby 
cause injury to persons living or carrying on business in 
the neighourhood or passing by, and that in consequence the 
removal, repair or support to such building, tent or 
structure or the removal or support of such tree, is 
necessary; or
(e) that any tank, well or excavation adjacent to any such 
way or public place should be fenced in such a manner as to 
prevent danger arising to the public; or
(f) that any dangerous animal should be destroyed, confined 
or otherwise disposed of,
such Magistrate may make a conditional order requiring the 
person causing such obstruction or nuisance or carrying on 
such trade or occupation, or keeping any such goods or 
merchandise, or owning, possessing or controlling such 
building, tent, structure, substance, tank, well or 
excavation, or owning or possessing such animal or tree, 
within a time to be fixed in the order -
(i) to remove such obstruction or nuisance; or
(ii) to desist from carrying on, or to remove or 
regulate in such manner as may be directed, such trade 
or occupation, or to remove such goods or merchandise, 
or to regulate the keeping thereof in such manner as 
may be directed; or
(iii) to prevent or stop the construction of such 
building, or to alter the disposal of such substance; 
or
(iv) to remove, repair or support such building, tent 
or structure, or to remove or support such trees; or
(v) to fence such tank, well or excavation; or
(vi) to destroy, confine or dispose of such dangerous 
animal in the manner provided in the said order;
or, if he objects so to do, to appear before himself or 
some other Executive Magistrate subordinate to him at a 
time and place to be fixed by the order and show cause, in 
the manner herein after provided, why the order should not 
be made absolute.
(2) No order duly made by the Magistrate under this Section 
shall be called in question in any Civil Court.
Explanation. - A "public place" includes also property
belonging to the State, camping grounds and grounds left 
unoccupied for sanitary or recreative purposes.
56. Briefly, they are as follows: Section 134 prescribes the
procedure for the service or notification of the order. 
Section 13 5 requires the person to whom the order is
addressed to obey and show cause.
Section 13 6 is about the consequences of his failing to do
so.
Section 137 deals with the procedure where the existence of 
public right is denied.
Section 13 8 is on the procedure where he appears to show
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cause.
Section 139 empowers the Magistrate to direct local 
investigation and examination of an expert.
Section 140 empowers the Magistrate to furnish written 
instructions etc.
Section 141 prescribes the procedure on Order being made 
absolute and consequences of disobedience.
Section 142 empowers a Magistrate to issue injunctions 
pending inquiry.
Section 143 a Magistrate may prohibit repetition or 
continuance of public nuisance.
57. Section 144 reads as follows:
144. Power to issue order in urgent cases of nuisance or 
apprehended danger.-
(1) In cases where, in the opinion of a District 
Magistrate, a Sub-divisional Magistrate or any other 
Executive Magistrate specially empowered by the State 
Government in this behalf, there is sufficient ground for 
proceeding under this section and immediate prevention or 
speedy remedy is desirable, such Magistrate may, by a 
written order stating the material facts of the case and 
served in the manner provided by section 134, direct any 
person to abstain from a certain act or to take certain 
order with respect to certain property in his possession or 
under his management, if such Magistrate considers that
such direction is likely to prevent, or tends to prevent 
obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully
employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a
disturbance of the public tranquility, or a riot, or an 
affray.
(2) An order under this section may, in cases of emergency 
or in cases where the circumstances do not admit of the 
serving in due time of a notice upon the person against 
whom the order is directed, be passed ex parte.
(3) An order under this section may be directed to a
particular individual, or to persons residing in a 
particular place or area, or to the public generally when 
frequenting or visiting a particular place or area.
(4) No order under this section shall remain in force for 
more than two months from the making thereof:
Provided that, if the State Government considers it 
necessary so to do for preventing danger to human life, 
health or safety or for preventing a riot or any affray, it 
may, by notification, direct that an order made by a 
Magistrate under this section shall remain in force for 
such further period not exceeding six months from the date 
on which the order made by the Magistrate would have, but 
for such order, expired, as it may specify in the said 
notification.
(5) Any Magistrate may either on his own motion or on the 
application of any person aggrieved, rescind or alter any 
order made under this section by himself or any Magistrate 
subordinate to him or by his predecessor-in-office.
(6) The State Government may, either on its own motion or 
on the application of any person aggrieved, rescind or
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CHAPTER 4 THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF INDIAN ENVIRONMENTAL
STATUTES
In the last chapter we saw how the new public law rationale, 
evolved out of the Indian Constitution, has been able to 
modify and develop the common law on public nuisance as an 
effective tool to tackle environmental pollution in India. 
Within the last two decades, specific laws have been enacted 
in India to protect the environment.1 We now examine the 
three important statutes for the control of environmental 
pollution in India, the Water (Prevention and Control of 
Pollution) Act of 1974 [Act No. 6 of 1974], the Air 
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 1981 [Act No. 
14 of 1981] and the Environment (Protection) Act of 1986 
[Act No. 29 of 1986].
Until the mid-197 0s there were few initiatives in India 
to legislate for pollution control at the national level. 
The Orissa River Pollution Act of 1954 and the Maharashtra 
Prevention of Water Pollution Act of 1969 were two early 
State enactments in this field. Various States prompted the 
Central Government to initiate legislation for the purpose 
of water pollution control in line with the Maharashtra Act. 
A Bill was introduced in the Rajya Sabha as early as 1962 
and was examined by the Select and Joint Committees of 
Parliament.2 Although it was realised at the time of the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment of 1972
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at Stockholm that environmental problems of the developed 
countries are quite different from those which are faced by 
developing countries like India,3 no clear model of 
alternative legal strategy was then envisaged. It can be 
seen that by and large new laws were made adhering to the 
earlier models of legal regulation. Even today, such 
foundations continue to affect law enforcement and 
particularly inhibit the practical implementation of the new 
public law rationale.
By the late 1970s environmental protection had assumed 
political importance in India and was given more attention 
as part of the process of development and government 
planning. It was noted in 1980 by the Tiwari Committee, a 
high-level government committee,4 that all major political 
parties in India had recognised this need by the late 197 0s 
and specific concerns for the environment were aired by them 
in their political manifestos.5
The Tiwari Committee had for its deliberations a 
compilation of over 200 existing laws relating to 
environmental protection.6 The major shortcoming of these 
laws, as brought out by the Committee,7 was that many of them 
were updated versions of earlier laws which had primarily 
been used to promote development through resource 
utilisation. The Committee found that these laws, lacking 
statements of explicit policy objectives, were inadequate 
for helping the implementing machinery. Also, there were no
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procedures for reviewing the efficacy of the law. The 
findings of the Committee, thus, emphasise the complexity of 
the problem of statutory environmental protection in India, 
as most of the laws do not clearly state the social 
objectives they aim to achieve.8
Our analysis in this chapter starts from the wider 
framework of environmental law regulation generally. We then 
focus on the general framework of the three major 
environmental statutes in India, referred to above, to 
appraise their basic approach and their regulatory 
rationale. It is significant that they were soon seen as 
dysfunctional.9 Later sections of the present chapter, thus, 
focus on the post-1986 amendments to illustrate the gradual 
permeation of the new public law rationale, which has become 
the hallmark of the present Indian legal development. The 
chapter also analyses current views of legal scholars in 
India about regulatory ideologies and legislative approaches 
for environmental protection and development. The permeation 
of the new public law rationale, through modifications 
brought about to suit the ground realities of India, further 
manifests characteristic indigenous elements of Indian legal 
development which we discuss in detail in chapter 5 below.
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4.1 The nature of environmental regulation
Before we proceed to evaluate the specific pollution control 
statutes in India, we assess here briefly the foundations of 
regulatory laws generally and the basic rationale, ideology 
and strategy adopted in Anglo-American environmental laws. 
It is generally argued that most regulatory laws for the 
protection of the environment fail to achieve their 
objectives as they are applied in a legal tradition adopting 
the 'command and control' strategy of Western penal laws.10 
In order to understand environmental law within the Western 
regulatory paradigm, one must look at the development of 
regulatory laws in general. Obviously, to do this in detail 
is beyond the scope of the present study.11
In the relevant literature, it has been shown that 
since the mid-1960s there has been a gigantic increase in 
the regulatory legal order in the Anglo-American common law 
jurisdictions, creating what could be called a regulatory 
legal culture.12 Although economic regulations, as broadly 
conceived, initially dealt with market mismatches such as 
control of prices or of monopoly trade practices,13 they 
have also gradually become a common feature of environmental 
laws, which has evoked much debate.14 The operational 
strategy of these early regulatory laws remained basically 
unaltered, in the sense that regulation is a state-imposed 
limitation on the exercise of discretion by individuals and 
organisations which is supported by threat or sanction. No
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serious efforts seem to have been made to change the 
'rationale in regulation'15 and it can be argued that the 
only perceptional change is the shift in techniques,16 with 
greater emphasis on using 'modern' economic theories aimed 
at wealth maximisation.17
As a form of social control, regulation takes different 
styles and strategies. Adopting Donald Black's 
classification, one can distinguish two major strategies 
within the modern Anglo-American regulatory legal order.18 
They have been identified for the purpose of environmental 
protection in a socio-legal study at Oxford as the 
'compliance system' with a conciliatory style of enforcement 
and the 'sanction system' with a penal style.19 Hawkins's 
work reveals the emergence of a new regulatory paradigm in 
the field of environmental law in England by adopting the 
conciliatory style. This new regulatory paradigm is 
characteristically different from the traditional penal laws 
with a distinct aversion of sanctioning rule breaking with 
punishment. It also seeks to differ from the traditional 
penal law approach in its techniques and operational 
philosophy.20
The emphasis of the new regulatory law is not on 
identifying a problem or a deviant for the purpose of 
punishment but rather to achieve functional efficiency in 
terms of societal and economic results. At the functional 
level these new regulations give rise to wide discretion,
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which constitutes an important aspect of enforcement.21 
Other recent studies in the UK also show the importance in 
the use of discretion, particularly as a vital component to 
reflect acceptable constitutional and moral values.22
One can also see that in the United States, the earlier 
'command and control' mode of regulation now seems to be 
replaced by a market-oriented risk management approach and 
a retroactive liability-based approach.23 These appear to 
have brought about in recent years some fundamental 
restructuring of environmental laws and the functions of the 
Environment Protection Agency in the US.24 The recent legal 
and institutional inventions in the US have been explored by 
jurists in some developing Asian jurisdictions25 and similar 
innovative systems to control pollution have been evolved by 
some of them.26
The above necessarily very brief discussion shows a 
rethinking in the Anglo-American common law jurisdictions 
and the continuing search there to find new approaches in 
specific legislation to protect the environment.27 In the 
light of this brief glimpse at the current Anglo-American 
rethinking on the rationale and style of regulation to 
protect the environment, we now proceed to evaluate the 
major relevant Indian statutes. One can reiterate, at the 
outset, that a major hurdle for the appropriate development 
of environmental law in India has been the tendency to 
adhere to old Anglo-American penal law models. It took some
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time to realise that statutes imposing stringent standards 
without proper guidance for their administration are 
functionally useless and would only result in inequity and 
injustice in the management of the environment. This often 
results in the laws becoming mere paper tigers and assuming 
the role of sheer symbolic legislation.
4.2 Evaluation of the Water Act, 1974 and the Air Act, 1981
Here we focus on the general framework of the Water Act and 
the Air Act prior to their amendments in 1988 and 1987 
respectively.28 The Water Act of 1974 was passed by
Parliament under Article 252 of the Constitution of India,29 
pursuant to resolutions passed by various State
legislatures.30 The ambit of the Water Act is quite
extensive, in the sense that pollution is widely defined in 
Section 2(e) of the Act:
""pollution" means such contamination of water or such 
alteration of the physical, chemical or biological 
properties of water or such discharge of any sewage or 
trade effluent or of any other liquid, gaseous or solid 
substance into water (whether directly or indirectly) 
as may, or is likely to, create a nuisance or render 
such water harmful or injurious to public health or 
safety, or to domestic, commercial, industrial, 
agricultural or other legitimate uses, or to the life
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and health of animals or plants or of aquatic
organisms."
The Water Act established administrative agencies or 
Boards under the executive branch of the Central and State 
governments. The functions of these Boards include advising 
the government as well as to promulgate industrial effluent 
standards and to inspect sewage and effluent treatment 
plants. Prevention and control of pollution of water is 
achieved through a permit or 'consent administration' 
procedure which is analysed further below. Discharge of 
effluents is permitted only after the consent of the State 
Board has been obtained and subject to any conditions 
imposed by it. Failure to comply with the directives of the 
State Board is punishable under the Act's penal provisions.
The Air Act of 1981 was modelled on the Water Act, with 
elaborate provisions delineating the powers and functions of 
the Central and State Boards. The ambit of the Air Act is 
also drawn very wide as "air pollutant" is defined in 
Section 2(a) of the Act to mean "any solid, liquid or 
gaseous substance (including noise) present in the 
atmosphere in such concentration as may be or tend to be 
injurious to human beings or other living creatures or 
plants or property or environment".31 The Air Act 
specifically empowered State Governments to designate air 
pollution areas and to prescribe the type of fuel to be used 
in these designated areas. Initially it applied to certain
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types of industries like those involving production of 
asbestos, cement, fertilisers and petroleum products which 
may not be operated without the consent of the State Boards 
under Section 21 of the Act, but subsequent amendments to 
the Act in 1987, discussed in detail later in this chapter, 
have extended the restriction to any industry.
The Water Act and the Air Act, before the 1988 and 1987 
amendments, showed several defects.32 First under Sections 
24 and 25 of the Water Act, consent has to be obtained from 
the State Board for a new or altered drain outlet or for a 
new discharge of sewer effluents into a stream.33 Similar 
provisions are contained in Section 21 of the Air Act. Under 
the two Acts, the Board may vary or alter these conditions 
at any time, and may also revoke its consent. It has been 
shown that these ostensibly broad powers have seldom been 
invoked, and bear little relation to the actual functioning 
of the Board.34 In practical terms, the Board's only 
recourse was to institute a prosecution, which was often 
ineffective and time-consuming process, and a poor 
instrument for pollution control.
Secondly, the Acts have created administrative agencies 
and have conferred wide powers on them. Sections 3-18 of 
both the Water Act and the Air Act contain elaborate 
provisions concerning the constitution of the Central and 
State Boards and their powers and functions. However, a 
close analysis of the structure, powers and functions of
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these statutory agencies has revealed that they were 
ill-suited to ensure the adoption of adequate pollution 
control measures.35 The State Boards have never been 
adequately staffed, and lacked the capability or resources 
to perform the various functions prescribed by the Water Act 
and the Air Act.36 There was excessive governmental control 
over these Boards as the members were nominated by 
governments, and served at the pleasure of such governments, 
and the Board often functioned only as an advisory body 
within the Department of Environment, where it could 
institute prosecutions but had no real enforcement powers.37
Thirdly, in the operation of these two laws there was 
near-total apathy towards public participation in pollution 
control decision-making.38 Since the public's interests were 
deeply affected by pollution of air and water, one might 
reasonably expect that the public should be given 
opportunities to be heard at all stages of pollution control 
decisions. However, Section 25(3) of the Water Act simply 
empowers the State Board to "make such inquiry as it deems 
fit in respect of the application for consent and in making 
such inquiry it may follow such procedure as may be 
prescribed." The Air Act contained a similar provision in 
Section 21(3). There was, thus, no specific requirement of 
public involvement.
It has been shown that, in practice, the Board merely 
dispatched an officer to visit the premises of the permit
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applicant to verify information given by the applicant and 
this officer had no mandate to consult with members of the 
general public.39 Moreover, the permit applications made by 
industries were never published by the Board. Under Section 
25(6) of the Water Act or Section 51(2) of the Air Act, only 
persons "interested in" or "affected by" a Board's permit 
could scrutinise the contents of any such permit. It has 
again been noted that such permission is normally denied to 
members of the general public.40 The public has thus been 
left completely in the dark as to the particulars of the 
pollutants discharged into water or air, and the polluters 
discharging them.
Fourthly, the most important defect for the purpose of 
our analysis is that Section 49 of the Water Act and Section 
43 of the Air Act initially denied the public the right to 
seek court enforcement of the legislative provisions by 
expressly barring the courts from "taking cognizance of any 
offence (under these Acts) except on a complaint made by, or 
with the previous sanction in writing of, the State Board". 
Both these sections under the Air Act and the Water Act were 
subsequently amended to remove this hurdle to judicial 
recourse.
Thus, although the Board's permit actions may have 
far-reaching pollution consequences, the public had no 
access to any mechanism for redress. Equity jurisdiction was 
also unavailable to enforce the Acts. For example, Section
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58 of the Water Act specifies that "no injunction shall be 
granted by any court or other authority in respect of any 
action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power 
conferred by the Act".41 Further, under Section 28 of the 
Water Act and Section 31 of the Air Act, an appeal against 
the permit order of the Board is available only to the 
person aggrieved, i.e., the person who was denied a permit.
Fifthly, Sections 24-26 of the Water Act require 
varying standards for different regions. The actual standard 
in a particular area depends upon the number and type of 
industries, their location and the quantity of water in the 
stream. However, Sections 24-26 of the Water Act offer 
little guidance to the Board in setting appropriate 
standards. Under Section 24(1)(a) of the Water Act, "No 
person shall knowingly cause or permit any poisonous, 
noxious or polluting matter determined in accordance with 
such standards as may be laid down by the State Board...". 
The Air Act contains no comparable provisions for varying ad 
hoc standards. There is no requirement in either Act for the 
preparation of environmental impact assessments in 
connection with planned new sources of pollution. Since the 
application of standards is a quasi-judicial determination, 
one might expect the Board to give notice to affected 
parties and to offer them an opportunity to be heard. Yet, 
no such procedural refinements are offered under India's Air 
and Water Acts.
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Thus the Water Act and the Air Act, before their 
respective amendments in 1988 and 1987, depicted the classic 
example of a regulatory paradigm which served no effective 
purpose to control water and air pollution. The adoption of 
a permit system and the imposition of penal sanctions 
through criminal prosecution for violators of permit 
conditions depicted the rationale and approach of these 
laws. Before we proceed to analyse the significance of the 
amendments that manifest the permeation of the new public 
law rationale into the regulatory paradigm of Indian 
environmental jurisprudence, we need to examine the 
Environment- Act.
4.3 Evaluation of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986
The Environment Act was passed by Parliament in May 1986 and 
came into force on 19 th November 19 8 6 . 42 The object of the 
Act states that it was enacted to implement the decisions 
taken at the Stockholm Conference in 1972. However, it would 
obviously appear that the main impetus for its enactment was 
because the government came under considerable pressure, 
following the gas leak accident at Bhopal in December 1984, 
to design comprehensive legislation for controlling toxic 
and hazardous substances.
The Act gives a wide definition to the term
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"environment" which has been defined under Section 2(a) as 
follows:
""environment" includes water, air and land and the 
inter-relationship which exists among and between 
water, air and land, and human beings, other living 
creatures, plants, micro-organism and property."
The term "environmental pollutant" is defined under Section 
2(b) of this Act as:
""environmental pollutant" means any solid, liquid or 
gaseous substance present in such concentration as may 
be, or tends to be, injurious to environment."
The Act, thus, relates directly to the protection and 
improvement of the environment and the prevention of hazards 
to human beings, other living creatures, plants and property 
from the kinds of pollution that was initially envisaged 
under the Water Act and the Air Act. Thus, the Act attempts 
to be an umbrella statute by not being specific to any one 
kind of pollution.
Section 3 of the Act confers much wider powers on the 
Central Government to enforce, in the States, policies which 
are not specifically mentioned under the Water Act or the 
Air Act. Thus, new powers were conferred on the Central 
Government to set standards for pollution discharged or 
emitted into the environment and also to regulate the 
handling of hazardous substances under Sections 7 and 8 of 
the Act. Section 7 of the Act reads as follows:
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"No person carrying on any industry, operation or 
process shall discharge or emit or permit to be 
discharged or emitted any environmental pollutant in 
excess of such standards as may be prescribed."
Section 8 states:
"No person shall handle or cause to be handled any 
hazardous substance except in accordance with such 
procedure and after complying with such safeguards as 
may be prescribed."
Under Section 15(1) of the Act, failure to comply with 
or contravention of any of its provisions was made
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 
five years or with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees. 
In cases of continuing offence, the fine may extend to five 
thousand rupees for every day "during which such failure or 
contravention continues after the conviction for the first 
such failure or contravention". Under Section 15(2) of the 
Act, where the offence continues beyond the period of one 
year after the date of conviction, the offender shall be 
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 
seven years.
The Act also provided for some radically fierce 
provisions to penalise offences committed by companies. 
Section 16(1) of the Act states that where any offence has 
been committed by a company, every person directly in charge 
of, and responsible to the company, as well as the company
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itself, "shall be deemed to be guilty" and is liable to be 
proceeded against and punished for any offence. The proviso 
to that section puts the burden of proof on such person to 
prove that the offence was committed without his knowledge 
or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the 
commission of such offence. Section 16(2) further states 
that if an offence is "committed with the consent or 
connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part 
of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the 
company", they shall also be deemed to be guilty of that 
offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and 
punished accordingly. The Act thus substantially increased 
the penalties for any contravention of its provisions 
compared to those envisaged under the Water Act and the Air 
Act.
However, several commentators have expressed their 
doubts as to how far the environmental policies will be 
implemented through this legislation.43 The Act has been 
criticised as being ineffective and only designed to fulfil 
the international obligations of the Stockholm Conference.44 
It would appear that no careful analysis of the potential 
short and long-term deleterious effects of pollution on the 
environment has been taken into consideration while enacting 
this Act. It could also be said that the Act, like all 
previous laws on environmental matters, does not clearly 
state the social objectives it aims to achieve. In the 
absence of clear policy statements on the objectives to be
153
accomplished, administrative machineries are set up to 
implement the legislation. But how can the administrators 
interpret their duties, from time to time, when the intent 
and purpose for which the enactment was made in the first 
place remains vague?
Although the Act appears to be an umbrella statute, it 
does not override earlier specific legislation for the 
purpose of punishment. This can be seen in Section 24 of the 
Act which reads as follows:
"(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), the 
provisions of this Act and the rules or orders made 
therein shall have effect notwithstanding anything 
inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other 
than this Act.
(2) Where any act or omission constitutes an offence 
punishable under this Act and also under any other Act 
then the offender found guilty of such offence shall be 
liable to be punished under the other Act and not under 
this Act."
The above provisions appear blatantly contradictory and 
paradoxical. Such provisions, often found in Indian laws, 
seem to ensure that the stringent penalties prescribed by 
the Act remain on paper. A well-known journalist in India 
has castigated this Act as a cobra that is seemingly fierce 
but without venom in its fangs.45 One can argue, however, 
that the above provisions, even if they appear as 'paper
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tigers', have a role and purpose as symbolic legislation. 
They are not as completely useless as they may appear. They 
have an educative function which is difficult to assess by 
analysing the statute as such. They often also function as 
'safety valves' till the legal mechanism picks up momentum 
and the various loopholes are patched up.
This strengthens the argument for the purpose of our 
study that Indian laws are not to be assessed on their face 
value, but rather to be assessed on their long-term effect. 
This fierce yet toothless statute raises fundamental 
jurisprudential questions about the role of statutory 
regulation in India. Indian ideology on the role and concept 
of law, discussed in chapter 5 below, views codes and 
statutes as mere signposts, in this case a bold warning sign 
to keep perpetrators off.
4.4 The permeation of the public law rationale in Indian 
environmental regulation
As seen above, in spite of the drawbacks and criticisms, the 
Environment Act of 1986 introduced some important new 
elements into India's pollution control regime. The most 
significant aspect of the Environment Act in the context of 
our present debate is its manifestation of the new public 
law rationale by the extension of the rule of locus standi
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under Section 19 of the Act, which reads as follows:
"No court shall take cognisance of any offence under 
this Act except on a complaint made by:-
(a) the Central Government or any authority or officer 
authorised in this behalf by that Government; or
(b) any person who has given notice of not less than 60 
days, in the manner prescribed, of the alleged offence 
and of his intention to make a complaint, to the 
Central Government or the authority or officer 
authorised as aforesaid."
Section 19(b), thus, allows the court to take 
cognizance of any offence under the Act on a complaint made 
by any person who has given not less than sixty days notice 
of the offence to the authority. This is an innovative 
change from what was envisaged under the earlier laws. 
However, the Act's requirement of sixty days notice could 
render the right of a complainant to move the court 
ineffective and could enable the offender to escape from 
penal liability.
Another strategically significant innovation in the Act 
can be seen in the power to give directions under Section 5 
of the Act. It extends not only to the closure, prohibition 
or regulation of any industrial operation or process but 
also includes the power to direct stoppage or regulation of 
the supply of electricity or water or other services. This 
power conferred on the Central Government appears as a
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unique strategy. It promotes the prospects for compliance 
without adopting a punishment strategy.
The power under Section 5, together with the power of 
entry for examination, testing of equipment and other 
material objects under Section 10 and the power under 
Section 11 to take samples, to a great extent ensure 
compliance without confrontation. This Indian development, 
in a sense, appears to resemble the new developments in the 
UK and the USA, replacing the earlier regulatory regime 
based merely on the penal law strategy, as briefly discussed 
above in 4.1 of this chapter.
Both the Air Act and the Water Act were amended in 1987 
and 1988 respectively. The amendments brought the provisions 
under these two Acts in line with the Environment 
(Protection) Act, 1986. We focus here on three particular 
areas that forcefully manifest the permeation of the new 
public law rationale into Indian regulatory laws.
First the power to prosecute had remained exclusive to 
the government agency and the citizens had no direct 
statutory remedy. But, as we saw above, Section 19 of the 
Environment Act brought about an important change which 
allows any person to prosecute a polluter by a complaint to 
the magistrate. Similar provisions were incorporated in 
Section 43 of the Air Act in 198746 and Section 49 of the 
Water Act in 1988.47 Section 43 of the Air Act now reads as
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follows:
" (1) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence 
under this Act except on a complaint made by -
(a) a Board or any officer authorised in this 
behalf by it; or
(b) any person who has given notice of not less 
than sixty days, in the manner prescribed, of the 
alleged offence and of his intention to make a 
complaint to the Board or officer authorised as 
aforesaid,
and no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan 
Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class 
shall try any offence punishable under this Act.
(2) Where a complaint has been made under clause (b) of 
sub-section (1), the Board shall, on demand by such 
person, make available the relevant reports in its 
possession to that person:
Provided that the Board may refuse to make any such 
report available to such person if the same is, in its 
opinion, against the public interest."
Section 49 of the Water Act is similarly worded with an 
additional sub-section which reiterates the power of the 
Magistrate to pass sentence under the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1973. Section 49 (3) of the Water Act now reads
as follows:
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 29 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) , it
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shall be lawful for any Judicial Magistrate of the 
first class or for any Metropolitan Magistrate to pass 
a sentence of imprisonment of a term exceeding two 
years or of fine exceeding two thousand rupees on any 
person convicted of an offence punishable under this 
Act. "
The above sub-section would appear as an unnecessary 
clause since the power of the first class Magistrate is not 
restricted at all.48 Therefore the inclusion of such a 
clause in 1988 must have had a definite purpose which, it is 
submitted, is to re-assert to the few hundred odd 
Magistrates around the country their powers and duties for 
environmental protection. It emboldens and encourages 
Magistrates to be tough. This is a clear indication of the 
permeation of the new public law rationale, which was 
graphically expounded in the Ratlam case discussed above in 
chapter 3.4 and below in chapter 6.1.
Section 19 of the Environment Act and the amended 
Section 43 of the Air Act and Section 49 of the Water Act 
bring out the extended concept of locus standi which is one 
of the hallmarks of the emerging Indian public law regime. 
Evolved under the constitution by the Indian judiciary,49 it 
has now found a secure place in environmental regulation.
Secondly, the amendments under Section 43(2) of the Air 
Act and Section 49(2) of the Water Act require the Boards to
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disclose relevant internal reports to a citizen seeking to 
prosecute a polluter. This freedom of information and the 
legal requirement for a more open functioning of public 
authorities again obviously manifests the new public law 
rationale with its emphasis on public accountability by 
regulating the regulator. The above changes now call forth 
the need for detailed environmental impact statements. This 
could to a great extent reduce many other conspicuous 
drawbacks that still prevail in the administration, 
according to a legal expert.50 It is now greatly felt that 
environmental impact assessment can achieve in India a 
better environmental regime built up from the grass roots.51 
Such a requirement is forseeable in the light of the present 
changes and it could help make Indian bureaucrats think, 
according to one Indian environmental lawyer, who has also 
argued that lessons can be learnt from the American 
experience.52
Thirdly, the amendments introduced a new Section 33A 
into the Water Act, and a new Section 31A into the Air Act. 
Both new provisions empowered the Boards to issue directions 
to any person, officer or authority, including orders to 
close, prohibit or regulate any industry, operation or 
process and to stop or regulate the supply of water, 
electricity or any other service. Both these provisions are 
worded similar to Section 5 of the Environment Act and they 
read as follows:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law,
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but subject to the provisions of this Act, and to any 
directions that the Central Government may give in this 
behalf, a Board may, in the exercise of its powers and 
performance of its functions under this Act, issue any 
directions in writing to any person, officer or 
authority, and such person, officer or authority shall 
be bound to comply with such directions.
Explanation:- For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby 
declared that the power to issue directions under this 
section includes the power to direct -
(a) the closure, prohibition or regulation of any 
industry, operation or process; or
(b) the stoppage or regulation of supply of 
electricity, water or any other service."
One can say that the new approach, extending the 
Boards' powers to give directions, greatly enhances 
administrative discretion and thereby works against 
administrative inertia. The Environment Act has thus given 
greater thrust and emphasis to the new public law rationale 
and the consequent amendments to the Water Act and the Air 
Act. The three most important changes that have been brought 
about in the Water Act and Air Act, pursuant to the new 
approach adopted in the Environment Act, clearly show the 
permeation of the new public law rationale.
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4.5 The evolving Indian legal ideology on environmental 
regulation
The above brief examination of the specific laws to control 
pollution reveals that in their actual operation the laws 
are often ineffective. This, it is submitted, is because the 
objectives and underlying policies are not well enough 
matched to the inherently complex setting of India. Today, 
it is an area where ideals, policies and administrative 
realities are often at odds, creating a quagmire that raises 
serious doubts about many strategies adopted even by new 
laws. Therefore, in order to achieve an ecological balance 
and to promote ecologically sound economic development, the 
primary task will be to identify and understand the social 
reality and dominant social values and to bring about legal 
changes accordingly.
Before we proceed to Chapter 5 below to discuss aspects 
of dominant indigenous social values which remain eclipsed 
in the legal system and its processes, it is relevant to 
examine briefly the views expressed by contemporary Indian 
legal writers and environmental lawyers on the progress of 
environmental laws.
Books on environmental law and policy in India are 
mostly collection of papers presented in various university 
seminars.53 Academic writing on Indian environmental laws 
started to appear in international law journals only from
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1985 onwards.54 Some of the specialist work on environmental 
law in India by Indian scholars appears to be casual, shoddy 
and unplanned.55 Even the Tiwari Committee, consisting of 
eminent scientists and environmentalists, was able to make 
only a cursory evaluation of the existing laws, which remain 
a haphazard collection. The Committee's work has been 
criticised by a legal expert as a macro-level analysis 
without a theoretical framework.56
On the jurisprudence of environmental legislation, 
Chhatrapati Singh appears to be the only legal scholar who 
has questioned the wisdom of merely legislating harsher laws 
to solve environmental problems.57 According to him, Indian 
environmental laws operate on the deterrent theory of 
criminal justice administration. However, the retributive 
values of the penalties fail to deter because there is a 
total disparity between retribution and the economic 
benefits of non-compliance.58 Singh also finds that from the 
economic point of view the laws seem totally 
counter-productive. They either slow down industrial 
development or provide the industries scope for indulging in 
more corrupt practices, such as manoeuvering the activities 
of the concerned Boards through economic or political 
malpractices.59 According to Singh, the basic 
jurisprudential problem lies in the application of a 
'policing the society theory' and its corollary 'conflict 
model' approach.60
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More recent analysis, following the amendments of the 
Water Act and Air Act, also indicates the inappropriateness 
of the penal approach.61 Thus, it has been pointed out by 
Chandrasekharan Pillai, a criminal law professor, that:
"The fact that the punishments have been increased in 
the latest amendments to the Water Act and Air Act may 
not have the desired effect of preventing and 
controlling pollution. On the contrary it might 
aggravate the inhibitions of the courts/prosecuting 
agencies in launching prosecutions."62
On the usefulness of the new strategy adopted to seek 
compliance without confrontation, Pillai notes with some 
pessimism that:
"At present the effective measure to control pollution 
would be that provided in Section 33 and 33-A however 
deficient, they might be in their present form. The 
penal provisions, it is felt, would remain as threats 
for a while and fade away after five or seven years. 
Because the enforcement agencies, as already discussed, 
might not be acting on them frequently."63
It has also been argued that the jurisprudential 
approach of environmental regulation should not be confined 
merely to seeking a resolution to the conflict of values.64 
According to Singh, it must not polarise the regulators and 
the users against each other so that they are in conflict, 
but the law should find means which fuse the interests of
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the regulator with those of the user in mutual co-operation. 
Ideally the interest of the user and the regulator would be 
the same. Thus according to him:
"For clearly, the question concerning environmental 
problems is not how best to punish someone, but how to 
manage the society in the best way so that maximal 
development is attained with nil or minimal 
environmental under-deve1opment. In other words a 
complete change in our jurisprudential perspective is 
required if we are to protect the environment and get 
over the exploitative [colonial] mentality."65
Singh has argued that the value of protection of the 
environment must be seen as overriding and as being in the 
interest of all people and that only laws which lead to this 
end have the 'right' perspective. Such a perspective cannot 
be achieved within the 'policing the society' theory of the 
Western regulatory paradigm, which presupposes a certain 
sociology of society and perceives it on the basis of a 
'conflict' model, wherein the task of the regulator is to 
resolve the conflict in favour of a particular interest 
amongst competing groups of interest by using economic 
sanctions.
Some years ago, Upendra Baxi, a well-known legal 
scholar in India, pointed out that the most striking and 
fundamental flaw within the institutional design of the law 
for environmental protection in India is its neo-colonial
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character.66 According to him, 'neo-colonial' essentially 
means thoughtless transplants of legislative and 
administrative models from the First World, inapposite 
borrowings of Western institutional blueprints and of the 
underlying ideologies, excessive reliance on alien judicial 
and law making forms, precedents and philosophies. It means 
planned uses of law and administration "as if people did not 
matter" .67
One can see from such statements that the ideology 
voiced by leading Indian legal experts strongly resists 
imitation of the West. As a major Third World jurisdiction, 
the legal system of India, in a sense, is better positioned 
to evolve unique ways of development than the 
'under-developed' systems or even the so-called 'developed' 
legal systems.68 The new Indian conceptualisations of 
environmental pollution control incorporate indigenous 
ideology and public interest perspectives which go much 
beyond the level of post-colonial rhetoric.69 The next 
chapter shows how the traditional understandings of law and 
the concept of Nature in Indian culture have to a great 
extent formed the basis for the current development of 
India's new environmental jurisprudence. Seen through the 
prism of such concepts, it could be argued that the modern 
Indian law on environmental protection has drawn important 
sustenance from concepts of public law and the public sphere 
which are not necessarily unique to Indian law, but are 
strongly manifested in its realm.
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CHAPTER 5 INDIAN LEGAL CULTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
JURISPRUDENCE
The earlier chapters showed how various factors have 
contributed to the gradual creation of a new public law 
rationale under the Indian Constitution. The development of 
environmental jurisprudence in India as part of a legal 
system which continues to change as a whole to meet new 
challenges, has thus shown a progression through the 
processes of legal osmosis in all directions. As discussed 
in the introduction, an important aim of the present thesis 
is to show, by focusing on the development of Indian 
environmental jurisprudence, how current legal progression 
involves more or less conscious use, if not a revival, of 
Indian indigenous conceptualisations of law. This 
progression, in line with cherished ancient legal 
traditions, occurs obviously in modified forms and processes 
and appears today as the influence of cultural rather than 
prima facie legal factors.
This chapter refines our discussion of the emergent and 
uniquely Indian regulatory paradigm by analysing the elusive 
conceptual and cultural characteristics which underpin the 
current development of laws in India generally and manifest 
themselves particularly in Indian environmental 
jurisprudence. The chapter initially identifies the 
significant aspects of Indian legal culture which
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characterise traditional legal systems and then proceeds to 
examine specific aspects of indigenous legal culture and 
their impact upon juristic concepts relevant for the 
construction of a new environmental jurisprudence.
It is argued here that while the present legal system 
in India is apparently built on colonial English models, 
various and diverse conceptual elements inherent in the 
traditional pre-British legal systems still exist1 and have 
not been displaced.2 Recent research suggests that the seeds 
of the new public law regime in India are firmly rooted in 
ancient Indian jurisprudence.3 Also the more 
philosophically-oriented recent literature relevant for 
environmental jurisprudence emphasises that Indian 
traditions of thought on Nature form a conceptual resource 
base that inspires current environmental philosophy.4 These 
underlying and more or less invisible postulates are now 
manifesting themselves again more clearly in the process of 
creating what we may call a 'postmodern' legal order in 
India.5
5.1 Legal systems and legal cultures
In their quest to understand whether India could evolve an 
indigenous legal system after independence, some Western 
legal scholars appear to have perceived the Indian legal 
system incorrectly. As indicated, Marc Galanter appears to
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be most prominent amongst them.6 In one of his conclusions, 
he indicates that:
"Contemporary Indian law is, for the most part,
palpably foreign in origin or inspiration and it is
notoriously incongruent with the attitudes and concerns 
of much of the population which lives under it. 
However, the present legal system is firmly established 
and the likelihood of its replacement by a revised 
"indigenous" system is extremely small."7
The conclusion of Galanter was also questioned by C.J. 
Fuller a few years ago.8 Fuller was able to see that at the 
very apex of India's modern legal system, judicial reasoning 
on new issues is preponderantly continuous with indigenous, 
pre-colonial, 'traditional' styles of reasoning.9 He thus 
demonstrated to an extent that modern legal norms can issue 
from the more diffuse norms and values of the older culture 
as a whole. W.F. Menski in a recent review of Galanter's 
book,10 uses a Japanese jurist's theoretical framework to 
show that traditional Indian law has not been displaced but
has thrived, albeit hidden from the view of official legal
science.11
Here, in order to evaluate the intricate indigenous 
aspects of the Indian legal system, one has to look beyond 
the mere sum total of all the laws that exist or operate 
today and focus upon the foundations or the matrix of the 
legal system. It would obviously involve a process of
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identifying not merely the gradual changes of the legal 
system, but a conceptual analysis of such modifications and 
of the diverse legal traditions that India has acquired in 
her long and varied historical past. To do this in detail 
would go beyond the ambit of the present study, so we 
present an outline argument here.
Around two decades ago, David and Brierley, well-known 
scholars in comparative law, stated that:
"One has a very incomplete grasp of what the law is if 
consideration is only given to its concrete rules at 
any given time. No less essential are those elements 
which give law its characteristic features and which 
assure its permanency, despite all the changes made in 
the legal norms. This is not to say that these other 
elements are removed from the general process of 
evolution; but their evolution is incomparably slower 
than are the modifications affecting the legal rules 
themselves and they are linked to a certain 
understanding of law and its social role and thus 
reflect the actual civilization of the country. 1,12
This seems to indicate that a system of law is 
something more than merely the sum total of all the rules 
valid in a given country at any given time. The general 
features of the law in a region are characterised by the 
civilisation of the region itself, its economic structures, 
its language and social manners, but most of all the core of
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this invisible law lies in the sense of justice of its 
inhabitants.
Professor Derrett seems to be the only expert on Indian 
law who ventured into this area. He noted a few decades ago 
that different observers would utilise different segments or 
different aspects of the evidence in order to answer this 
question.13 According to him:
"The enormous bulk of legislation which is based on 
western models, and the apparatus of the judicial 
process which is admittedly derived from western 
techniques, owed to western inspiration, and supported 
by a self-conscious desire to give the public the kind 
of justice which Britons and Americans expect in their 
own homelands, all tend to support belief that Indian 
law is a kind of annexe (if a special kind of annexe) 
to the Anglo-American "common-law" consortium of legal 
systems. But one who reads the law reports receives a 
number of impressions which tell a different tale. 
Whether he turns his attention to the substantive law 
itself, or the way in which it is being administered, 
or in the public's and judges' attitudes towards it, he 
sees traces of much that is recognizably 
traditional. 1,14
The observations of David and Brierley about legal 
systems in general, and Derrett's above comments in the 
context of the Indian legal system indicate that, apart from
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the totality of the formal laws, there is what one may call 
a 'legal culture7, a vital requisite to understanding any 
particular legal system and any significant legal 
development in that system.
More recently, a Japanese legal scholar who examined 
the concept of 7 legal culture7 from an Asian standpoint, has 
advanced the analysis of this theme by writing about the 
'postulates of law7 or 7 legal postulates', operating at 
different levels.15 Chiba, urges us to look beyond what he 
calls Western 'model jurisprudence7.16 He shows that a legal 
postulate is a value principle or value system specifically 
connected with a particular official or unofficial law which 
acts to found, justify and orient the latter.17 He sees the 
whole structure of law from a formal aspect as composed of 
three levels of law: official law, unofficial law and legal 
postulates.18 Chiba also shows that legal cultures grow out 
of historical experiences, upbringing, religion, prevailing 
ideologies, education and so forth, and they lead to and 
form a plural structure in most countries. According to him 
legal cultures have both an 7 internal7 as well as an 
7 external7 form; these are deep-rooted and manifest 
themselves as characteristic features of any significant 
legal development.19
It would thus appear that the conceptual roots of any 
legal development lie deep in all levels of human 
interactions of the people of a particular region. Thus it
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is argued here that postulates of law have to be recognised 
as a vital ingredient for any meaningful study of 'law and 
society', 'law and development' and, in the present context, 
of environmental law.
Before we attempt to analyse the conceptual roots of 
Indian legal culture in more detail, it must be pointed out 
that modernity of a legal system is generally attributed to 
a legal tradition following the Western legal culture.20 As 
Wieacker shows, the roots of Western legal culture lie in 
the Roman law tradition which is characterised by the 
adherence to, and predominance of, a positive law culture.21 
The positive law culture, originating perhaps from the 
command culture of Mosaic Law, has become central to Western 
civilisation and Western 'model jurisprudence'.22 
Consequently, there is a basic assumption that laws are to 
be imposed as the will of a superior authority. There is 
also a natural inclination of Western man in general, 
particularly post-Reformation Western man, to think of 
traditional values and morals based on religion and local 
tradition as something less important or less significant in 
social and political life. One can say that all these 
elements have contributed to a mental framework where the 
positive law culture is generally seen as the hallmark of a 
modern legal system around the world. However, a prominent 
author has warned that, unless checked, this will allow 
grave misunderstandings to develop in the analysis of Indian 
laws.23 Chiba, as indicated above, now appears to argue on
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the same lines for Asian laws generally.
It might not be out of context to note here that the 
annals of European legal history show the defiance of the 
English common law to follow the mainstream of Western legal 
culture.24 It would appear that the sublime uniqueness of 
the English common law tradition is, inter alia, manifested 
in the seminal notion of 'justice, equity and good 
conscience', which has been traced directly to the 
Romano-Canonical juridical philosophy of the 
sixteenth-century English jurists.25 To an extent, it must 
have been a necessary outcome of their exposure to India and 
its natives.26 The ideal form of Commonwealth envisioned by 
Sir Thomas More, the Lord Chancellor of Henry VIII was based 
on Indological sources.27 Thus a subtle yet prominent 
distinction of the English common law culture from the 
European mainstream appears to have played a vital role in 
the acceptance of the English legal culture in the colonies, 
particularly in India. Recent research on the introduction 
of English common law in the colonies examines some aspects 
of the scope of recognition of indigenous customary law and 
Islamic law, noting difficulties that have arisen from the 
clash of different cultures in places as far apart as Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, Ghana and Nigeria.28 Matson perceives 
'justice, equity and good conscience' as a 'vague notion' 
which made its way to India first in Portuguese guise in 
Bombay, then it appeared in Madras in English.29 However, 
from the Indian jurisprudential perspective this clausula is
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seen as very important.30 Thus it could be said that this 
formula, encapsulating the notions under traditional common 
law, was conceptually nearest to the indigenous legal 
traditions of India and thereby conducive for amalgamation.
Some years ago, different perceptions of legal cultures 
were brought out in the Bellagio Papers and other essays 
which give wide and varied perspectives of Third World 
jurisprudence through the folk laws in different regions.31 
It has also been shown that the amalgamation of 'law' as 
understood in the West with moral and religious concepts is 
an important aspect of indigenous traditions.32 The dominant 
Western conceptual understanding of law confines the purpose 
of a legal system to a limited sphere of social and 
political life. By itself, it cannot create a long lasting 
sustainable system that could accommodate, adapt and modify 
to changing concepts and world views within a particular 
society. It would therefore appear that the foundations and 
conceptual understandings of law in Western 'model 
jurisprudence' are narrow, compared to the broader 
conceptual understanding of non-Western legal cultures. In 
other words, modern Western law is in danger of separating 
the official law from Chiba's legal postulates, divorcing 
state law from local culture, often by assertive claims to 
the universal validity of legal rules.
In contrast, the primary purpose of law under the 
Indian indigenous tradition is aimed at sustaining a
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'universal order' in every possible way.33 One could argue 
that this broader, cosmic canvas inevitably gives rise to 
adaptability, flexibility and accommodativeness as the 
general characteristic feature of the legal order. Professor 
Derrett was able to perceive these characteristic features 
of Hindu culture in his Critique of modern Hindu law.34 He 
noted that:
"Flexibility, diversity, adaptability, and the genius 
for adjustment without changing one's entity - these 
are the hallmarks of Hinduism, properly not less a way 
of life than a religion. In this book I shall proceed 
upon the hypothesis, which I believe to be true, that 
the common denominator of Hinduism is still valid in 
legal contexts and is equally valid in all of them; 
that it consists quite happily with India's being a 
member of the international consortium of common-law 
nations, and that it is not open to being abolished or 
otherwise interfered with, whether from above or below; 
and that one can safely count on its efficacy in the 
indefinite future."35
The traditional indigenous understanding of law in 
India has a conspicuously rich content of varied 
philosophical and religious overtones which, according to 
Derrett, made it incongruous to an unaccustomed Western 
mind.36 It has also been said, again and again, that the 
traditional indigenous law of India was by itself a 
conglomeration of diverse conceptual understandings, which,
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one could say, was able to accommodate many divergently 
alien systems within its fold.37 Derrett indicated that:
"Out of the coexistence of different strands, at 
different levels of evolution, the nation expects to 
thrive; and the state and its officials are given a 
mandatory ethos within which all their acts must be 
developed. In India the statutes, constitutional 
provisions, and the courts adopt, rather, a structure, 
in keeping with the spirit of Hinduism, which, as it 
were, holds up a mirror to all sections of the public, 
with every hope of drawing them severally towards a 
common standard devised for them thousands of years 
ago. "38
The indigenous traditional law is primarily aimed at 
the individual, his behaviour, personality and outlook. A 
much wider and deeper aim is sought here to support a 
created, pre-existing order that is eternal. This implies 
that what anyone does has to be conducive to that larger 
order. Any aspect of individual action is placed into a 
conceptual framework of reference in which individualistic 
notions are made subservient to the needs of the system as 
a whole, in effect a situation where 'public interest' 
overrides 'private interest'.39 Here, the positivistic 
content of law apparently becomes diminished or less 
important, as the exercise of state power must seek its 
validation and authority from the eternal order itself.
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Thus the traditional indigenous concept of law in India 
is different from the 'modern' concept of law which tends to 
separate cultural values, morality and social beliefs from 
the domain of law. The problematic question here is to 
assess the main conceptual characteristics of this 
impregnable legal culture that has inculcated values into 
the region and the society. It is impossible to do this in 
a few words, but the task itself cannot be avoided. In any 
event, one can do much more than simply assert that the 
legal culture which has developed from -time immemorial in 
India and which has permeated into the collective psyche of 
the inhabitants, is charting the course of development of a 
new indigenous jurisprudence which India is currently 
witnessing. It is therefore reiterated here, before we go 
into particular details which evidentially identify these 
postulates, that the conceptualisation of law in India, 
based on indigenous traditions, is not only different but 
much wider than generally understood in the Western concept 
of law.
Although controversies abound about the 
historiographies of India,40 it is apparent that several 
centuries of Muslim and English governance have affected the 
development of traditional Indian law. Since the eighteenth 
century, the British colonial governors gradually imposed on 
India a general system of law aimed primarily to maintain 
law and order and secure property rights. Upon the 
foundations laid by the Judicial Plan of 1772 by Warren
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Hastings, later colonial administrators built an 
Anglo-Indian judicial system.41 The second half of the 
nineteenth century virtually revolutionised the legal system 
with a spree of over-legislation, influenced by the desire 
to introduce English law and to shape the legal system from 
the English lawyers' point of view.42
A few decades ago, M.C. Setalvad, then Attorney-General 
of India, gave his exposition of the Indian legal system in 
the Hamlyn Law Lecture, placing it in the mainstream of the 
English common law systems.43 According to him, the 
structure and powers of the court, the roles of judges and 
lawyers, the adversarial system of trial, the reliance on 
judicial precedent and the shared funds of concepts and 
techniques, bring the Indian legal system in the mainstream 
of the English common law system.44 The common law in India 
in the wide meaning of the expression would include not only 
what in England is known strictly as the common law, but 
also its traditions, some of the principles underlying the 
English statute law, the equitable principles developed in 
England in order to mitigate the rigours of the common law, 
and even the attitude and methods pervading the British 
system of administration of justice.45 Even as late as 1978, 
David and Brierley, in the second edition of their book on 
the major legal systems of the world today, have placed the 
Indian legal system, by overall assessment and for all 
practical purposes, as one based on English common law.46 
They indicate, however, that the desire of the English to
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respect the rules of Hindu law was hampered by their own 
ignorance of its nature.47
Some Indian legal scholars have also perceived the 
Indian legal system generally as a common law system 
blending elements of other systems along with its own 
traditional notions of law.48 Little over a decade ago, a 
well-known contemporary Indian legal scholar found the 
Indian legal system a common law system that has only 
incompletely emerged from the heritage of colonial rule.49 
There were too many laws introducing too many changes which 
paid little attention to the local views and feelings. Baxi 
found that this necessarily affected both the quality of the 
law and its social communication, diffusion, acceptance and 
effectivity, which has led to criticism and talk of 
'crisis'.50 He pointed out that:
"The British Indian model of law making was a 
'top-down' model; it was a paradigm of Austinian type.
....Thereby law making remains more or less the 
prerogative of a small cross-section of elites. This 
necessarily affects both the quality of the law enacted 
and its social communication, acceptance and 
effectivity. "51
Despite such elaborate argumentation exhibiting the 
displacement of Indian legal traditions and their 
replacement by common law structures, it must be noted that 
such views undervalue the central importance of indigenous
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cultural concepts. One is therefore more persuaded by 
Derrett's view that the official system is basically an 
import, a transplant, which acclimatised in a manner that 
its importers would never have wished; inadequate to perform 
the task required of it, yet only too adequate in creating 
problems not expected of it.52
5.2 Dharma and its dynamics
As discussed in the previous sub-chapter, India's indigenous 
legal tradition based upon the Indian understanding of the 
interlinkages of law, philosophy and religion is 
fundamentally different from the positive law tradition 
prevalent in modern Western societies. It is also not the 
same as the natural law tradition based on mere morals and 
values derived from religious beliefs. The notion of law in 
India from ancient times is based on the concept of 
'dharma',53 which permeated Indian society in all its 
conceivable aspects on an ideological basis, incorporating 
a wide variety of specifics to the elusive general.54 The 
'dharmic' tradition in India has inculcated a deep-rooted 
indigenous legal culture which is often misunderstood as 
mere morality based on a religious orientation.55 Under this 
tradition, dharma, artha and kama are legitimate aims of 
life; the natural order of things requires that men take 
them into account. This dharmic tradition aimed much beyond
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the domain of exercising state power or religious 
orientation. One can say that the emphasis is on the 
internal inculcation of human conduct, which is quite 
apparently different from modern law's emphasis on
regulating human behaviour by external sanctions. In other 
words, the dharmic system relies much more on the power of 
self-control than on externally enforced control.
The dharmic tradition, consequently, accords great 
importance to philosophical and ethical values in the 
context of legal development.56 Dharma as a legal concept 
peculiar to India was described as a social cement by 
Professor Derrett:
"This concept of righteousness, dharma, as an
educational 'suction', is peculiar to India, and is a 
social cement which ties permanently communities with 
nothing else in common but their domicile in the sub­
continent and their millennia-old committal to living 
together in competitive co-existence in a multi­
cultural super-society. "57
From a cursory Western analysis, Robert Lingat found
that the concept of dharma derived from a more general
notion which exceeds the domain of law in many respects 
without actually comprehending it entirely.58 The word 
dharma has been translated as 'duty', and Lingat has pointed 
out that this distinction is essential only for the Western 
jurist:
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"The word 'dharma' which is translated here 'duty' in 
effect expresses conformity with what Hindus regard as 
the natural order of things, and this explains its 
association with law. "59
However, one can say that any analysis based on a 
superficial understanding of 'duty' as a legal concept fails 
to bring out its wider ramification in jurisprudential 
terms. Thus it has been pointed out recently that Lingat 
apparently did not understand the actual operation of the 
central Hindu concept and, very clearly, refused to 
acknowledge the role of self-control.60
Some Indian legal philosophers have grappled with 
closely related issues. From an Indian viewpoint, 
Chhatrapati Singh, in his exposition of the logical, 
epistemological and ontological foundations of the idea of 
law was able to show dharma as a third alternative that 
could operate against the dominant legal positivism and its 
various opposing natural law theories.61 According to him:
"As against the dominant legal positivism which bases 
law on the will of some people, philosophers have 
sought to discover universal principles of law by 
probing into nature, including human nature. They have 
thus come up with various natural law theories. But 
these are not the only two alternatives - as 
philosophers of law commonly seem to assume. In between 
these two theories lies the third alternative which
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looks for the substance and justification of basic laws 
in the communal mode of human existence and the 
teleology of its development. It is this third 
alternative which has seemed to me the most promising 
direction needing critical exploration."62
This third alternative, expressed in the notion of 
dharma and Chiba's conceptualisation of legal postulates 
generally, is clearly different from the notions of both 
positive law and natural law. The 'duty' orientation of 
dharma differs from the 'jural opposites' or the 'jural 
correlatives' of 'rights' under legal conceptions applied in 
Western jurisprudence.63 At the same time, the dharmic 
culture contains within itself the characteristics of both 
the positive law culture as well as the natural law culture. 
The dharmic culture does not consider that law emanates from 
any authority whether sovereign or divine. To a legal mind 
trained in the Western legal culture, the dharmic culture 
could almost appear as lawless. In other words, the dharmic 
culture aims to achieve 'justice without law'.64
5.3 The nature of Indian dharmic culture
According to Derrett, Indians find it difficult to believe 
that their subtle and cryptic civilisation can possibly be 
understood by a foreigner and that the Indian is in no
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danger of losing his Indianness because the ability to 
adjust to a new environment or ideology is a remarkable 
feature of an Indian.65 Derrett states that:
"It is the agglutinative power (as contrasted with the 
de-racination which other races experience, when 
exposed to the attractions of another culture) which 
makes Indians, their culture and their contemporary 
predicaments especially intriguing. They are intriguing 
to themselves, as Indian observers with genuine 
academic qualifications show. And they intrigue the 
remainder of the world . . . "66
The agglutinative power lies in the facility to 
tolerate and accommodate different cultures and values. This 
receptive attitude, it appears, enables a unique 
transformation without much obliteration. In other words, 
Indian culture is inclusive, not exclusive, based on the 
universal conceptual core of dharma. As a result, India has 
been willing to borrow what is good from elsewhere and make 
it her own, so that foreign transplants have become 
Indianised. Derrett was of the view that:
"Indian tolerance of oddities and broadness of sympathy 
are proverbial. The ability to adjust to the novel 
environment and the novel idea, without abandoning the 
original stand point, is unique. Modifications in 
colour do not affect the substance." 67
In our present context, one could see this as a major
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factor in allowing the establishment of a new Indian public 
law regime, which appeared to permit the use of modified 
common law strategies in environmental litigation. An 
observation in the same vein can in fact be noted in 
Granville Austin's perception of the making of the Indian 
constitution.68
"India's original contributions to constitution-making, 
[that is] accommodation ... the ability to reconcile, 
to harmonize, and to make work without changing their 
content, apparently incompatible concepts - at least 
concepts that appear conflicting to the non-Indian, and 
especially to the European or American observer. 
Indians can accommodate such apparently conflicting 
principles by seeing them at different levels of value, 
or, if you will, in compartments not watertight, but 
sufficiently separate so that a concept can operate 
freely within its own sphere and not conflict with 
another operating in a separate sphere ... With 
accommodation, concepts and viewpoints, although 
seemingly incompatible, stand intact. They are not 
whittled away by compromise but are worked 
simultaneously. "69
The subtle element of 'Indianness' is such that new 
developments of law are brought about more or less in unique 
ways invisible for lawyers without Indian cultural 
knowledge. Ultimately, radical changes, brought about slowly 
through modification rather than alteration, i.e., legal
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osmosis, take a long time to be understood as such. For 
example, Galanter's monumental and comprehensive coverage of 
the development of the unique positive discrimination law in 
India does not appear to note the gradual conceptual 
transformation of the Indian caste system.70 Derrett, 
apparently, was able to appreciate the traditional ideology 
of the caste system and at the same time perceive it as 
unsuitable to the demands of the day. He observed:
"Quite the most interesting of India's struggles with 
her own diversities arose out of caste and religion. 
The beauty of the caste system is that it prevented a 
class-struggle. Everyone had a right to his way of 
life, and this was protected better than any 'closed 
shop' . No one would intrude on the sacrosanct way of 
life of another. But this could not square with the 
demands of an industrialised nation, nor with the
effects of mobility and earning by both men and
women. "71
As discussed in chapter 2 above, the Indian 
constitution aims to bring about many radical changes from 
the earlier political, social and economic order, as many 
other newly written constitutions would do. Yet the
participatory processes through which this was achieved, 
particularly the judicial process, with which we are
centrally concerned here, depict distinct elements of Indian 
legal culture. Many socio-legal studies focusing on the role 
and exercise of judicial power by the Indian Supreme Court
194
have shown its unique functioning.72 Judicial review in 
India is seen as an explicitly assigned political role and 
the provisions for judicial review have sanctioned the 
courts' involvement in the ongoing political process.73 
While these studies reveal quite different viewpoints about 
the nature of the Indian legal system, it is evident that 
the judges of the higher courts in India have assumed a 
position which is quite different from the English common 
law tradition,74 and have adopted a role which might not be 
much dissimilar to that of the sages or 'rishis' of the 
ancient past.75
Important social, economic and political questions 
generally not put to judges in other countries are decided 
by the courts in India. The role of the Indian judge is 
based on the internal ('systemic') requirement to sustain an 
all-comprehensive notion of law and justice as the central 
Indian postulate of law, namely dharma. In Indian terms, the 
judges' duty can be expressed by the proposition that the 
judge is the only person whose samanya dharma (common 
dharma) is the same as his varna-ashrama dharma (the dharma 
of the profession or station) .76 The pedagogic and 
persuasive nature of most judicial discourses displays this 
'dharmic' culture.77
The phenomenology of this new legal philosophy has been 
summed up by the well-known "activist" former judge of the 
Supreme Court of India, Justice Krishna Iyer, who stated
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that if law must serve life - the life of the million masses 
the crucifixion of the Indo-Anglican system and the 
resurrection of the Indian system is an imperative of 
independence.78 Thus quests by juridical pathfinders, in 
search of new avenues,79 show the genesis or rather the 
reincarnation of a new legal order which has been slowly but 
perceptibly restructuring Indian judicial discourses.80 
Significantly, such comments have been made in the context 
of public interest litigation debates. A few years ago, 
Upendra Baxi, while writing on the plight of the victims of 
the Bhopal case, was able to show to an extent the move from 
a jurisprudence of abstraction to a jurisprudence of human 
solidarity.81 He observed that India's articulations of the 
Bhopal victims' claims invite such a jurisprudence and the 
Supreme Court of India is perhaps well endowed by experience 
to inaugurate it.82
Following Maneka Gandhi's case,83 there have been 
momentous judicial innovations in the use of the judicial 
system to re-orient the ideology of Indian jurisprudence. It 
is, therefore, too simple to rely on the conjecture that the 
legal system in India is adhering to the common law 
jurisprudence and that India has simply continued the Anglo- 
American models of judicial processes. The legal strategies 
evolved under Indian judicial patronage are bringing about 
institutional and structural modifications to the entire 
legal system.84 This is, then, not a revolutionary recent 
phenomenon, but looks more like a culture-specific
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characteristic of current Indian law.
5.4 Dharma and contemporary Indian jurisprudence
It is significant that discussion on the contemporary 
relevance of ancient Indian law is now getting under way.85 
Some Indian scholarly legal discourse has now focused on 
this aspect.86 A few years ago, Rama Jois, a High Court 
judge, made an exploratory search into ancient Indian 
jurisprudence in a public law lecture at Cochin 
University.87 Rama Jois favourably compares dharma with 
modern public law, as the duty of the 'State' was not only 
to enforce obedience to the law against individuals but also 
to conform to the law in all its actions for the purpose of 
ensuring the welfare and happiness of all people. In showing 
that the ancient legal and constitutional system in India 
was established on a duty-based society, he stated:
"The legal system which was the same for the whole of 
India, notwithstanding the existence of large number of 
Kingdoms, some larger in size and others smaller 
indicates that the concept of absolutist monarchies had 
always been rejected and the supremacy of 'Dharma' 
(Law) over the Kings as declared in the authoritative 
texts was respected in letter and spirit. The doctrine 
of 'King can do no wrong' emanating from the concept of 
Divine Rights of Kings was not accepted, though the 
King as head of State was held in high esteem and
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people were asked to respect him as God, so that he 
might command the respect and the obedience of the 
people who were by nature God fearing and thereby 
ensured obedience to Dharma. At the same time, Dharma 
Sastras impressed upon the Kings to look upon the 
people as God (Praja Vishnu) and serve them with love 
and reverence."88
Dharma as the duty of every individual towards society 
was, thus, matched by the duty of the ruler towards his 
subjects and the society of his realm. Here lie the seeds of 
modern public law in India.89 Rama Jois then describes 
various aspects of Rajadharma, a significant facet of Dharma 
according to which all the kings exercised their 
sovereignty, and how it applies with equal force to all 
persons who come to exercise political and administrative 
power under any system of the government.90 Following Jois's 
line of arguments, the Constitution of India, particularly 
the Directive Principles of State Policy, can be seen to 
form the rajadharma of India today.
Rama Jois found support for his view in the statement 
of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan in the Constituent Assembly in 
favour of the Objectives Resolution moved by Jawaharlal 
Nehru. Dr. Radhakrishnan, later a president of India, had 
stated,
"Dharmam Kshatrasya Kshatram Dharma, righteousness is 
the king of kings. It is the ruler of both the people
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and the rulers themselves. It is the sovereignty of the 
law we have asserted. "91
Thus according to Jois, supremacy of Rajadharma has re- 
emerged in modern India in the form of constitutional 
supremacy which forms the foundation of the new democractic 
and secular State.92 The significance accorded to the aims 
and ideals of the Constitution to establish a public law 
regime, analysed above in Chapter 2, is the manifestation of 
this legal culture. As this thesis shows, the most important 
and unique characteristic of Indian environmental 
jurisprudence is its development as part of a new public law 
regime within the legal order established by the Indian 
constitution.
It is significant to note here that a former Attorney- 
General of India sees the recent developments in Indian 
administrative law as reminding government of the need for 
self-control.93 Although Sorabjee's article, based on a 
lecture to the Administrative Law Bar Association in London, 
does not explicitly mention dharmic culture, it nevertheless 
reflects the new legal culture of India. Other legal 
scholars appear confused when grappling with the present 
debate. Chhatrapati Singh, in analysing dharmasastra and 
contemporary jurisprudence in India, appears to hold the 
view that,
"In modern jurisprudential terms one may say; the 
grundnorm which established the dharmasastra as law is
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different from the grundnorm that legitimises the 
modern Indian law; that is, the reasons for which the 
normative framework of dharmasastra was accepted by 
people as law is not the same as the reasons for which 
the modern normative framework is accepted by people as 
law. Any question of the relevance of the sastras to 
modern law would be out of place."94
Singh finds that the rise and dominance of the Western 
legal culture and legal positivism in this century speak 
against legal science as a separate science i.e., 
dharmasastra - a science of righteousness.95 He thus states, 
"In the light of this positivistic understanding of 
modern law teaching and practice, even to assert that 
there is or can be dharmasastra, a self-contained body 
of knowledge qualifying to be a science, in the strict 
sense, goes contrary to the general belief."96
Here and in his earlier book, Singh has shown the basic 
shortcomings of Western legal theories with their 
positivistic attitudes which have their roots in the post­
enlightenment colonial expansionism of Europe, where it 
became important to use law as an instrument of social 
control and hence to define it as the will of the sovereign 
(the state) and not as a systematic science to attain 
justice in society.97
Rajeev Dhavan' book on the juristic techniques of the
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Indian Supreme Court, based on his doctoral dissertation at 
SOAS some two decades ago, showed that a distinct Indian 
jurisprudential approach does in fact exist, particularly on 
Indian concepts of property, and based on premises different 
from those of the Western concept of property.98 But Dhavan 
was not able to show the manifestations of dharmic concepts 
as they remained eclipsed within the then dominant 
jurisprudence. In 1960, Julius Stone the well-known common 
law jurist, challenged the jurists of India at that time to 
explain what precisely other countries can learn from 
India's cultural heritage. Although the results were on the 
whole negative, Professor Derrett, was able to bring out, to 
some extent, the usefulness of dharma concepts for world
99peace. y
In his conclusion, Dhavan showed that the Indian courts 
of the 1960s and early 1970s had taken up the theoretical 
assumption of a 'cosmopolitan jurisprudence' and stated 
that:
"The Court appears to have assumed a theoretical 
approach with regard to the nature of the individual 
and the State, and then arbitrated mechanically between 
their conflicting claims on the basis of cosmopolitan 
jurisprudence. "10°
At the same time, Dhavan, a student of Professor 
Derrett, was able to perceive then that in many less 
controversial areas, other than on property rights and
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preventive detention, this theoretical assumption breaks 
down. He stated:
"In all these cases the Court seems to have relied on 
native instincts and needs even though it had tried to 
preserve its tone of cosmopolitan objectivity. Thus we 
can see that although traditional factors have operated 
through an undeclared but clearly identifiable instinct 
for traditional matters, in the main the Court has 
thought of its function as not lagging behind the 
principles of cosmopolitan jurisprudence."101
However, Dhavan quoted Krishna Iyer J's observation in 
the then sensational Indian case of Smt. Indira Gandhi v 
Shri . Raj Narain,102
"Legality is within the Court's province to pronounce 
upon, but canons of political propriety and democratic 
dharma are polemical issues on which judicial silence 
is the golden rule."103
That was nearly two decades ago. There is less judicial 
silence now, particularly for rendering environmental 
justice. In a more recent article on Dharmasastra and modern 
Indian society,104 Dhavan notes that:
"There are a large number of areas in which the sastric 
order survives as part of a living social order. This 
is inevitable given India's geographic and demographic 
size and the fact that many facets of social life in 
many parts of the country have been left relatively
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undisturbed. But the force of the modern state - no 
less its British predecessor as its contemporary 
manifestation - has been to fundamentally question the 
basis of the sastric system. The end result has been 
precipitous. Sastric learning - once a powerful source 
of inspiration, influence and respect - has become 
otiose and irrelevant."105 
However, he then goes on to say,
"Even if the civil order ordained by the sastra has 
been seriously undermined, the beliefs from which this 
order eventually derived inspiration remained 
unscathed. "106
In other words, the value system as such is perpetuated, 
even if its original proponents are no longer identifiable 
or active. This appears to indicate that indigenous Indian 
legal postulates are continuing to exercise some influence. 
Significantly, Dhavan notes this with reference to public 
law:
"Although the public system of governance has intruded 
into people's lives, it has not been accepted as an act 
of faith. The system is there to be used and abused to 
advantage. "107
He therefore concludes that the real problem of modern 
Indian society stems from the relationship between civil 
society and the public system of governance. Unless the 
latter is accepted as an act of civil faith it would remain 
highly vulnerable to extreme dysfunctionality.108 Although
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this appears to be a negative assessment, it nevertheless 
reiterates the need for the growth of the public law 
rationale in India. Dhavan's analysis appears to be 
incomplete and writers seem to be unable to link ancient 
concepts and modern legal developments. This problem, 
however, is hardly new.
S.K. Purohit has to a great extent attempted to unravel 
the multifarious and intricate facets of ancient Indian 
legal philosophy in a very recent work.109 Although it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to evaluate all those 
aspects, one could hardly fail to notice Purohit's analysis 
of law within the Indian jurisprudential concept of rita110 
and law as culture within the concept of dharma.111 He 
states:
"To Indians who have been traditionally cherishing 
Dharma and whose genius and culture have imbibed its 
tenets, Dharma contains in itself jus positivism as 
well as jus naturale and is a principle of division as 
well as unity, and a coherent scheme of life as well as 
a ideal of perfection. In one word it is the epitome of 
Indian civilisation and culture."112
It appears beyond dispute that Purohit's work is 
remarkable in its attempt to take up the challenge to re­
present the old concepts in a clear and lucid modern style. 
However, it is submitted that Purohit, like many others 
before, seems to succumb to the temptation to carry out a
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comparative analysis with Western jurisprudence and in the 
process muddles much of his venerated discourse, which is 
useful for contemporary Indian jurisprudence.
The re-creation of the dharmic order, as W.F. Menski 
has shown in a recent piece of writing on Hinduism and 
democracy, is centred on the concepts of rita (macrocosmic 
order) and, more prominently, dharma (microcosmic order), 
ultimately every individual's duty to act appropriately at 
any given time.113 I would submit, in the light of the work 
of Purohit and Menski,114 that such concepts remain central 
to Indian legal culture as such. I would disagree to the 
extent that this conceptual understanding involves not 
merely 'Hinduism' in India's pluralistic culture.
The present thesis can certainly not probe into the 
conceptual details of the links between dharma and modern 
Indian public law.115 However, when one applies one's 
awareness of these underlying conceptual links to a specific 
area of legal development, such as environmental law, it 
becomes easier to draw the relevant links, at least in 
outline. The final sub-section of this chapter attempts to 
do just this by showing that Indian culture conceptualises 
the environment within its holistic universal framework of 
reference, thus prompting the creation of a neo-dharmic 
jurisprudence in India.
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5.5 Indian tradition and environmentalism
As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, nature in 
Asian traditions of thought has become a field of
rediscovery to recent environmental philosophy.116 As 
editors of a recent volume of essays on environmental
philosophy, Callicott and Ames were persuaded by the fact 
that Asian traditions of thought can help the West
reconstruct its worldview. They are of the opinion that
Eastern traditions of thought represent nature, and the 
relationship of people to nature, in ways that cognitively 
resonate with contemporary ecological ideas and 
environmental ideals.117 They hold the view that
contemporary environmental misdeeds perpetrated by Asian 
peoples today can in large measure be attributed to the 
intellectual colonisation of the East by the West.118
Callicott and Ames also show that comparative
environmental philosophy faces the most obvious problem: 
that ideas of Eastern cultures must be made intelligible to 
non-specialists in the West through the syntax and semantic 
discrimination of Western languages (and vice versa).119 At 
present there is much confusion and, as we saw with
reference to the legal debates in chapter 5.4 above, a
marked inability to articulate the linkages between culture 
and law in India. In consequence, Asian philosophies often 
appear to be confused as inferior variations of Western 
themes. In other words, by Western paradigms, either there
206
is no Eastern philosophy worthy of the name, or, if there is 
one, it is of an inferior grade.120 Either argument tends to 
declare this philosophy irrelevant for modern legal 
analysis.
Callicott and Ames are of the view that Western 
cognitive culture today appears to be in the midst of a 
millennial upheaval which undoubtedly appears more 
disjunctive from the current internal perspective than it 
may in retrospect. Nonetheless, ideas inherited from an 
amalgamated Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian heritage - about 
the world, about who we are as human beings in the world, 
and about what in the world is valuable to have and hold - 
seem to have played themselves out, both theoretically and 
pragmatically.121
In this context, the same authors point out that from 
the mid-fifteenth to the mid-twentieth century, many Western 
nations openly pursued a policy of naked imperialism - 
imposing, by force of arms, their common economic, 
political, administrative, and religious culture on Asian 
(and African, Australian and American) peoples.122 While 
most Asian nations are no longer Western colonies, few 
former victims of Western imperialism have 'returned to pre­
colonial ways'. That would imply, in the common perception, 
a return to the past. Yet, from the recent studies on Indian 
law which have been examined in the preceding sub-chapters, 
it can be deduced that tradition was in fact never fully
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displaced. If traditional concepts could not be dislodged by 
colonialism it may not be possible to abandon the past when 
the vices of colonialism and industrialism are being 
condemned by those concerned about the environment.
India's religious and cultural heritage has been shown 
to reveal a knowledge of nature and rules of utilisation of 
natural resources that respect the integrity of nature.123 
It has even been seen as a resource for a global eco- 
theology.124 A cardinal feature of the traditional culture 
within the collective psyche of Indian society is the notion 
of 'ahimsa' which creates a strong sense of non-violence 
that reflects not only elements of nature conservation but 
also anathematises notions of law favouring any rampant or 
violent development.125
Using illustrative examples, Dwivedi has been able to 
bring out the practical impact of Hinduism on conservation 
and sustainable development.126 Dwivedi' s work shows how 
Satyagraha (the insistence or persistence in search of 
truth) provides a flexible, adjustable system of moral and 
ethical guidelines towards environmental preservation and 
conservation. According to him the early Sanskrit texts, the 
Vedas and Upanishads, teach the non-dualism of the supreme 
power that existed before creation.127 God as the efficient 
cause, and nature, Prakrti, as the material cause of the 
universe, are unconditionally accepted, as is their 
harmonious relationship.128 Thus God and Prakrti are one and
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the same.
Conceptualisations like Prajapati, the creator of sky, 
earth, oceans, and all species, who is also their protector 
and eventual destroyer and the only Lord of creation, show 
that human beings have no special privilege or authority 
over other creatures. On the other hand, they have more 
obligations and duties. Dwivedi shows that the Hindu belief 
in the cycle of births and rebirths provides a solid 
foundation for the doctrine of ahimsa (non-violence against 
animals and human beings).129 Recent works by O.P. Dwivedi 
bring out the increasing need for a universal code of 
conduct for environmental protection based on the concept of 
dharma.120 He examines the concept of dharma and 
distinguishes it from the internalised, individualised and 
liberty-centred Western concept of duty.131
The ecological crisis of today is not a Western 
phenomenon alone. The East today has no more lived to its 
highest ideals than has the West.132 It could be said that 
one cannot have an ecological movement against violence in 
nature unless the value of non-violence is made central to 
the ethos of a culture.
It is certainly beyond the scope of this thesis to show 
the many and very diverse traditions of thought in India on 
various aspects of the nature of nature. Callicott and Ames 
have to some extent undertaken that task. In terms of
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environmental and ethical discussion the philosophical views 
of Samkhya, Yoga, Vedanta and Mahayana Buddhist thought 
could be employed fruitfully. It could be shown that the 
notion of Prakrti as Triguna (Sattva, Rajas, Tamas) is 
clearly "systemic and (internally) relational" and 
environmental ethicists could possibly find in them powerful 
conceptual resources.133 Callicott and Ames have arrived at 
the conclusion that,
"We are persuaded that Asian traditions of thought can 
help the West reconstruct its world view. Firstly they 
can help along the process of western self-criticism by 
providing an alternative place to stand, an outsider's 
point of view, from which the West can more clearly 
discern the deeper substrata of its inherited 
intellectual biases and assumptions. And secondly, if, 
as some scholars have suggested, the historical 
dialectic of Western thought is being impelled in what 
has until now been a predominantly Oriental direction, 
Eastern traditions, rich in metaphor, simile, and 
symbol, can help the West articulate in ways that are 
culturally assimilable, the very untraditional abstract 
ideas forthcoming from contemporary theoretical studies 
of the nature of nature.134
These ideas are not as new as they may sound. An often- 
cited quotation of M.K. Gandhi135 reflects the Indian 
approach towards sustainable environment and development:
"God forbid that India should ever take to
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industrialism after the manner of the West. The 
economic imperialism of a single tiny island kingdom is 
today keeping the world in chains. If an entire nation 
of 300 million took to similar economic exploitation, 
it would strip the world bare like locusts."136
Contemporary Indian writings on industrialisation and 
development are beginning to re-discover this deep and 
overall inner relatedness of things.137 Newly emerging 
Indian views show that a new ecological order cannot be 
built on the old colonial order as the two are ethically, 
economically and epistemologically incongruent.138 Other 
recent literature clearly bring out the attitudes of the 
common people of India on the environment.139 In 
acknowledging the inspiration which he was able to draw from 
the participation of indigenous people, Maurice Strong, the 
Secretary-General of the Earth Summit, stated:
"Traditional peoples are the primary custodians of most 
of the evolutionary experience of mankind. They still 
hold vital and rare wisdom based on their success at 
managing a sustainable environment, as their ability to 
exist in harmony with ecosystems such as the forest, 
that more "developed" cultures are decimating,
testifies..... The belief of Indian tribal peoples,
for example, that their culture was born and nourished 
in the forest, and their dependence for survival upon 
its continued existence, has imbued in them a 
respectful attitude to nature, and given rise to the
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development of the most basic principles of forest 
management. "140
Vandana Shiva, a well-known ecologist in India, has 
argued that forests have always been central to Indian 
civilisation.141 They have been worshipped as Aranyani, the 
Goddess of the forest, the primary source of life and 
fertility and the forest as a community has been viewed as 
a model for societal and civilisational evolution. The 
diversity, harmony and self-sustaining nature of the forest 
form the organisational principles guiding Indian 
civilisation. According to Shiva, the aranya samskriti (the 
culture of the forest or the forest culture) was not a 
condition of primitiveness, but of conscious choice.142 
Shiva has also viewed the Chipko Andolan (the movement to 
hug trees), based on the injunctions of ahimsa, as a
feminist movement to protect nature from the greed of
143men.
One could say from the point of view of equality that
the natural world is not, as represented in classical
Western science, an aggregate of essentially independent 
entities. It is a relationally unified, differentiated and 
integrated system. Human beings, moreover, are both emergent 
from and immersed in the ecosystem. To that extent, this 
world view of ecology is "holistic", and the man-world 
relationship "integrated" and "organic".144
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Again, these are not entirely new revelations. 
Rabindranath Tagore, the national poet and philosopher of 
India, once wrote:
"Contemporary western civilization is built of brick 
and wood. It is rooted in the city. But Indian 
civilization has been distinctive in locating its 
source of regeneration material and intellectual, in 
the forest, not the city. India's best ideas have come 
from where man was in communion with trees and rivers 
and lakes, away from the crowds. The peace of the 
forests has helped the intellectual evolution of 
man. "145
One could argue from what Tagore has said that the 
distinctiveness of Indian culture lies in having defined the 
principles of life in nature as the highest form of cultural 
evolution:
"The culture of the forest has fuelled the culture of 
Indian society. The culture that has arisen from the 
forest has been influenced by the diverse processes of 
renewal of life which are always at play in the forest, 
varying from species to species, from season to season, 
in sight and sound and smell. The unifying principle of 
life in diversity, of democratic pluralism, thus became 
the principle of Indian civilization."146
The impact of the current rediscovery of Indian culture 
is evident in most areas of scientific policy making
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processes. For instance a well-known Indian ecologist, while 
calling for a change in the land use pattern which had 
arisen due to earlier faulty governmental policies, has
pointed out that:
"To restore and husband the potential of our land must 
be our foremost concern. And to implement this simple 
deed we do not need huge amounts of money or
sophisticated enterprise or a massive governmental 
machinery. All we need is a most commonsensical 
approach to observe, feel for and understand land as a 
living dynamic system of which we are but a part. Our 
cultural and religious ethics must compel us to take 
care of it. This land ethics must permeate and
influence every deed of ours which would potentially 
have an impact on the living landscape."147
Recently, for forging a new common purpose around the 
world, the American Vice President Al Gore proposed a global 
Marshall Plan.148 It might surprise many to note that Al 
Gore has sought inspiration from Gandhi for the change that 
is currently required to keep Earth in the balance. He
states:
"But I believe deeply that true change is possible only 
when it begins inside the person who is advocating it. 
Mahatma Gandhi said it well : "We must be the change we 
wish to see in the world" . "149
This reflects growing awareness of the importance of
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self-control mechanisms rather than legal strategies based 
on 'command and control'.
Al Gore has also discovered that for giving effect to 
his global Marshall Plan, the world's strategy for inducing 
a global demographic transition to lower growth rate should 
be based on the strategy used in the least 'modernised' yet 
highly traditional societies of Kerala and elsewhere.150 He 
finds:
"But there are some stunning success stories that show 
what can happen with a strategic approach. One of the 
most interesting case studies of demographic transition 
in the Third World comes from the Kerala province of 
southwestern India, where the population growth has 
stabilized at zero eventhough per capita incomes are 
still extremely low. The provincial leaders with 
assistance from international population funding, 
developed a plan that is keyed to Kerala's unique 
cultural, social, religious, and political 
characteristics and focuses on a few crucial factors.
.........  The consequences are little short of
remarkable; in an area of the world characterized by 
uncontrollable population growth, Kerala's rate more 
nearly resembles that of Sweden than nearby Bombay."151
Legal scholars in India are searching for solutions,
too. Chhatrapati Singh, in analysing dharmasastra and
contemporary jurisprudence in India, has stressed the need
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to make a detailed study of the dharmasastras, nibandhas, 
vyavaharas and customary laws which are particularly 
relevant for environmental protection.152 Singh showed how 
the close relationship that existed between the communal way 
of life all over rural and tribal India governed by 
customary laws was able to manage traditional community 
resources like forests, grazing lands, irrigation etc. 
According to him:
"Statutory laws, like the Panchayat Acts, Forests Acts 
and the Irrigation laws have been super-imposed on 
these customary laws. Such statutes were often aimed at 
massive exploitation of the common property resources, 
thereby impoverishing the tribal and rural people as 
well as breaking down the traditional community 
resources management systems. All this is a part of our 
colonial legal history. "153 
At the same time he proceed to sate that:
"We are grossly ignorant of the laws and rules 
governing such matters, both in the dharmasastra as 
well as in the pre-British Muslim laws. It is being now 
realised that some of the traditional methods of 
preservation of forests, such as declaring them divine 
{devabanas, rakhas) or associating village tanks with 
village temples, were essentially democratic methods of 
people participation in preservation and utilisation of 
common goods. We need to make a detailed study of the 
dharmasastras, nibandhas, vyavaharas and customary laws 
to re-learn the whole juridical areas of public
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property management."154
Others are beginning to see actual results. Professor 
Leelakrishnan, writing on the new forest law in India, 
showed the remarkable shift from the old revenue-obsessed 
attitude to a new environment-oriented approach towards 
forests.155 He noted that:
"Recognition of the symbiotic relationship between the 
tribal people and forests is the most significant 
feature of the new forest policy. While the laws and 
administrative measures hitherto followed had miserably 
failed in this respect the new policy makes an attempt 
to restore old rights and concessions to the tribal 
people and recognises their effective role and 
association in the protection, regeneration and 
development of the forests."156
The development of laws in a postmodern society shows 
the need for a new regulatory order emphasising the power of 
self-control. Elsewhere, Richard Brooks has explored how far 
the state could and should mandate environmentally sensitive 
life styles.157 Brooks questions whether direct or indirect 
coercion is legally supportable and identifies as more 
suitable the pluralism principle, wherein law fosters either 
in a neutral or equal fashion differing ways of life and 
differing groups.158 Harold Berman's theory of an 
integrative jurisprudence appears to point in the same 
direction as a key to understanding the development of World
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Laws.159 According to him integrative jurisprudence is based 
on a legal philosophy that combines the three classical 
schools: legal positivism, natural law theory, and the
historical school. In Berman's analysis of both positivism 
and natural law with historical integration, one could see 
a revival of historical jurisprudence.
According to Berman, the Western legal positivist 
tradition, which has given the political and moral aspect of 
that tradition their dynamic impulse for the last several 
centuries, has diminished substantially. At the same time, 
he sees a new global legal tradition emerging, which in some 
way threatens the Western legal tradition while also 
building upon it.160 The crisis of the Western legal 
tradition is that it is at the end of an era in which world 
history was centred in Western history and the beginning of 
an era in which Western history is centred in world 
history.161
Therefore the socio-legal aspects of environmentalism 
pose a central question, which is no longer whether law is 
a significant vehicle for social change but rather how it so 
functions, how the inherent sociological obligations in our 
legal system can be fulfilled to win a battle for 
qualitative existence.162 It is a case of creating a new 
post-modern legal order. The current Indian experience shows 
how this can be based on indigenous cultural traditions 
which encompass law within a 'holistic' framework of
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regulation and, significantly, self-regulation.
The next chapter shows the manifestation of this 
approach in recent Indian judicial discourse and analyses 
the current development of environmental jurisprudence by 
Indian courts. Chapter 6 below focuses on specific 
articulations in important Indian environmental cases which 
bring out the inarticulated premises of legal 
conceptualisation in Indian environmental jurisprudence.
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CHAPTER 6 THE JURISPRUDENCE ON INDIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
This chapter focuses on the Indian case-law about 
environmental protection. Initially, particular aspects of 
three well-known environmental cases or rather groups of 
cases are analysed in detail to show the important 
characteristic features of Indian environmental 
jurisprudence. First, Ratlam, as an early path breaker, has 
opened the way for the development of India's new 
environmental jurisprudence. Secondly, the Mehta cases show 
the gradual induction of new principles based on the public 
law rationale. Thirdly, the attempts made to resolve the 
famous Bhopal case by the Indian courts reveal the 
renunciation of established common law principles and 
notions of law. These three well-known environmental law 
cases exhibit the adoption of unique strategies and 
techniques that authenticate the operation of a new public 
law rationale and also reveal the use of autochthonous 
postulates of law and justice. They epitomise the neo- 
dharmic jurisprudence of environmental justice in India.
The early sections of this chapter analytically focus 
on these three well-known innovative types of cases and 
identify the operating principles that underpin them. In the 
light of our discussions in earlier chapters, we see here 
how the new public law rationale, building on the common law 
models in a fashion unique to the Indian legal culture, has
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been based on autochthonous elements of juridical reasoning 
and understanding of law. This jurisprudential delineation 
can be seen as a postmodern legal development, with 
traditional conceptualisations of law, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, slowly but perceptibly establishing 
themselves in modified forms.
The chapter then proceeds to analyse other important 
environmental law cases decided by the Supreme Court and the 
various High Courts in India within the last decade which 
graphically delineate the postulates of Indian environmental 
jurisprudence. In short, while focusing on the development 
of environmental jurisprudence by the Indian judiciary, this 
chapter illustrates and explains the unusual nature of 
Indian juridical reasoning.1 We shall see how the elements 
of the Indian legal culture often operate as inarticulated 
premises, nevertheless shaping the new jurisprudence. It 
must be pointed out at the outset that our present grouping 
of cases is not a watertight compartmentalisation of 
specialist concerns, but that the new rationale permeates 
all areas of Indian law.
6.1 The juridical rationale of Ratlam
Municipal Council, Ratlam v Vardhichand2 was a criminal 
appeal decided by the Supreme Court of India in July 1980. 
It was a case wherein a magistrate had ordered the appellant
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municipality under Section 133 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code of 1973 to abate a public nuisance caused by poor 
sewerage facilities in a locality by taking some time-bound 
action.3 The order of the magistrate had been reversed by 
the Sessions Court but the High Court had approved the 
magistrate's order and the municipality then appealed 
against the High Court's decision to the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court expounded the wide parameters of the power of 
the executive first class magistrate in taking effective 
action against public nuisance for environmental
violations.4 In deciding this case, Krishna Iyer J. noted: 
"The truth is that a few profound issues of processual 
jurisprudence of great strategic significance to our 
legal system face us and we must zero-in on them as 
they involve problems of access to justice for the 
people beyond the blinkered rules of 'standing' of 
British Indian vintage. If the centre of gravity of 
justice is to shift, as the Preamble to the
Constitution mandates, from the traditional 
individualism of locus standi to the community 
orientation of public interest litigation, these issues 
must be considered."5
The above observation of Justice Iyer in Ratlam clearly 
manifests two legal postulates. First, it emphasises the 
need to shift the 'centre of gravity' in the administration
of justice. In other words, a re-orientation or a
progressive change in the modernisation of the judicial
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processes. This also indicates that the established legal 
structure will have to give way to a new legal order. 
Secondly, the shift from individualism to community 
orientation is seen as a necessary and mandatory requirement 
of the aims and ideals of the Constitution, discussed in 
detail in chapter 2.1 above.
Thus this judgment is not confined to the 
interpretation of a specific provision in the Criminal 
Procedure Code, as it would seem to appear, but it clearly 
brings out the hidden postulates of post-colonial Indian 
constitutional dimensions which have become particularly 
vital in the development of Indian environmental 
jurisprudence.
The judgment highlighted the scope of the new 
orientation of the power under the criminal codes that could 
then be activated efficaciously. Accordingly:
"Although these two codes are of ancient vintage, the 
social justice orientation imparted to them by the 
Constitution of India makes it a remedial weapon of 
versatile use."6
The judgment supplemented the magistrate's order and 
compelled the State (in the form of the Municipality) to 
take appropriate action to stop the pollution caused by the 
effluent of an alcohol plant. The learned judge stated 
unequivocally that "industries cannot make profit at the
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expense of public health",7 and asked why the magistrate had 
not pursued this aspect. It is also significant to note the 
manner in which the court interpreted the power of the 
magistrate when it observed:
"The imperative tone of S. 133, Cr.P.C. read with the 
punitive temper of S. 188, I.P.C. makes the prohibitory 
act a mandatory duty."8
The judicial observations in Ratlam obviously raise the 
question whether such seemingly innocuous and hortatory 
judicial rhetorics can have practical inoculative effect. 
Two jurisprudentially significant aspects arise for debate 
out of this judgment. First, there is an emphasis to shift 
the primary legal concern away from business or industrial 
interests when confronted with the public interest for a 
healthy environment. Secondly, the juridical rationale in 
Ratlam emphasises the 'duty' of the authority, instead of 
the 'rights' of the aggrieved persons, as a mandatory 
requirement of the new legal order.
Krishna Gopal,9 already discussed in chapter 3.4 
above, is a notable example where the Ratlam rationale has 
made this particular provision under the Criminal Procedure 
Code an effective tool for environmental protection.10 P.C . 
Cherian v State of Kerala,11 also discussed in chapter 3.4 
above, and more recently K.C. Malhotra v State of M.P.,12 
show how the Ratlam rationale has found effective 
application.
238
One can therefore agree with the assertion that the 
Ratlam case has provoked the consciousness of the Indian 
judiciary to a problem which had not attracted much 
attention till then.13 Thus Ratlam has been seen to prepare 
the path for judicial activism to rely on the constitutional 
mandate for environmental protection.14 Commenting on the 
significance of the Ratlam case, Professor Leelakrishnan and 
others at Cochin University hold the view that by invoking 
Section 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code, even corporate 
bodies and public corporations can be made accountable for 
causing nuisance by way of pollution.15
As indicated, there are now many other similar cases 
where Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 
was effectively used.16 In Madhavi v Thilakan17, it is 
poignant to note Justice Chettur Sankaran Nair's 
observations. Reflecting on the report of the Sub-Inspector 
of Police who recommended that the trade should not be 
stopped because that would deprive the respondents of their 
livelihood, a fundamental right in Article 19(1) (g) of the 
Constitution, the learned judge held:
"To say that a workshop or factory should not be closed 
down, as it provides livelihood to some persons, 
unmindful of the consequences of others, would be to 
say the untenable. Constitutionally recognised values, 
cannot be ignored. "18
Thus Justice Nair categorically asserted the importance
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of "constitutionally recognised values". He relied upon 
relevant provisions of the Constitution to hold that every 
man has also "the right to live in peace, to sleep in peace 
and the right to repose and health, as part of the right to 
live".19 He justified his approach by his interpretation of 
the relevant section in the statute and put the right to 
life higher than the right to work. He then proceeded to 
observe that:
"This principle expressed through law and culture, 
consistent with nature's ground rules for existence, 
has been recognised in S. 133 (1)(b)."20
Here it can also be seen that the underlying premise of 
the learned judge's juridical articulation lies in the 
unique jurisconscience of "law and culture consistent with 
nature's ground rules for existence". It is submitted, in 
other words, that the learned judge appears to indicate that 
the operation of Section 133 is now no more based on the 
British-Indian common law rationale, but rather on the 
Indian constitutional law rationale, which in turn operates 
on "nature's ground rules for existence".
The reference to "nature's ground rules of existence", 
as the analysis in the previous chapter showed, links 
precisely to the Indian concept of 'dharma' with its 
emphasis on the inevitable inter-relatedness of all human 
activity. Thus it can be said that the inarticulated premise 
of the learned judge's interpretation of Section 133 of the
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Criminal Procedure Code shows the underlying postulates of 
Indian environmental jurisprudence. Especially in the light 
of later cases and, thus, with the benefit of hindsight, one 
can therefore say, that the Ratlam rationale shows an 
indubitable manifestation of a juridical rationale based on 
modified dharmic ideas of a legal order. In the current 
development of Indian environmental jurisprudence, this 
element of a self-controlled order and of the systemic need 
to check imbalances and to avoid abuses of ecological 
equilibria is clearly evident not only in cases where public 
authorities are involved.
6.2 The juristic principles in the Mehta cases
There are to date more than a dozen reported decisions of 
the Supreme Court under the name of M.C. Mehta v Union of 
India.21 The petitioner in all these cases is a practising 
advocate of the Supreme Court. The first case,22 decided in 
February 1986, was a public interest writ petition filed 
before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the 
Constitution. Orders were sought from the court to restrain 
the re-opening of certain industrial plants of one Shriram 
Food and Fertiliser Corporation, which had been closed 
following a major leakage of oleum gas from one of its units 
in Delhi. The court after considering the reports of experts 
appointed by the government and by the court, permitted the 
plants to be re-opened but only subject to the strict
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observation of conditions laid down by the court.23
In a separate order for compensation in the same 
case,24 the court laid down new principles of absolute 
liability without exception. The rule laid down by the court 
states that:
"Where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or 
inherently dangerous activity and harm results to 
anyone on account of an accident in the operation of 
such hazardous or inherent activity resulting, for 
example, in escape of toxic gas, the enterprise is 
strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those 
who are affected by the accident and such liability is 
not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis- 
a-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under 
the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. 1,25
The decision of the Indian Supreme Court in this case, 
laying down the new principle of absolute liability, is a 
significant departure from the established common law 
principle of strict liability. It is important for our 
present study to note the way in which the court laid down 
the rule, again giving greater emphasis to public interest 
rather than private interest. In laying down this rule, the 
then Chief Justice Bhagwati held:
"We have to evolve new principles and lay down new 
norms which would adequately deal with the new problems 
which arise in a highly industrialised economy. We
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cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constricted by 
reference to the law as it prevails in England or for 
the matter for that in any other foreign country. We no 
longer need the crutches of a foreign legal order. We 
are certainly prepared to receive light from whatever 
source it comes but we have to build our own 
jurisprudence. "26
The judgment very clearly indicates the need to deviate 
from the common law tradition of the earlier legal order and 
at the same time shows the willingness to accommodate and 
accept what is found good in the earlier legal order or in 
other legal systems. This attitude of the Indian judges 
manifests the Indian legal culture of syncretism with its 
openness and readiness for legal osmosis, which we have 
discussed in detail in chapter 5.3 above.
On the question of compensating victims of industrial 
accidents and on the principles of liability of industries 
engaged in inherently dangerous and hazardous activities, 
the court addressed the issues in a novel fashion. The new 
strategy was moulded under Article 32 of the Constitution to 
compensate those who were affected by violation of their 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution.27 The 
court strengthened its power to grant remedial relief on the 
basis that it would otherwise rob Article 32 of its efficacy 
and render it impotent and futile.28 The court felt that it 
would be gravely unjust to the person whose fundamental
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right was violated to require him to go to the civil court 
for claiming compensation.29 This shows that modern Indian 
environmental law developments are more than verbose 
exercises in philosophy. More recently, it has become 
obvious that the focus on implementation and on meaningful 
remedies has become a major element of the new rationale.
In the next important Mehta case,30 decided in 
September 1987, the Supreme Court ordered the closure of 
about thirty tanneries, which had failed to take minimum 
steps required for the primary treatment of industrial 
effluent, and the government was directed to enforce the 
standards required under law on more than one hundred other 
tanneries.
In this case the court explicitly emphasised the 
importance of, and the need for, protecting the environment 
by relying on Articles 48A and 51A of the Constitution.31 
Our discussion in chapter 2.2 above showed the significance 
of these two articles incorporated into the Constitution by 
the 197 6 amendment for promoting the jurisprudential 
development in this area. The judgment also quoted in 
extenso the proclamation adopted by the United Nations 
conference on Human Environment at Stockholm in 1972, 
pointing out the stand of the Indian delegation led by the 
then Prime Minister of India.32 The importance accorded to 
the policy of protecting the environment by reference to 
such materials, it is submitted, shows how the judges of the
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apex court in India do not shun away from political and 
social realities but rather give important consideration to 
them and also make it a point now to exhibit their awareness 
of such issues.
The court ordered the closing down of the tanneries 
with the following observation:
"Just like an industry which cannot pay minimum wages 
to its workers cannot be allowed to exist, a tannery 
which cannot set up a primary treatment plant cannot be 
permitted to continue to be in existence for the 
adverse effect on the public at large which is likely 
to ensue by the discharging of the trade effluents from 
the tannery to the river Ganga would be immense and it 
will out weigh any inconvenience that may be caused to 
the management and the labour employed by it on account 
of its closure."33
The unequivocal rationale of the court reiterating the 
importance of public concerns over individual proprietary 
interests is, thus, also made clear in this judgment.
The next significant Mehta case,34 was decided in 
January 1988 after the earlier decision to close down the 
tanneries. In this case, Orders were passed by the Supreme 
Court to abate the pollution of the river Ganga by directing 
the Kanpur municipal corporation to take various steps for 
the prevention of pollution of that river. The court also
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ordered that copies of the judgment be sent to all other 
municipalities through whose areas the river Ganga flows.
The new public law rationale and its link with Indian
legal culture are very much manifest in this case,
particularly in the elaborate directions given by the court. 
This can be seen, for instance, in the following:
"In order to rouse among the people the consciousness 
of cleanliness of environment the Government of India 
and the government of the States and of the Union
Territories may consider the desirability of organising 
'Keep the city clean' week (Nagar Nirmalikarana 
Sapt aha) , 'Keep the town clean' week (Pura 
Nirmalikarana Saptaha) and 'Keep the village clean' 
week (Garma Nirmalikarana Saptaha) in every city, town 
and village throughout India at least once a year. 
During that week the entire city, town or village 
should be kept as far as possible clean, tidy and free 
from pollution of land, water and air."35
The tone and the style of the above directions
originating from the apex court of law would appear to an 
unaccustomed legal mind as some pedagogic prescription 
wrapped in religious solemnity and presented with a spirit 
of festivity. The persuasive element and the pedagogic mode 
of judicial discourse in fact reflect Indian legal culture 
and its emphasis on self-control. In other words, it fosters 
the rationale of internal inculcation of normative values to
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regulate human behaviour through self-participation, 
adopting ritualistic or festive traditional customary
fashions.
What is significant for our study is the dharmic
cultural orientation, whereby directions of law are 
encapsulated in ritualistic connotations in order to rouse 
among the people an environmental consciousness without
dictating the law in a 'command and control' style.36
Venkataramiah J. urged the authorities to act on those 
suggestions noting that although legislation provided for 
the prevention and control of pollution, 'many of those 
provisions have just remained on paper without any adequate 
action being taken pursuant thereto'.37 It is quite obvious 
that from a Western jurisprudential perspective such 
directions are perhaps worthy of comment.38
This case not only depicts the permeation of the new 
public law regime but also the impact of autochthonous 
elements of the Indian legal culture on Indian environmental 
jurisprudence. In the first place, by entertaining this case 
as a public interest litigation, the court took the view 
that the petitioner was entitled to move the court in order 
to enforce the statutory provisions which imposed duties on 
the municipal authorities.39 Thus the aim to regulate the 
regulator, which constitutes the underlying idea behind the 
public law approach, is sought to be achieved not only by 
emphasising the statutory duties but also by indicating the
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desirability to carry them out in a manner acceptable to the 
people's consciousness.40
In the same Mehta case, further Orders were passed by 
the Supreme Court in December 1991.41 Here the court ordered 
that a general notice be published in the national 
newspapers so that all industries situated along the river 
Ganga should file their affidavits before the court to state 
what steps they had taken to comply with orders of the court 
and the directions issued by the Ministry of Environment and 
Forests. It was further made clear that if any industry 
failed to take necessary steps for preventing pollution or 
following the standards, that industry should be directed to 
be closed. Further orders were also issued by the Supreme 
Court to effectively carry out its earlier orders.42 More 
recent news reports show that the Supreme Court has now 
ordered the closure of eighty-four industries located in 
Uttar Pradesh43 and thirty industries in West Bengal44 for 
having failed to comply with the court's directions.
The Supreme Court also entertained several other public 
interest writ petitions by Mr Mehta against pollution 
control authorities to prompt them to take action against 
air pollution in and around Delhi. In November 1990, the 
Supreme Court issued directions to the Environment Ministry 
to take action to reduce the air pollution in Delhi caused 
by motor vehicles in one such Mehta case.45 The Supreme 
Court also issued a series of orders in another Mehta case,
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where the petitioner sought to challenge the continuance of 
stone crushing operations in the close vicinity of Delhi and 
consequent pollution arising from it.46 The latter case 
pinpoints the style of judicial discourse that prompts 
administrative action. This is what the Supreme Court has to 
say about the regulators:
"We are constrained to record that Delhi Development 
Authority, Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Central 
Pollution Control Board and Delhi Pollution Control 
Committee have been wholly remiss in the performance of 
their statutory duties and have failed to protect the 
environment and control air pollution in the Union 
Territory of Delhi. Utter disregard to environment has 
placed Delhi in an unenviable position of being the 
world's third grubbiest, most polluted and unhealthy 
city as per a study conducted by the World Health 
Organisation. Needless to say that every citizen has a 
right to fresh air and to live in pollution free 
environments . "47
The above observations of the Supreme Court emphasise 
public accountability, which forms the apotheosis of the new 
public law rationale. The above strictures on the concerned 
public authorities indicate yet another facet in the 
operation of the new jurisprudence, obliging government 
agencies to control themselves. The power and efficacy of 
such judicial discourse is shown to give rise to 'a 
jurisprudence of rancour and strictures'.48 According to
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Baxi :
"A stricture is the signature of disapproval and 
dissent. It is also a summons to constitutionally 
becoming behaviour. A stricture is not a sentence and 
yet it enjoys the fecundity of a sanction. It 
stigmatises without conviction. Its moral rhetoric of 
dismay, distress and disgust creates an aura of 
illegitimacy of power. Its moral force pierces even the 
rhinocer[o]s-layers of the political skin, in a kind of 
micro-surgery on body politic.....
.... The SAL discourse of strictures has assumed 
unimaginable potency; it poses a fertile threat to all 
those who would exercise power as if they were above 
the law and the Constitution. "49
It is also significant to note that the court did not 
dispose of the writ petition but ordered to keep it pending 
for the purpose of monitoring the compliance of their 
directions.50 This shows the adoption of a rolling review 
technique where there is constant monitoring and not just 
one dramatic court battle. This further indicates the active 
role that the court has taken upon itself to see that its 
directions are complied with in due course. Thus we see here 
a different style in the use of law and judicial process.
In November 1991, the Supreme Court issued directions, 
in yet another Mehta case,51 to disseminate information and 
messages on environmental protection in cinema halls and for
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broadcast on national radio and television. This was with a 
view to educating the people about their social obligation 
to protect the environment and making them aware of their 
obligation not to act as polluting agents or contributors. 
Here the court relied on the fundamental duty of every 
citizen under Article 5lA(g) to protect and improve the 
natural environment with an interesting observation that:
"Our ancestors had known that nature was not subduable 
and, therefore, had made it an obligation for man to 
surrender to nature and live in tune with it. Our 
Constitution underwent an amendment in 197 6 by 
incorporating an Article (51-A) with the heading 
"Fundamental Duties". Clause (g) thereof requires
it 52
The court then went on to observe that:
"Law is a regulator of human conduct as the professors 
of jurisprudence say, but no law can indeed effectively 
work unless there is an element of acceptance by the 
people in society. No law works out smoothly unless the 
interaction is voluntary. In order that human conduct 
may be in accordance with the prescription of law it is 
necessary that there should be appropriate awareness 
about what the law requires and there is an element of 
acceptance that the requirement of law is grounded upon 
a philosophy which should be followed."53
The above observations of the court again indicate the
251
new orientation of Indian jurisprudence, emphasising the 
requirement of laws' awareness and acceptance grounded upon 
a philosophy which should be followed. The court observed 
further that:
"We are in a democratic polity where dissemination of 
information is the foundation of the system. Keeping 
the citizens informed is an obligation of the 
government. It is equally the responsibility of society 
to adequately educate every component of it so that the 
social level is kept up. We, therefore, accept on 
principle the prayers made by the petitioner."54
The above reasoning of the court shows that in order to 
sustain a higher level of social order, the emphasis must be 
on the obligation of the government and on the
responsibility of the society. This indicates the rationale 
of the new public law order. Although seemingly hortatory, 
the above observations have been relied upon in the more 
recent case of K.C. Malhotra v State of M.P.55 It is also 
significant to note that in issuing the various directions 
to improve the sewerage and public health facilities the 
court in K.C. Malhotra emphasised that:
"It shall be the duty of the State and its
instrumentalities to educate not only the inhabitants 
of the locality, but the members of the society to live 
with appropriate awareness and to take all measures so
that water and environment may not be polluted."56
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The directions issued by the court in K.C. Malhotra, 
analysed above, show how the Ratlam rationale and the public 
law principles of the Mehta cases have now firmly been 
established in current Indian environmental jurisprudence. 
This also shows, as indicated, that our present grouping of 
cases is not a watertight compartmentalisation of specialist 
concerns, but that the new rationale permeates all areas of 
the law.
The above reasoning and observations of the court, it 
is submitted, indicate an underlying legal philosophy which 
prompts the creation of an obligation of the government and 
a responsibility of the society to maintain a higher social 
level. It is submitted that the regulatory rationale of law 
in India which emphasises the obligatory elements of human 
interaction, depicts the operation of a legal culture of 
regulating human conduct through a combination of persuasive 
means and voluntary acceptance. This depicts the Indian 
legal culture, based on the dharmic characteristics of 
Indian jurisprudence. The dharmic legal order, which act as 
the underlying legal postulate of Indian jurisprudence, 
envisages an ideal social order. Also in its operational 
philosophy one could see a juridical rationale that 
anathematises the 'command and control' legal ideology and 
brings in the conceptual understanding of law more in line 
with the Indian notions of dharma and ahimsa, in other 
words, non-violent means of achieving a self-controlled 
eternal order.
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From all the important Mehta cases analysed above and 
in more strictly legal terms, the juristic principles, now 
considered in India as Mehta principles, can be summed up as 
follows: (a) The writ jurisdiction of the higher courts can
be invoked to seek remedies for environmental infringements 
as a violation of fundamental rights and fundamental duties 
under the Constitution; (b) The power of the court under 
this jurisdiction permits the court to mould appropriate 
remedies, including compensation, as remedial relief for 
violation of fundamental rights and duties.
In other words, the above legal principles show how the 
Indian juridical techniques favour a flexible approach 
facilitating speedy remedial action and constant vigilance 
to support self-control mechanisms of law. The Mehta 
principles also show the emerging postulates of tortious 
liability in India whose principal focus is on the social 
limits of economic development.57 Here there is a strong 
indication that the public law rationale of Indian 
environmental jurisprudence is antithetical to the current 
Anglo-American approaches to environmental law and 
compensation based on economic theories which we briefly 
discussed in chapter 4.1 above to highlight their inherent 
deficiencies.
However, it has to be pointed out here that the award 
of compensation which has been developed in India under the 
new rationale is different, and yet at the same time built
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upon compensation as understood in the common law
jurisdiction. This position, which might not have been
obvious at the time of the early Mehta case of 1987, is now 
clear from a more recent case, Nilabati Behera v State of 
Orissa.58 Here an award for compensation in public law 
proceedings under Articles 32, 226, and 300 of the
Constitution, was held different from that envisaged in 
private tort law action of the common law tradition.
It is also significant to note the way in which Justice 
Verma, after discussing the opinions of the Law Lords in the 
UK,59 amalgamates their views with the emerging principles 
found in a line of Indian decisions, particularly Rudul 
Sah,60 the Bhagalpur Blinding cases61 and the Bhopal 
case.62 The Supreme Court thus held that the relief of 
monetary compensation as exemplary damages, in proceedings 
under Article 32 by the Supreme Court or under Article 22 6 
by the High Courts, for established infringement of the 
indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 of the 
Constitution is a remedy available in public law. This is 
based on the principle of strict liability for the
contravention of the guaranteed basic and indefeasible 
rights of the citizen.
Justice Anand's discussion about the difference in the 
purpose of public law proceedings and private law
proceedings is also significant for our present discussion 
as it delineates the characteristic feature of the new
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public law rationale that underpins Indian environmental 
jurisprudence. The juridical discussion begins with the 
reiteration that the court is prepared to "forge new tools 
and devise new remedies" in order to meet the ends of 
justice.63 Anand J. then states:
"The purpose of public law is not only to civilize 
public power but also to assure the citizens that they 
live under a legal system which aims to protect their 
interests and preserve their rights. Therefore, when 
the court moulds the relief by granting "compensation" 
in proceedings under Article 32 and 22 6 of the 
Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of 
fundamental rights, it does so under the public law by 
way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the 
liability for the public wrong on the State which has 
failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental 
rights of the citizen. The payment of compensation in 
such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally 
understood in a civil action for damages under the 
private law but in the broader sense of providing 
relief by an order of 'monetary amends' under the 
public law of the wrong done due to breach of public 
duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights of the 
citizen. "64
Thus Nilabati Behera v State of Orissa, in effect, 
refines the legal postulates that operate in the Mehta 
cases, representing particularly the wider ramifications of
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the new public law rationale. This new rationale shows that 
the Indian judiciary is now well on the way to developing a 
jurisprudence, particularly on environmental matters, which 
is remarkably more 'modern' and at the same time similar to 
the traditional (pre-British-Muslim) legal understanding 
based on every individual's responsibility for the common 
good.
6.3 The jurisprudence of 'justice without law' in Bhopal
The Bhopal cases arose out of one of the world's worst 
industrial disasters. The calamity occurred on the night of 
2-3 December 1984 in Bhopal in the State of Madhya Pradesh. 
Highly toxic gas leaked from a chemical factory of the Union 
Carbide Corporation, killing more than 2,500 and injuring 
more than 2 00,000. This led to the biggest ever litigation 
for damages before the American courts. Following a forum 
non conveniens ruling by the American courts these cases 
were tried by the Indian courts. Much has been written about 
this sensational case and its impact on the development of 
environmental law in India and abroad.65
The settlement reached in the Bhopal case is reported 
in four documents. They are the Supreme Court's order dated 
14th February 1989,66 a supplemental order dated 15th 
February 19 8 9 , 67 a consequential memorandum of the terms of 
settlement signed by Union Carbide's and the Government of
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India's lawyers and tendered to the court on 15th February 
198968 and an order dated 4th May 19 8 9 69 setting forth the 
Supreme Court's reasons for urging the settlement.
The Order of the Supreme Court of 4th May 1989, wherein 
the court gave reasons for their earlier Settlement Order of 
14th and 15th February 1989, evoked much legal debate 
particularly on the manner in which the court sought to 
resolve the case. A prominent Indian jurist has analysed 
these orders, taking note of the debate in this area with 
much criticism and counter-criticisms.70 A significant 
criticism against the Supreme Court's settlement orders of 
14th and 15th February came from P.N. Bhagwati, a former 
activist Chief Justice of India, who felt that the Bhopal 
case had come to a disturbing end in which where the 
multinational had won and the people of India had lost.71 At 
that time many other lawyers had also felt that the 
settlement order was most unusual and wrong, particularly 
the manner in which the court had passed the order behind 
the backs of the victims.72
However, our analysis here aims to identify the 
inarticulated premises in the juridical rationale as 
evidence of the underlying postulates of India's newly 
evolving environmental jurisprudence. The manner in which 
the Indian courts sought to resolve these cases again 
depicts characteristic features of Indian legal culture. For 
the purpose of this study, we particularly focus on the non­
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application of established principles of common law and the 
adoption of alternative dispute resolution strategies. The 
Bhopal cases in India explicitly authenticate Indian 
environmental jurisprudence in this respect.
It can be seen from the order of 4th May 1989 that the 
court "considered it a compelling duty, both judicial and 
humane, to secure immediate relief to the victims" rather 
than pursuing considerations of excellence and niceties of 
legal principles.73 In conclusion, the court expressed its 
own limitation as a fallible human institution whose view, 
in the ultimate analysis, is to be judged by what it does to 
relieve the undeserved suffering of thousands of innocent 
citizens.74 The court then quoted the words of Wallace 
Mendelson from a study on Supreme Court Statecraft - The 
Rule of Law and Men:
"In this imperfect legal setting we expect judges to 
clear their endless dockets, uphold the Rule of Law, 
and yet not utterly disregard our need for the 
discretionary justice of Plato's philosopher king. 
Judges must be sometimes cautious and sometimes bold. 
Judges must respect both the tradition of the past and 
the convenience of present."75
The Mehta principle on absolute liability which, as 
Union Carbide sought to argue, had changed Indian law 
explicitly to favour their opponents, was referred to by the 
Supreme Court:
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"One aspect of this matter was dealt with by this court 
in M C Mehta v Union of India [AIR 1987 SC 1086] which 
marked a significant stage in the development of the 
law. But at the hearing there was more than a mere hint 
in the submissions of the Union Carbide that in this 
case the law was altered with only the Union Carbide 
Corporation in mind, and was altered to its 
disadvantage even before the case had reached this 
court. "76
The court then went on to refine and explain the Mehta 
principle in the following terms:
"The criticism of the Mehta principle, perhaps, ignores 
the emerging postulates of tortious liability whose 
principal focus is the social-limits of economic 
adventurism. There are certain things that a civilised 
society simply cannot permit to be done to its members, 
even if they are compensated for their resulting 
losses. "77
Here, it is difficult to discern what the judges of the 
Supreme Court are able to see as the emerging postulates of 
Indian tort law. But in our investigation of the common law 
foundations of public nuisance, in chapter 3.1 above, we 
noted the efforts designed to develop a public law of torts 
in India, perhaps similar to that found in civil law 
jurisdictions, especially the French jurisprudence.78 
However, on a more ideological analysis, such postulates of 
Indian tort law seem to rest upon the values and norms that
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'a civilised society can permit'.
The court then referred to the wisdom of Fritz 
Schumacher, for a new orientation of science and technology 
towards the organic, the gentle, the non-violent, the 
elegant and beautiful.79 The reference to Schumacher was 
made in the context of the need to evolve a national policy 
to protect public interest and human rights from ultra- 
hazardous industrial activities in pursuit of economic 
gains. It is submitted that such reliance by the court on 
non-legal policy and philosophical materials gives a strong 
indication of the underlying ideology that governs the 
juridical discourse in developing Indian environmental 
jurisprudence.
On 22 December 1989, the Supreme Court of India, while 
upholding the constitutional validity of the Bhopal Gas Leak 
Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985, found that the 
victims were not given the right to be heard before the 
settlement and that this was wrong.80 However, the court 
held that justice had been done to the victims, although 
justice had not appeared to have been done. The late Chief 
Justice Mukharji had held that "to do a great right after 
all, it is permissible sometimes to do a little wrong".81 
What is quite obvious here is that the issues involved are 
so substantial, the relief needed is so immense, that new 
ways have to be found to achieve 'complete justice'.
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Thus one could see more or less total deviance from 
established canons of common law jurisprudence. It is an 
explicit situation where Indian judges have given less 
importance to rendering justice according to law but rather 
show the desire to render justice, if necessary without much 
adherence to law. In other words, the judicial process in 
this case, as in many other cases in India, displays the 
deconstruction and establishment of a new ideology of law 
and justice. It strikes at the very heart of English 
juristic technique that justice should be seen to be done. 
It openly challenges the conceptual understanding of what 
constitutes 'justice' in a particular situation such as 
this .
In a critical evaluation of the Bhopal settlement, some 
experts on Indian environmental law find that the net effect 
appears to achieve the mixed private and public goals of 
compensation, corrective justice and deterrence.82 According 
to Divan and Rosencranz, the basic analytical question is 
whether the settlement efficiently achieves the traditional 
tort goals of compensation, corrective justice and 
deterrence. Norms of efficiency dictate that the goals of 
tort law be achieved at a minimum cost to society in terms 
of expense and time.83 Thus they are of the opinion that:
"Although the Supreme Court's orders do not ascribe 
liability to Carbide, the settlement implicitly 
establishes the multinational's accountability. 
Retributive or corrective justice requires that the
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tortfeasor not benefit from his or her action or 
negligence but instead be forced to compensate the 
victim. The settlement clearly achieves this end. 
Indeed, the Bhopal settlement is the first in a mass 
tort case where a multinational has paid for the action 
of its local subsidiary. The settlement, therefore, is 
likely to strengthen the emergent norm of international 
law that transnational corporations are strictly liable 
for mishaps from hazardous activities conducted by 
their subsidiaries around the globe .... At the same 
time, by consenting to a settlement that will not 
severely deplete Carbide's assets, the Indian 
Government has signalled its willingness to permit new 
investments in hazardous industries, provided that the 
investors are willing to internalize the social costs 
resulting from their activities.
In the final analysis, the Supreme Court's 
statesmanship has secured more for the Bhopal victims 
than the Indian Government could have otherwise 
obtained, at least for the short term."84
The above insightful evaluation of Divan and Rosencranz 
shows that although there has been a total deviation from 
what might have been considered as established processual 
jurisprudence, the net result of the Bhopal case is that 
justice was achieved by adopting alternative methods. Here 
one could say that what they call 'the Supreme Court's 
statesmanship' is the manifestation of an important element
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of the new jurisprudence. In fact, it had the practical 
effect of procuring the money without much delay. 
Consequently, as a recent news report shows, the Special 
Courts set up in Bhopal have been able to dispose of three- 
fourth of claims relating to the deaths due to the 
disaster.85
When the government of India sought to bring action 
against UCC in the US courts to serve the best interest of 
the victims, it was pointed out that the public interest in 
India would not tolerate a different standard than that in 
the US where the safety system of the plant was designed.86 
The plea of the Union of India then was that the courts in 
India are not up to the task, but Justice Keenan of the US 
District Court at New York rejected that plea and held that 
the Indian courts are the most appropriate forum.87 He 
observed:
" [T] o retain the litigation in this forum, as 
plaintiffs request, would be yet another example of 
imperialism, another situation in which an established 
sovereign inflicted its rules, its standards and values 
on a developing nation. This Court declines to play 
such a role. The Union of India is a world power in 
1986, and its courts have the proven capacity to mete 
out fair and equal justice. To deprive the Indian 
judiciary of this opportunity to stand tall before the 
world and to pass judgment on behalf of its own people 
would be to revive a history of subservience and
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subjugation from which India has emerged. India and its 
people can and must vindicate their claims before the 
independent and legitimate judiciary created there 
since the Independence of 1947. "88
On 3rd October 1991, the Supreme Court wrote the 
epitaph on the Bhopal case by upholding the terms of the 
1989 settlement with its judgment on the Review Petitions.89 
The Bhopal decisions were not decided by a few radical 
judges, but had occupied the minds of four different 
Constitutional Benches with five judges. Altogether the 
hearings on all these cases had taken up 88 days, engaging 
the minds of 10 different judges.90 In upholding the 
settlement orders and earlier decisions, the court 
reiterated its earlier stand that what is required is to 
meet the demands of justice.
Justice in this particular situation primarily 
warranted the expeditious disposal of the case. To get 
involved deeper into legal niceties would only have enmeshed 
the Indian judges into a more difficult tangle within a 
legal system that is undergoing a great change. It was 
considered just in that situation to give immediate relief 
to the victims and avoid getting involved in any further 
legal exegesis. If the court had adopted any other approach, 
it would have been at the risk of ultimately ending up again 
in American courts, with their notorious 'due process' 
conceptual yardsticks, where the decrees of the Indian court
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would have to be measured for execution. It can be seen from 
the judgment that the Supreme Court was well aware of this 
problem.91
More recently, an Indian lawyer has questioned the 
correctness of the decision of the Supreme Court in the 
review petition in a reputed international law journal.92 
Sen brings out the most unusual way in which the matter was 
dealt with by the Supreme Court. He even fears that the 
court's decision to dispense with the elementary requirement 
of natural justice in this case can operate as an incentive 
to administrative and judicial indiscipline.93 However, Sen 
also notes that:
"It would, of course, be pointless to label the 
decision of a superior court as void, not because of a 
conceptual bar, but because of the absence of a 
tribunal which can censure its lapse, however obvious 
it might be, from accepted norms of judicial 
propriety. "94
Here, Sen appears to be lost since his perception does 
not seem to take account of the great changes brought about 
recently in the Indian legal system which seriously question 
what those 'accepted norms of judicial propriety' are. He 
certainly seems to be out of touch with the present 
realities when he seeks support for his proposition that the 
decision is void referring to Holdsworth's History of 
English Law and to cases on English law of contract.95
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However, one could agree to some extent with Sen that 
the manner in which the review proceedings were conducted 
left much to be desired in that "in an area of the law where 
certainty once held sway, confusion now reigns".96 But such 
confusion, it is submitted, is inevitable when great changes 
are envisaged and brought about to a legal order. The 
present situation is apparently chaotic and confuses many in 
India and abroad as to the future shape of Indian 
jurisprudence and the nature of the Indian legal system for 
the twenty first century and beyond. However, as explained 
above, the technique of the Indian Supreme Court in 
disregarding what Sen calls 'accepted norms of judicial 
propriety' aimed at safeguarding justice itself, which is 
now in Indian jurisprudence, again seen as superior to 
procedural law.
In the last judgment of the Bhopal case,97 the Supreme 
Court referred to Ratlam and used the quote that Justice 
Krishna Iyer had taken from M. Cappelletti and B. Garth's 
Access to Justice - A World Survey, (Vol I, pp.123-124), to 
describe the unsuitability of a legal system based on the 
common law tradition.
" Admirable though it may be, it is at once slow and 
costly. It is a finished product of great beauty, but 
entails an immense sacrifice of time, money and talent. 
This 'beautiful' system is frequently a luxury; it 
tends to give a high quality of justice only when, for 
one reason or another, parties can surmount the
267
substantial barriers which it erects to most people and
to many types of claims."98
Thus the Bhopal case depicts the important facet of 
procedural flexibility in Indian environmental 
jurisprudence, which could be appropriately termed as 
'justice without law'.99 This leads to a deliberate 
deviation from established legal procedures as well as the 
purposeful adoption of alternative dispute resolution 
processes into the mainstream of the Indian legal system. To 
that extent it encourages and reaffirms the usefulness of 
more flexible and convenient processes for the 
administration of justice. This, it is submitted, is again 
a characteristic feature of the Indian neo-dharmic 
j urisprudence.100
6.4 The contours of Indian environmental jurisprudence
Apart from the above three significant groups of cases that 
highlighted the emphasis of Indian environmental 
jurisprudence, there are a number of other cases which have 
reinforced this new jurisprudence. The cases discussed below 
were selected because they comment on significant aspects. 
It is not the purpose of this part of our study to give a 
complete comprehensive coverage of all the decisions. Since 
judgments of the Supreme Court have more force than those of 
the High Courts, they are discussed first.
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One of the first cases following the initiation of the 
jurisconscience in Ratlam was Rural Litigation and 
Entitlement Kendra v State of Uttar Pradesh101. In this case 
a letter which was treated as a writ petition under Article 
32 of the Constitution was initially brought before the 
Supreme Court in 1983 to abate pollution caused by limestone 
quarries in the Dehradun Valley in the Mussoorie hills of 
the Himalayas. The Supreme Court played an activist role in 
this litigation, essentially conducting a comprehensive 
environmental review and analysis of the national need for 
mining operations located in the Dehradun Valley. In 
addition, the judgment provided a scheme for an 
administrative oversight of reforestation in the region.
It is particularly interesting to note that the court 
required the state to act not only as a party to the 
litigation but as a protector of the environment in 
discharge of statutory and social obligations when it held: 
"While we reiterate our conclusion that mining in this 
area has to be stopped as far as practicable, we also 
make it clear that mining activity has to be permitted 
to the extent necessary in the interest of the defence 
of the country as also for the safeguarding of the
foreign exchange position...... The court expects the
Union of India to balance these two aspects and place 
on record its stand not as a party to the litigation 
but as a protector of the environment in discharge of 
its statutory and social obligation for the purpose of
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consideration of the court by way of assisting the 
court in disposing of the matter in issue."102
The court ordered the closing down of several mines 
based on the reports of inspecting committees appointed by 
the court and in its reasoning maintained that:
"Preservation of the environment and to keep the 
ecological balance unaffected is a task not only 
governments but every citizen must undertake. It is a 
social obligation and let us remind every citizen that 
it is his fundamental duty as enshrined in Article 
5lA(g) of the Constitution."103
The strategies adopted in this case by the court 
characterise its role not merely as an adjudicator but as an 
inquisitor and as a conciliator.104 The activist role of the 
judiciary in this case also reinforces the submission that 
the nature of modern Indian legal culture is focused on a 
search for justice, while awareness of limitations remains 
strong.
The next case that I have taken up for analysis is Shri 
Sachidanand Pandey and another v State of West Bengal.105 
This judgment of the Supreme Court brings out the 
autochthonous elements that underpin the current development 
of environmental jurisprudence in India. In this case the 
Supreme Court had to consider the environmental impact of 
the construction of a five star hotel near a wildlife park
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in Calcutta. The court found that the construction would not 
interfere with the wildlife, particularly with the flights 
of migratory birds. However the court held:
"Whenever a problem of ecology is brought before the 
Court, the Court is bound to bear in mind Art. 48-A of 
the Constitution, .... and Art. 51-A(g) which proclaims 
it to be the fundamental duty of every citizen of India 
"to protect and improve the natural environment ..." 
When the Court is called upon to give effect to the 
Directive Principle and the fundamental duty, the Court 
is not to shrug its shoulders and say that priorities 
are a matter of policy and so it is a matter for the 
policy-making authority. The least that the Court may 
do is to examine whether appropriate considerations are 
borne in mind and irrelevancies excluded .... However 
the Court will not attempt to nicely balance relevant 
considerations. When the question involves a nice 
balancing of relevant considerations, the Court may 
feel justified in resigning itself to acceptance of the 
decision of the concerned authority. "106
The judgment highlighted the risk in interfering with 
Nature beyond the degree of tolerance in a very interesting 
manner by quoting extensively at the very beginning of the 
judgment the famous words of the North American Indian Chief 
of Seattle. This quote, which has been retold and undergone 
several translations, was made around 1855 by the Indian 
Chief in reply to the then President of the U.S., Franklin
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Pierce, who wished to buy the land of the Indian tribe.107 
The Indian Supreme Court quoted this extensively, apparently 
not to lose its full effect. Some extracts of this long 
quote must suffice here to indicate the cryptic ideological 
rationale that might have enigmatically pervaded the 
juridical thinking as a relevant consideration:
"How can you buy or sell the sky, the warmth of the
land? The idea is strange to us.....We know that the
white man does not understand our ways...... His
appetite will devour the earth and leave behind only a
desert.....I do not know. Our ways are different from
your ways. The sight of your cities pains the eyes of 
the red man. But perhaps the red man is a savage and
does not understand.....This we know: the earth does
not belong to man; man belongs to the earth.....
Whatever befalls the earth befalls the sons of the 
earth. Man did not weave the web of life: he is merely 
a strand in it...... "108
Justice Chinnappa Reddy's use of this quote in a case 
which raised fundamental environmental law questions in 
India has been found interesting by some legal scholars in 
England.109 The particular use of this long quote, it is 
submitted, is a strong indication of the inarticulate 
premises of Indian juridical reasoning. Justice Chinnappa 
Reddy's use of this quote clearly conveys his desire to 
illustrate the ideology which the Indian courts have adopted 
in matters concerning the protection of the environment
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conflicting with private proprietary rights of individuals.
Sachidanand Pandey clearly brings out the current 
judicial attitude in environmental cases by highlighting the 
need to protect the environment, at the same time showing 
the need for the Indian Supreme Court to restrain itself in 
exercising judicial discretion. This can be seen in the 
observation of Justice Khalid, who stated in the same case: 
"Public interest litigation has now come to stay. But 
one is led to think that it poses a threat to Courts 
and public alike. Such cases are now filed without any 
rhyme or reason. It is, therefore, necessary to lay 
down clear guidelines and to outline the correct 
parameters for entertainment of such petitions. If 
Courts do not restrict the free flow of such cases in 
the name of Public Interest Litigations, the 
traditional litigation will suffer and the Courts of 
law, instead of dispensing justice, will have to take 
upon themselves administrative and executive 
functions. 1,110
Justice Khalid also stated that traditional litigation 
has to be tackled by other effective methods like 
decentralising the judicial system and entrusting much of 
the traditional litigation to village courts and Lok Adalats 
through a complete restructuring of the procedural law, 
which he explicitly identified as "the villain in delaying 
disposal of cases".111
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The above case also shows, contrary to general belief, 
that the Indian Supreme Court is not overzealous in its 
attitude towards environmental protection cases. There are 
several other cases where the Court has refused to interfere 
with the administration. In Dahanu Taluka Environment 
Protection Group and another v Bombay Suburban Electricity 
Supply Company Ltd. and others,112 the Supreme Court refused 
to interfere with the construction of a thermal power plant 
in Dahanu, Maharashtra. The court held that it should adopt 
a self-imposed restriction in considering such an issue. 
According to the court:
"The court's role is restricted to examine whether the 
government has taken into account all relevant aspects 
and has neither ignored nor overlooked any material 
considerations nor been influenced by extraneous or 
immaterial considerations in arriving at its final 
decision. "113
Subhash Kumar v State of Bihar114 is another important 
case in which the Supreme Court restrained itself when it 
found that a public interest litigation for preventing 
environmental degradation was being abused to satisfy a 
personal grudge. In this case the petitioner, an influential 
business man, sought directions against the West Bokaro 
Collieries and Tata Iron and Steel Company to stop their 
discharge of slurry/sludge into the river Bokaro in Bihar. 
The court found that the purpose of filing the petition was 
not to serve any public interest but rather the self­
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interest of the petitioner to collect the slurry to use it 
for his business purposes. The court held that:
"It is the duty of this Court to discourage such 
petitions and to ensure that the course of justice is 
not obstructed or polluted by unscrupulous litigants by 
invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court 
for personal matters under the garb of public interest 
litigation...115
The court held that a petition under Article 32 for the 
prevention of pollution is maintainable at the instance of 
a person or even by a group of social workers or 
journalists. But recourse to proceedings under Article 32 of 
the Constitution should be taken by a person genuinely 
interested in the protection of society on behalf of the 
community.116
In Bangalore Medical Trust v B. S. Muddappa and 
others,117 residents of a locality challenged the action of 
the Bangalore Development Authority converting an open space 
reserved for a park into a private hospital site through a 
public interest litigation. The Karnataka High Court allowed 
the petition and the Supreme Court confirmed the judgment of 
the High Court in an eruditely well-written judgment by the 
late Justice Thommen. It was held in this case that:
"The public interest in the reservation and the 
preservation of open space for parks and play grounds 
cannot be sacrificed by leasing or selling such sites
275
for private persons for conversion to some other user. 
Any such act would be contrary to the legislative
intent and inconsistent with the statutory 
requirements. Furthermore, it would be in direct
conflict with the constitutional mandate to ensure that 
any State action is inspired by the basic values of 
individual freedom and dignity and addressed to the 
attainment of a quality of life which makes the 
guaranteed rights a reality for all the citizens."118
The late Justice Thommen relied not only upon Ratlam 
but also on a variety of human rights cases under Art.21 of 
the constitution for the above proposition.119 The Supreme 
Court also found the Chief Minister of the State of
Karnataka in breach of his public trust.
Tarun Bharat Sanqh, Alwar v Union of India and
others,120 is a significant case because, while clarifying 
its earlier Order,121 the Supreme Court issued directions to 
provide adequate protection, including police protection, to 
environmental activists. While placing on record that the 
Sangh had evinced a constructive and helpful attitude, the 
court observed:
"But business and commercial interests and the 
relentless means of achieving them, being what they 
are, it is not safe to rule out any possible 
intimidatory tactics against environmentalists. They 
are perhaps the most thankless and unprotected lot. We
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should, therefore, direct the District Administration 
of Alwar to afford protection to the petitioner's 
members and workers. We look upon the authorities of 
the State Government, in particular to the Police 
Administration of the district, to ensure that none of 
the activists and workers of the petitioner are 
subjected to any intimidation and hinderance to their 
activity" .122
It is significant to note the extent to which the 
Supreme Court in recent times has encouraged environmental 
activists. They are not only tolerated but also accorded 
respect and protection by the Indian judiciary. The above 
directions of the Indian Supreme Court tend to show what one 
could call the subtle nature of the Indian legal culture, 
which is in stark contrast to the general attitude and 
tendency in many highly developed jurisdictions to use the 
police powers of the state against environmental activists. 
The judgment appears to support environmentalists and local 
activists at the grassroots level by conferring police 
protection on local activists, thereby manifesting the 
operation of the public law regime and the dynamics of the 
rule of law as understood in India. It is submitted that 
this judicial attitude clearly reveals the subtle trait of 
Indian legal culture which attributes close benignity to 
nature, so that those who genuinely seek to protect nature 
at the grassroots level are themselves entitled to 
protection.
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All the Supreme Court judgments discussed above show 
the vivid contours of Indian environmental jurisprudence, 
the scope as well as the limits of juridical rationale and 
judicial activism. A further search into the various High 
Court judgments reveals many more interesting cases and 
details which add to the profile of this jurisprudence.
Up to the mid-1980's the High Courts in India generally 
refrained from any judicial intervention for the purpose of 
environmental protection. This particular 'judicial hands 
off' aspect is best illustrated by one of the early cases 
decided in 1980 by the Kerala High Court. It was a case 
brought before the court seeking to forbid the State of 
Kerala from proceeding with the hydro-electric project at 
Silent Valley.123 In this case, the Kerala High Court 
refused to interfere with the government's policy decision. 
It would appear that much material was placed before the
court to show the national policy and the need for
environmental consideration. Yet the court held:
"We are by no means satisfied that these aspects have 
not been borne in mind by the government in planning 
and processing the project. We are also not satisfied 
that the assessment of these considerations made by the 
Government and the policy decisions taken thereafter 
are liable to be reviewed by this court in these
proceedings. 1,124
The project was, however, abandoned as a result of
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political pressure and the direct intervention of the then 
Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi.125
A quantum leap in Indian environmental jurisprudence 
was made by a judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in 
1987. Although it initially appeared as a freak judgment, T . 
Damodhar Rao v S.O. Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad,126 can 
now be considered as a significant judgment which reinforces 
the unique characteristic features of Indian environmental 
jurisprudence. Here, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh 
prohibited the government from constructing houses on a 
piece of land previously allocated for a recreational park. 
Justice Choudary gave an emphatic human rights approach to 
his exposition of the law on ecology and environment, 
referring to the Stockholm Declaration of the UN as well as 
the African Charter on Human and People's Rights.
The court produced an elaborate discussion on the law 
of ecology and environment by examining it from the 
viewpoint of Indian legal and constitutional obligations to 
preserve and protect the ecology and environment.127 The 
court delineated the Indian jurisprudence from the dictates 
of the common law doctrine of ownership which give the right 
to the owner to use and enjoy the thing he owns, and could 
extend even to consuming, destroying or alienating the 
thing.128 The court showed its aversion to the thrust of 
this concept of individual ownership which was to deny 
communal enjoyment of individual property. The court was
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categorical in asserting the Indian juridical approach to 
environmental law and stated that:
"Under the powerful impact of the nascent but the 
vigorously growing law of environment, the unbridled 
right of the owner to enjoy his piece of land granted 
under the common law doctrine of ownership is 
substantially curtailed."129
The legal ideology of protecting the environment as 
perceived by the Indian courts can be seen in the following 
observation:
"The objective of the environmental law is to preserve 
and protect the nature's gifts to man and woman such as 
air, earth and atmosphere from pollution. Environmental 
law is based on the realisation of mankind of the dire 
physical necessity to preserve these invaluable and 
none too easily replenishable gifts of mother nature to 
man and his progeny from the reckless wastage and 
rapacious appropriation that common law permits."130
Here the court relied upon Articles 48A and 5lA(g) of 
the Constitution and adopted a human rights approach to 
prevail over and above the common law right of land 
ownership. According to the court, slow poisoning by the 
polluted atmosphere amounted to violation of Article 21 of 
the Constitution. Thus:
" [I]t would be reasonable to hold that the enjoyment of 
life and its attainment and fulfilment guaranteed by
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Art. 21 of the Constitution embraces the protection and 
preservation of nature's gifts without [which] life 
cannot be enjoyed. There can be no reason why practice 
of violent extinguishment of life alone should be 
regarded as violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution. 
The slow poisoning by the polluted atmosphere caused by 
environmental pollution and spoliation should also be 
regarded as amounting to violation of Art. 21 of the 
Constitution. .... It, therefore, becomes the 
legitimate duty of the Courts as the enforcing organs 
of Constitutional objectives to forbid all action of 
the State and the citizen from upsetting the 
environmental balance."131
Thus the basic characteristic elements that underpin 
Indian environmental jurisprudence are explicitly brought 
out in the court's interpretation of environmental law in 
this case. There is not only a strong rejection of common 
law notions but also an ingestion of indigenous concepts of 
law in this area.
In L.K. Koolwal v State of Rajasthan and others,132 the 
petitioner, representing the citizens of the city of Jaipur, 
moved the Rajasthan High Court under Article 22 6 of the 
Constitution to remedy the acute sanitation problem of the 
city which led to slow poisoning, affecting the life of the 
citizens. The court entertained the writ petition directing 
the municipality to remove dirt and filth and clean the
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entire city of Jaipur, particularly the areas mentioned in 
the petition. The court also appointed a team of five 
eminent advocates of the court as commissioners to inspect 
the city with the petitioner and the Administrator of the 
municipality.133
What is very interesting in this case is the judge's 
interpretation of Article 51A of the Constitution. It is 
extremely difficult to accept the conclusion of Justice D.L. 
Mehta's discussion and discern the logic that the duties 
under Article 51A in effect confer rights on citizens. There 
is, however, a clear indication that the judge's conceptual 
understanding of 'rights' and 'duties' is not in line with 
Western conceptual understanding of law. Interestingly, the 
judge saw the change in the jurisprudence and stated that: 
"Prior to 197 6 everyone used to talk of the rights but 
none cared to think that there is a duty also. The 
right cannot exist without a duty and it is the duty of 
the citizen to see that the rights which he has 
acquired under the Constitution as a citizen are 
fulfilled. ”134
Koolwal does not appear as a well-reasoned nor a well- 
written judgment and there is a failure to note Ratlam or 
any other case.135 However, it strengthens current Indian 
judicial propensity to create innovative jurisprudence.
In Kinkri Devi and another v State of Himachal Pradesh
282
and others,136 the Himachal Pradesh High Court issued
directions for cancelling limestone mining leases as this 
industry posed dangers to the wildlife, ecology and
environment. Here the court delineated more clearly the 
rationale of Indian environmental jurisprudence and firmly 
applied the Supreme Court rulings on this matter.
"Thus there is both a constitutional pointer to the 
State and a constitutional duty of the citizens not 
only to protect but also to improve the environment and 
to preserve and safeguard the forests, the flora and 
fauna, the rivers and lakes and all the other water 
resources of the country. The neglect or failure to 
abide by the pointer or to perform the duty is nothing 
short of a betrayal of the fundamental law which the
State and, indeed, every Indian high or low, is bound
to uphold and maintain. 1,137 
The court relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court138 
and held:
"The judicial organ of the State having sounded a note 
of caution at the highest level, this Court cannot 
remain silent spectator if there is a complaint that 
the warning has fallen on deaf ears."139
The concern shown by the judiciary in environmental 
cases has, at times, resulted in prescribing remedial 
measures with such specificity that it would appear the 
courts are’ performing executive and administrative 
functions. Thus in Citizens Action Committee v Civil
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Surgeon, Mayo (General) Hospital, Nagpur and others,140 the 
Bombay High Court issued directions with great specificity, 
laid down in an Annexure to the judgment. However, the court 
also noted:
"Such directions or writ by the Courts are not issued 
to run the Government through Court. We hasten to 
dispel any such impression. These are issued so as to 
compel the statutory bodies including the State to 
stand by the citizens and to do their public duty so 
that the purposes of public laws expressly enacted are 
not frustrated. While doing so, furtherance of public 
interest is the sole touchstone. That is equally the 
central point of judicial considerations. The domain of 
jurisdiction in this regard is occupied by the 
administration of public law. That should be evident 
from directions contained in the Annexure which are 
intended to meet the grievances found to be real and 
genuine and to afford remedial measures to the citizens 
incorporated in the City of Nagpur, matters of policy 
being left to the authority concerned. "141
The courts have also assumed divergent roles for 
protecting the environment, particularly that of a 
conciliator. Thus in Janki v Sardar Nagar Municipality142 
the High Court of Gujarat persuaded a municipality to 
provide a sewerage and drainage system for the residents of 
a certain area who had approached the court as public 
interest litigants. Here the persuasive nature of the
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judgment and the participatory role played by the High Court 
is noteworthy.
More recent cases show the process of streamlining and 
regulating the use of public interest litigation cases for 
the protection of the environment. In Smt. Satyavani and 
another v A. P. Pollution Control Board and others,143 the 
Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissed a writ petition which 
sought to set aside the industrial licence granted by the 
Union of India to a modern meat processing project. The 
petitioners here sought to establish animal rights to 
protect buffaloes under Articles 48A and 5lA(g) of the 
Constitution. Dismissing the case, the court found that the 
petitioners were merely trying to vindicate sentimental 
objections through a public interest litigation for the 
protection of the environment.144 Here the court relied upon 
the Supreme Court decisions in Sachidanand Pandey145 and 
Subhash Kumar.146 It is also relevant to note here that one 
of the petitioners who made an erroneous statement in his 
affidavit was ordered by the court to be prosecuted for
147perjury.
In People United for Better Living in Calcutta - Public 
and another v State of West Bengal and others,148 the High 
Court of Calcutta ordered the State Government to stop 
reclaiming certain wetland for commercial or residential 
purposes. In this elaborate judgment, Justice Umesh Chandra 
Benerjee made a thorough survey of the impact of interfering
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with natural wetland. He found no justiciable reason to 
disagree with the opinion expressed by environmentalists 
that wetland should be preserved and no that interference or 
reclamation should be permitted.149
The observations of the court while discussing the 
meaning of 'ecology7 and 'ecological problem' seem to show 
a significant modification in the development of Indian 
environmental jurisprudence. The Court appeared to take the 
view that ecological problems and environmental degradation 
are to be seen as a special type of social problem, similar 
perhaps to alcoholism, crime, death on the road - which make 
the society better off without it.150
Still, many authorities continue to disregard 
environmnetal concerns. P.P. Vvas and others v Ghaziabad 
Pevelopment Authority, Ghaziabad and another,151 is an apt 
example where the Allahabad High Court found how the 
statutory object to secure preservation of the environment 
and development of residential colonies is defeated by 
authorities who lack dynamism, aestheticism and enthusiasm 
for development, though assigned developmental duties.152 
Here the local authority had failed to develop a public 
park, Adu Park, in the place earmarked in a master plan in 
Raj Nagar of Ghaziabad in Uttar Pradesh.
The court emphasised the importance of public parks as 
a gift of modern civilisation and a significant factor for
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the improvement of the quality of life.153 The court felt 
that the authority, having failed to develop the Adu Park as 
a park for several years, had belied all the cherished hopes 
of the State and citizens as contemplated under Article 48A 
of the Constitution.154
The court also held that the fundamental right to life 
under Article 21 of the Constitution includes the right of 
enjoyment of pollution free water and air for full enjoyment 
of life.155 The court relied upon Article 51(g) and then 
went on interestingly to interpret clause (j) of Article 51. 
It was held:
"The last clause (j) of Article 51-A of the 
Constitution further mandates that it shall be the duty 
of every citizen of India to strive towards excellence 
in all spheres of individual and collective activity, 
so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of 
endeavour and achievement. It is lamentable that the 
respondents being the State instrumentality have failed 
to discharge both the fundamental duties."156
The above judicial pronouncement explicitly seeks to 
extend the duty concept into the very way of life of every 
Indian citizen. It is submitted that the above 
interpretation of a constitutional provision, requiring 
strife towards excellence in 'all spheres of individual and 
collective activity' in order that 'the nation constantly 
rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement',
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reverberates with the cosmology of dharmic concepts, albeit 
put in modified form.
All the cases discussed above have shaped the contours 
of Indian environmental jurisprudence. As indicated at the 
beginning of this chapter, it was not the purpose of this 
part of our study to provide complete coverage of all 
decided cases. The above selection of important cases 
decided by various High Courts and the Supreme Court in 
India shows the variations and modified approaches adopted 
by different High Courts. Taken as a whole, they clearly 
manifest the Indian conceptual understanding of law 
established on the rationale and principles of public law, 
as now enforceable in a court of law in India. The next 
chapter provides my concluding analysis, summing up the 
essential features of the neo-dharmic jurisprudence that 
characterises current Indian environmental justice.
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION: THE NEO - DHARMIC INDIAN ENVIRONMENTAL
JURISPRUDENCE
This chapter brings together the characteristic features of 
Indian environmental jurisprudence and is based on the 
analysis and discussions carried out in the earlier 
chapters. This thesis has argued that Indian environmental 
jurisprudence today is mainly based on three interconnected 
elements. First, it manifests the postmodern Indian 
constitutional law rationale which now clearly accords more 
importance to public concerns rather than to protecting 
private interest. Secondly, it reflects certain traditional 
aspects of Indian legal culture through implicit and 
explicit reliance on autochthonous values based on pre­
colonial indigenous conceptions, which are clearly more 
relevant for environmental protection than much of the legal 
writing assumes. Thirdly, it bears testimony to the uniquely 
activist role of the Indian judiciary in promoting a new 
public law rationale which has also had many implications in 
fields other than environmental protection.
These jurisprudential developments were made possible, 
as this thesis has shown, because of the evolution and 
induction of a new rationale which relied upon the 
importance accorded to the aims and ideals of the 
Constitution as much as reflections of ancient Indian 
notions of law and justice. The incorporation of specific
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provisions in the Constitution by the 42nd amendment in 197 6 
has explicitly bolstered this jurisprudence and there has 
been a clear shift in the legal ideology of India within the 
last two decades. This can be seen, as our analysis in 
chapter 2 showed, particularly in the greater emphasis 
accorded to the Preamble and in understanding the purpose 
and role of the Fundamental Rights and the Directive 
Principles of State Policy under the constitution in the new 
light of 'public interests' and 'public duties'.1
India's new public law regime has been gradually 
strengthened through the cumulative effects of judicial 
interpretations which have gradually changed the meaning of 
relevant important Articles of the Constitution. This, in 
turn, led to various kinds of amended legislation, both in 
the Constitution itself during the 1970s and in the field of 
environmental laws during the 1980s. Such legislation 
differs from earlier models in that it takes the new 
rationale explicitly into account. During the 1990s the 
emphasis has, so far, been placed on the judicial refinement 
of Indian environmental jurisprudence.
Chapter 2 showed how the newly evolved strategies in 
Indian public interest litigation, unprecedented and unique 
in many respects, have apparently become a key element in 
developing the new public law regime.2 Environmental 
litigation in India today, mostly brought as public interest 
litigation, demonstrates that Indian environmental
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jurisprudence has become an integral part of the new public 
law jurisprudence. The cost-effective and speedy remedial 
process now available under SAL has enhanced the development 
of environmental jurisprudence in India. Its power and 
efficacy has been described by a well-known Indian jurist as 
giving rise to 'a jurisprudence of rancour and strictures'.3 
According to Baxi:
"The SAL discourse of strictures has assumed 
unimaginable potency; it poses a fertile threat to all 
those who would exercise power as if they were above 
the law and the Constitution."4
The development of Indian environmental jurisprudence 
within a public law regime has made the State accountable in 
all major environmental litigation. This was made possible 
because of three significant developments in the 
interpretation of the Constitution, as analysed in detail in 
chapter 2. First, the interpretation of Article 12 of the 
Constitution has brought a wide range of public entities and 
their activities within the fold of the significantly 
enlarged definition of 'the state', thus requiring many more 
institutions to comply with the new constitutional 
rationale. Secondly, the Indian judicial discourse on the 
concept of 'equality', exemplifying the inequity of treating 
unequals equally has led to the creation of the concept of 
'arbitrariness' as a litigation strategy under Article 14, 
giving ample scope for judicial scrutiny of administrative 
discretion. Thirdly, the right to a clean environment is now
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subsumed within the extended right to life under Article 21. 
This requires positive state action which is judicially 
recognisable as just, fair and reasonable.
The permeation of the public law rationale has 
gradually steered the Indian legal development away from the 
common law tradition. This change has been brought about 
through a process of modification and accommodation and is 
clearly seen in the new Indian understanding of the common 
law principle of public nuisance. I have shown in chapter 3 
how this particular branch of law, originally based on 
common law principles, has been gradually developed in India 
as an effective tool to tackle environmental issues. While 
the common law principles on public nuisance as a crime 
remain ineffective and dormant when it comes to addressing 
environmental issues in other common law jurisdictions, they 
have been judicially recast in India to suit the needs of a 
developing nation.
As discussed in chapter 3, in the Anglo-American common 
law jurisdictions, legal culture tends to operate within a 
private law rationale, with individual and proprietary 
interests clearly outweighing the public interest. The 
Indian development of public nuisance principles reveals the 
processual effects of inducting the public law rationale. It 
has become an important aspect of the development of Indian 
environmental jurisprudence.
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The modifications and the changes in line with the new 
public law regime have also been manifested in specific 
environmental statutes. The significant changes that have 
been brought about to the specific laws on pollution control 
were analysed in chapter 4 above. The amendments to the Air 
Act in 1987 and the Water Act in 1988, in line with the 
innovative provisions under the Environment Act of 1986, 
enlarged the scope of locus standi and expanded the scope of 
public participation along with greater access and freedom 
of information. Thus there is a clear permeation of the new 
public law rationale into India's regulatory framework to 
protect the environment.
The wider ramifications of the public law regime which 
has been established in India under the Constitution show 
that one cannot confine a study of Indian environmental law 
by taking into account merely the basic input of the common 
law tradition in India. It also requires understanding the 
intricacies of India's indigenous culture that have all 
along remained eclipsed at the ground level but now appear 
to constitute more visibly the underlying philosophical and 
ideological resource base for legal development.
Chapter 5 analysed in some detail how the ideology 
behind the establishment of a public law regime in India, 
particularly in the context of protecting nature and its 
resources, reflects traditional Indian legal culture in the 
new setting. The Indian conceptualisations of law and
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justice, encapsulated in the notion of an overriding order 
and its individualised manifestation in such concepts like 
dharma, have among their major attributes a legal culture 
demanding a public law regime. Based on social obligations, 
the aim is to maintain a universal order in which respect 
for nature and the close interlinking of man with cosmology 
are an integral part. It has not been the major purpose of 
this thesis to venture into a detailed study on various 
aspects of the dharmic tradition, but to analyse the current 
Indian legal developments based on the constitutional 
rationale. It is, however, important to see the operation of 
dharmic postulates in their contemporary forms within our 
current context.
The analysis of significant cases on environmental law 
in India in chapter 6 revealed the operation of various 
strategies and techniques adopted by the Indian courts. This 
chapter also depicted the inarticulated major premises of 
judicial discourse on environmental issues. The juridical 
rationale in Ratlam, the Mehta cases and the Bhopal 
decisions, all analysed in chapter 6, delineates the 
contours of Indian environmental jurisprudence. Ratlam 
conveys the duty-oriented legal approach that clearly 
reverberates with the neo-dharmic rationale. The Mehta cases 
have evolved public law principles by placing public 
interests well above private individual interests, while the 
Bhopal decisions authenticate a juridical reasoning 
emphasising expediency and efficacy. The above three
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important groups of cases depict the following elements: 
First, they manifest the deviation from established 
principles of law under the earlier legal order. Secondly, 
they reflect the urge to evolve indigenous jurisprudence. 
Thirdly, they adopt the most practical approach to solve the 
issues brought before the courts. The various other Supreme 
Court and High Court decisions also analysed in chapter 6 
illustrate and underpin the general trend of this 
jurisprudential development.
While examining India's evolving new environmental
jurisprudence, Professor Leelakrishnan and others at Cochin 
University in India have highlighted how the Indian
judiciary introduced new strategies of law.5 Similarly, 
Professor Jariwala of Banaras Hindu University has also 
shown the new direction of environmental justice in India 
through his critical appraisal of 1987 case law.6 It can be 
deduced from their discussions that, in strictly legal 
terms, Indian environmental jurisprudence is significant 
particularly in three respects.
First, there is the new dimension given to the dormant
procedural provisions on public nuisance as a crime.
Secondly, there has been a rejection of traditional common 
law doctrines of strict liability, creating instead an 
absolute liability for hazardous and inherently dangerous 
industrial activities. Thirdly, the past few years have 
witnessed the creation of what amounts to a fundamental
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human right to a clean environment guaranteed under the 
Indian Constitution. Side by side with these developments, 
two related legal technicalities of wider import have also 
been established. First, a relaxation of the rules of locus 
standi has promoted environmental justice through public 
interest litigation. Secondly, enlarging the scope for 
paying compensation under public law has enabled victims of 
environmental hazards to obtain a direct remedy through the 
writ jurisdiction of the higher courts. Thus the 
implantation and transplantation of many aspects of Western 
legal ideology has, in its operation, gradually and through 
legal osmosis, contributed to a regulatory framework which 
is more Indian in character and can therefore be called neo- 
dharmic.
The characteristic features of this postmodern Indian 
development can be summed up thus:
1. Within the secular context of modern Indian 
constitutional law, there has been a conscious move to 
create a new legal order, through a public law regime, 
focused on public rather than private interest.
2. The extended notion of the right to life under the 
Constitution, both in terms of procedural requirements 
as well as in substance, depicts a distinct cultural 
attitude towards the meaning and quality of life.
3 . The emphasis on duty, particularly the duty of 
public authorities, delineates the public law rationale 
aimed at regulating the regulator.
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4. The persuasive and pedagogic manner of Indian 
juridical discourse, rhetoric and strictures is 
directed at creating environmental consciousness 
through the internal inculcation of normative tenets 
rather than external sanctions.
5. There is a reliance upon indigenous concepts of 
nature and understanding nature as part of the 
universal order by emphasising the duty of every 
individual to be concerned about the environment.
6. There is a strong reaction, at times explicit 
aversion, against Western legal culture and dominant 
common law traditions.
7. At the same time, there is also a strong tendency to 
closely link Indian legal ideology with the current 
world ideology of a sustainable development, voiced 
around the world and in international fora, thereby 
placing the Indian legal development firmly within the 
new world order.
The above features of the Indian development cannot be 
seen as a retrogression aimed at the revival of an ancient 
legal order but as a progression from an incomplete or 
partially established modern legal order. In the development 
of this jurisprudence, many values and concepts considered 
as 'modern' are deliberately not being adopted. It is my 
argument that this does not mean a regression or a revival 
of pre-colonial ways but, rather, a progression towards a 
postmodern future. Thus this development is not aimed at
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merely 'modernising' a legal system, as it is generally 
assumed, but rather the creation of a distinctly postmodern 
legal system.
Indian environmental jurisprudence, as this thesis 
shows, manifests the characteristic features of Indian 
conceptual understanding of law encapsulated in the concept 
of dharma in modified forms. In the Indian context, this new 
postmodern legal culture could be termed as neo-dharmic. 
This neo-dharmic jurisprudence has brought about the 
establishment of a new public law regime as the apotheosis 
of the new constitutional law rationale in India. It 
permeates and directs Indian environmental jurisprudence by 
bringing in indigenous and traditional understandings of 
nature as well as developing them in line with the ideology 
of the new world order on environmental issues.
I have already pointed out that a little over three 
decades ago, Professor Julius Stone challenged Indian 
scholars to explain what precisely other countries could 
learn from her "cultural heritage".7 The result, then, was 
disappointing. This thesis shows that, in the meantime, new 
developments in Indian law have spoken for themselves, and 
that Indian judges, in particular, have taken up the 
challenge. It remains, however, true to say that very few 
scholars on Indian legal studies today appear to have taken 
up this challenge, nor have any substantial contributions 
been made to build upon the work of Professor Derrett.
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As pointed out in chapter 5 above, about two decades 
ago, in his doctoral dissertation on the juristic techniques 
of the Indian Supreme Court, Rajeev Dhavan showed that a 
distinct Indian jurisprudential approach does in fact exist, 
particularly on Indian concepts of property, and based on 
premises different from those of the Western concept of 
property.8 But there were no open manifestations of dharmic 
concepts at that time; they remained eclipsed by India's 
inherited legal framework and the attempts to modernise the 
legal system. Thus, in his conclusion, Dhavan showed that 
the courts of the 1960s and the 1970s had taken up
theoretical assumptions of a 'cosmopolitan jurisprudence'
with regard to the nature of the individual and the State,
and then arbitrated mechanically between their conflicting 
claims.9
In other words, Dhavan seems to have said that Indian 
judges were all along aware that theory and practice were at 
odds and incompatible in that particular area of law.
However, Dhavan was able to perceive then that in many less 
controversial areas, other than on property rights and 
preventive detention, this theoretical assumption breaks 
down. He stated:
"In all these cases the Court seems to have relied on 
native instincts and needs even though it had tried to 
preserve its tone of cosmopolitan objectivity. Thus we 
can see that although traditional factors have operated 
through an undeclared but clearly identifiable instinct
308
for traditional matters, in the main the Court has 
thought of its function as not lagging behind the 
principles of cosmopolitan jurisprudence."10
That was nearly two decades ago. What was not clear 
then has now become more visible, particularly for rendering 
environmental justice, thereby manifesting what we have 
called neo-dharmic jurisprudence. It is significant that 
recent discussions on their relevance for current Indian 
legal study are now rapidly getting under way.11
Indian environmental jurisprudence, as any other newly 
evolved branch in Indian law, cannot be studied in 
isolation. Apart from its linkages with cultural elements, 
it is closely connected with social, economic and political 
realities. I therefore attempt a very brief examination here 
of the current Indian economic and political ideology 
towards environmental protection.
Developing countries like India are now under 
tremendous pressure to achieve economic growth. This would 
mean they could follow the same roads through which the 
developed countries of the West have reached their present 
state of economic development, with all the environmental 
side-effects and other implications like social, cultural 
and moral disintegration. At the same time, in the wake of 
the new thinking on environment and development, it would be 
quite irrational that the countries of the South should
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blindly adopt the same pattern of development shown by the 
industrialised North. This necessarily calls forth different 
ideologies and legal approaches towards sustainable 
development as an inevitable option for them to adopt.12
By 1985, the Approach Paper to the Seventh Five-Year 
Plan of the Indian government had brought out relevant 
concerns at the policy making level.13 It showed how the 
national plan in India appeared to have endorsed the concept 
of sustainable development as its ideological basis.14 The 
Indian Planning Commission reiterated the fact that the 
problems encountered in the field of environment in India 
arise not only due to conditions of poverty and 
underdevelopment but also due to the negative effects of 
development programmes which have been badly planned or 
badly implemented.15
The question as to what constitutes development is most 
relevant in this context. Current Indian views appear to be 
against the ideology of the dominant pattern of development 
based on a linear theory of progress.16 Two well-known 
Indian environmentalists have argued that this ideology 
derives its driving force from a vision of historical 
evolution created in eighteenth and nineteenth century 
Western Europe and universalised throughout the world, 
especially in the post-war decades.17 The linearity of 
history, pre-supposed in the theory of progress, created an 
ideology of development that equated development with
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economic growth, economic growth with the expansion of the 
market economy, modernity with consumerism, and non-market 
economies with backwardness.
The Eighth Five-Year Plan which has been put into 
operation from April 1992, shows an approach of deregulation 
in the context of a series of economic reforms initiated by 
the present Indian government opening up the Indian 
economy.18 One can also see in this context the changes 
brought about in the politico-legal framework with the 
decentralisation of power through the Constitution (73rd 
Amendment) Act of 1993 and Constitution (74th Amendment) Act 
of 1993.19 These amendments have now endowed upon the 
panchayats or local governments, the power and 
responsibility to prepare plans for economic development and 
social justice and the implementation of schemes entrusted 
to them. In the present Indian scenario, more effective 
decentralisation of the polity is seen as the only solution 
to protect the local environment of the common man.20 The 
current ideological changes and the present trend towards a 
decentralised Indian polity, slowly establishing a panchayat 
raj, is a bold and welcome step. One can see that it fits in 
with and reinforces developments in Indian environmental 
jurisprudence based on the constitutional rationale and 
indigenous conceptual understanding of law and justice.
The concluding analysis of Indian environmental 
jurisprudence conveys two significant messages. First, in
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the current socio-political scene in India, the need of the 
hour is to require that all private activities and entities 
are made accountable to public life.21 The approach and 
rationale adopted so far in Indian environmental 
jurisprudence, thus, helps future development particularly 
to guide and direct the efficient use of judicial and 
administrative discretion for the protection of the 
environment. Secondly, Indian environmental jurisprudence, 
based on the public law rationale and autochthonous notions 
of law and nature, proceeds closely in line with the legal 
ideologies which are now frequently voiced in international 
fora.
This thesis could not include within its ambit a 
detailed examination of the links between the Indian 
development of environmental jurisprudence and international 
initiatives for sustainable legal principles. However, the 
Indian legal experience strongly favours the creation of a 
fundamental human right for a clean environment as a vital 
requirement for any sustainable legal principles to be 
adopted around the world.
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